It has long been obvious that the very top people in New Delhi have been living in a make-believe world in regard to the amount of military aid that they could expect from America and Britain. It would appear that the psychological balance which was rudely shaken by the Chinese aggression last autumn is taking a long time to restore itself. Whatever the expectations that might have been aroused by the men of the new frontier, the position of Whitehall has been fairly clear on almost all aspects of the Chinese threat. One has to “discover” motives like trade with China or the desire to avoid trouble in Hong Kong only if one has not paid any attention to Britain’s policy towards both China and India.
It is not necessary to go into the details of Britain’s China policy. A recital of some of the outstanding features would suffice. Unlike America, Britain recognised the Communist regime in Peking soon after it was established. If the diplomatic relations were not normalised for years, the difficulty arose from the Chinese side. Notwithstanding its involvement in the Korean war, the British Government worked in the closest possible collaboration with India to end that war. It is true that under American pressure the Attlee Government raised the defence budget thrice in six months to the truly fantastic figure of £4,700 million but this proved to be only a panic measure. The resulting economic dislocation forced the Labour Government to order fresh polls and it was defeated. Twelve years later, the party has still not lived down the consequences of that defence budget.
Background
Ever since, the British Government has not shown much appetite for direct or indirect involvement with China. Britain’s continued presence in the Indian Ocean and the long and determined struggle against the local communists in Malaya do not invalidate this appraisal. More pertinent is the fact that in the Indo-China war, where the Chinese participation was more or less direct, the British Government exercised a moderating influence on Washington. Not that Washington was spoiling for a fight, but sometimes it is necessary for the American administration to show public opinion at home that it has been restrained by so faithful an ally as Britain. This overall British policy made possible Britain’s co-operation with India at the Geneva conference in 1954.
Britain’s participation in SEATO under American pressure did not mean the abandonment of the policy of avoiding as far as possible a direct confrontation with China. The British Government was not happy with this development just as earlier it did not approve of either the ANZUS pact among America, Australia and New Zealand or the US-Pakistan mutual defence pact. Moreover, it did not exercise any pressure on India to join SEATO and the Indian policy of non-alignment remained quite acceptable to it. It was only at the time of the Suez crisis that Indo-British misunderstanding began. British spokesmen have since found it convenient to criticise the policy of non-alignment and India’s China policy, but primarily they were concerned with the preservation of their own interests first in the Middle East and later in Africa. They berated New Delhi not because it was non-aligned or “soft” towards China, but because it was proving inconvenient in areas of special British interest.
These historical facts are a reminder that the British Government has never been very anxious to organise or participate in an anti-China crusade. The relevance or irrelevance of such a crusade is a different matter. In point of fact the British Government has followed the same policy of stabilising the status quo in Central Europe. The policy of the status quo might be said to derive from the threat of a nuclear holocaust but it cannot be denied that that has all along been the British policy.
In the context of the Sino-Indian conflict this means quite clearly that the British Government would have in fact welcomed a settlement if Peking had accepted, as it indicated it would, the McMahon Line in the North-East in return for control over the Aksaichin plateau. Whether we like it or not, the British experts neither accept India’s claims to Aksaichin as foolproof nor regard the area as worth fighting for. The McMahon Line is a different matter.
It is well known that the British experts were quite sceptical about the policy of establishing forward posts in Ladakh. When the Chinese first crossed the McMahon Line last September, The Times for instance said that it was “evidently in retaliation to India’s moves in the Ladakh area earlier in the summer”. This was not a case of an aberration on the part of The Times editorial writer as some of our officials in India House appeared to think. It was a statement of the consensus of expert opinion here. Those who still doubt that it was so would do well to remind themselves that to date the British Government has not officially made a reference to India’s Ladakh frontier. Its statement of October 22 last mentioned only the McMahon Line. Even in private discussions British officials adhere to this point of view.
Solid Wall
This point is important because even at the height of the Sino-Indian crisis last autumn most experts here did not wholly depart from their view that the Chinese were seeking to achieve the limited objective of forcing India to recognise their occupation of the Aksaichin plateau. Anyone who tried to explain why India could not recognise the Chinese claim to the plateau came against a wall of incomprehension. The argument invariably was that the Chinese needed that area because of the Sinkiang-Tibet road and that it was of no use to India.
These experts might have wavered when the Chinese armies stood poised to move into the Brahmaputra valley and threatened sizable British investment in tea and oil in Assam. But they won the argument once the Chinese announced the cease-fire and started withdrawing to the McMahon Line. As a natural corollary, the view came to prevail that the Chinese would not invade NEFA again unless the Indians invited retaliation by trying to disturb the status quo in Ladakh, Consequently the question of military aid moved from the field of India’s defence requirements to that of political considerations which have a logic of their own.
One immediate consequence was the attempt to force India to make concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir. This problem has been discussed at length. What probably deserves particular attention is the British anxiety to preserve their position in India. From their point of view, it would indeed be ironical if one result of the Chinese aggressiveness is to increase American influence at the cost of their own. If a programme of large-scale military build-up is to go through in India, it must inevitably mean the introduction of American arms on a massive scale. This would mean not only the loss of the Indian market for British arms manufacturers, but also greater American political influence.
So far India’s continued dependence on British arms has been an important factor in helping to maintain British influence in our country. As long as Mr Krishna Menon showed preference for British manufacturers, signed contracts for the production under licence of British planes and excluded well known American firms competing for the same contracts, he was quite acceptable here. The picture changed when he negotiated the deal for the manufacture of Soviet MIGs in India. From the British view-point, American Star Fighters would be even worse if they were delivered free to India.
Inference
The obvious inference is that the British Government would welcome India’s return to the earlier posture. Since it cannot ensure such a performance by New Delhi, it faces a dilemma. The withholding of military aid would make sense only if the Americans also go along. If they do not, the policy of withholding military assistance would only hasten the dreaded prospect of loss of influence. In this situation, Pakistan’s outcry against India suits Britain as much as it does China. This interplay of rival forces and interests could continue for a long time. The stakes are high and no one can afford to act in a huff.
This is not to paint the familiar picture of Britain as the perfidious Albion. They are justified in trying to defend their interests as they see them. Also, they are genuinely convinced that it is beyond India’s capacity to bear the burden of economic expansion and rearmament simultaneously. They fear that the pursuit of such a policy will result in an indefinite postponement of the day when the Indian economy can become self-sustaining. Already it is believed that India would require economic assistance at the present level for the next 15 years or more.
Britain’s own experience is that once a country is caught up in a programme of rearmament, there is no opting out of it. If a programme of military assistance is undertaken on a big scale once, it would become self-perpetuating because even the replacements would have to be supplied if the Indian forces are not to be found ill-equipped once again. On balance, it appears that New Delhi will have to make do with much smaller aid than it seeks.
The Times of India, 1 June 1963