Peace and prosperity are not slogans whose popularity is limited to the Christmas season. As in most countries these slogans can be an electoral asset in Britain. The Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr R. A. Butler, know it only too well and are naturally anxious to carry conviction with the electorate. It does not matter much if in the effort to emerge as the champions of world peace they have fallen out of step with some of their principal NATO allies. After all the alliance is plagued with differences and has no coherent policy towards the Soviet Union.
As long as President Kennedy was alive and was engaged in a regular private exchange with Mr Khrushchev there was little scope for a British initiative. In the shadow of President Kennedy’s assassination and worldwide concern over its possible consequences to prospects of a detente between the western and Soviet blocs, the British Government was able to move forward with encouragement from Moscow. On December 4, Mr Butler sent an oral message through the Soviet Ambassador to Mr Gromyko that he would like to meet him in Geneva. No date has been fixed for the meeting but it is virtually certain that it will take place in the not too distant future.
Defence Costs
Apart from electoral considerations, the British Government is impelled to explore all possible avenues of improving relations with Russia by the compulsion of keeping defence expenditure within reasonable bounds. The current year’s defence budget is £1838 million compared with £1721 million last year. It is virtually certain the figure will increase to around £2,000 million next year. The cost of research and production has been rising steadily and all the services are now entering a period in which they will need new weapons. On this question of keeping down defence costs there is complete agreement between the Government and the Opposition. In fact there is a consensus here that the Soviet Government is no longer pursuing and is unlikely to pursue in future an expansionist policy.
On the face of it this policy of conciliation may not appear compatible with the Government’s determination to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. The maintenance of the deterrent has all along been justified exclusively in terms of the Soviet threat. On that score it has been vulnerable to familiar criticism from the American administration abroad and the Labour party at home. Briefly, the criticism has been that as it is the British Vulcan and Victor bomber force can only be a first strike weapon which means that at best it can be used as an offensive weapon in a preventive attack. In a few years, as Soviet air defence improves, it will become obsolete. Also, by maintaining the deterrent, Britain has encouraged nuclear ambitions in France and thus helped undermine the unity of the western alliance. Though it is never admitted, it is likely in fact that British planners have had another objective also in mind.
As far as I am aware this other aspect of the issue has been publicly stated for the first time in recent years in an article by Paul Johnson in The New Statesman last week. As the title of the article, “Will Wilson Keep The Bomb?” suggests, Johnson discusses the issue in the context of a Labour victory which only adds to its significance. Johnson opens his case for the maintenance of the deterrent with the statement that the health of the British economy is linked with the health of sterling. According to him “if we fail to maintain the international standing of sterling, all our socialist hopes, at home and abroad, will be drowned in a raging torrent of inflation”.
Sterling Area
Further the sterling area is perilously dependent on the Persian Gulf and Malaysia whose primary products – oil, rubber and tin – make a decisive contribution to the stability of sterling. “By one means or another, and until our economy recovers a dynamism it has lost since the 1880s, these areas must be kept within the sterling system”. He tries to draw the conclusion that British military presence in the Middle East is a matter of vital necessity. He reinforces the policy of military protection for the rich and backward sheikhs with references to the present confusion in the Arab world and the need for the gradual development of the rule of law in the sheikhdoms. In the case of Malaysia, the issue, according to him, is even clearer because there a British military presence is Malaysia’s only protection against the “totalitarian, imperialist powers of China and Indonesia.”
Now comes the crunch. Johnson argues that the military commitments in both these theatres cannot be fulfilled without nuclear weapons. The British conventional forces available in the two theatres are severely limited and unlikely to increase. They face potential opponents who are now equipped with a frightening panoply of modern weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in both areas and to withdraw them is to accept the inevitability of liquidating British responsibilities and thus winding up the sterling area. Further, it can be argued that the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons is unrealistic and that the strategic deterrent is a help in maintaining British influence in NATO and a measure of independence of the United States.
A whole series of complex issues are involved in Johnson’s arguments. It has been argued here that the policy of maintaining the strength of sterling, dictated by the needs of the financiers in the City, has hampered economic growth. The Economist for instance last summer campaigned for a fluctuating rate of conversion. In a series of articles in The Spectator, Davenport has blamed economic stagnation on the obsession with a strong sterling. Similarly many influential persons believe that in view of the world surplus of oil the continuing flow of oil from the Gulf is not dependent on the Aden base. There are others who have argued that British investments abroad yield smaller dividends than foreign investments in Britain and as such have not contributed to Britain’s economic health. For a layman it is virtually impossible to pronounce on which side the weight of argument lies. Two points are notable. First, Britain’s essential interests lie outside Europe and a detente with Russia in Europe is necessary for her. Secondly, the policy of seeking a detente with Russia is by no means incompatible with the maintenance of the deterrent and vice versa.
Dilemma
The British Government has found it difficult to reconcile its commitments in Europe and east of Suez because of limited resources. The “Europeans” at home and the Allies pressed it to honour its agreement to raise the strength of its forces in Europe from 52,000 now to 55,000 and to make up the deficiencies in its equipment. At one stage the American administration was even insisting that the reliance of the force on tactical nuclear weapons be given up which meant its re-training and the supply of much more sophisticated conventional weapons. Thanks to a fresh assessment of Russian strength the pressure has weakened. In fact it is felt that there may be scope for selective cuts even in the conventional forces in Europe. Incidentally there are reports that Russian troops have been pulling out of Hungary.
The British Government continues to protest that it is vitally interested in promoting the political unity of western Europe though it admits that it is not possible at this stage to renew its attempt to join the European Economic Community. These protestations must be treated with caution because they do not seem to accord with the overall trends in foreign and defence policy. If there was any significance in Mr Butler’s references at the NATO Ministerial Council’s meeting last Monday to the distinct possibility of China exploding a nuclear device within a year or two and developing a delivery system around 1970, it was that in the British view the world scene no longer conforms to the so-called cast-west division. The Defence Minister, Mr Peter Thorneycroft’s proposal that instead of the American sponsored multilateral naval force, the European allies should use the British TSR-2 as the basis of a multilateral tactical strike force need not cancel this assessment. For all we know the proposal might have been part of Britain’s effort to block the American proposal. All in all, it seems to be a reasonable view that British policy is tending to slip back to the old and familiar moorings, pre-common market.
The Times of India, 21 December 1963