North Viet Nam and the South Viet Nam Liberation Front have won a spectacular initial propaganda victory. At one blow they have destroyed much of the credibility of US claims regarding the progress of the war and the pacification programme. Contrary to the more optimistic American accounts the Viet Cong has shown that it is in good fighting shape and can strike at will wherever and whenever it chooses. How long it can sustain the spring offensive is a different matter. But after the events of the last fortnight it will be a long time before the Johnson Administration can convince public opinion in the United States and abroad that the war can be won.
Heavy Odds
The cost apart the propaganda victory is important for the North Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front. It will boost the morale of the people, the party cadres and the troops in the face of extremely heavy odds. It will keep the Saigon Government off balance and spread confusion in its ranks. Above all, it will help to convince the American people that the US cannot win whatever the sacrifice they may be prepared to put up with. The veterans of the anti-French struggle in the ‘forties and early ‘fifties cannot but recall that freedom was won as much on the battlefields of Viet Nam as in the meeting halls and newspaper offices of Paris.
The spread of the peace movement among the American youth, the division in the ruling Democratic Party, the well-publicised attempts to escape conscription and the popular revulsion against acts of brutality against suspected Viet Cong cadres will confirm Hanoi and the NLF in their belief that they can influence the outcome of the debate in the United States in their favour. There can be no doubt that the surprise attacks on the cities throughout South Viet Nam and the siege of the American marine base at Khe Sanh have been partly designed to destroy the credibility of President Johnson’s policy in the United States and thus create the impression that the choice is between continuous escalation leading to the use of tactical nuclear weapons and possibly involvement with China and a negotiated withdrawal. If the American people indeed come to accept that – that is the stark choice – the chances are that the advocates of disengagement would win in the long run because even the most hawkish of the hawks wince at the thought of uncontrolled escalation and the possibility of Chinese intervention.
The siege of Khe Sanh has revived memories of Dienbienphu and led to the conclusion that now as then Gen Giap is looking for a decisive military victory which would strengthen Hanoi and the NLF’s bargaining position for subsequent talks with Washington and Saigon. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Mr. Trinh’s renewed offer of negotiation in the midst of the unprecedented Viet Cong offensive and the consequent carnage strengthens this impression.
But if the theory that the current campaign is part of the continuing peace offensive is even partially correct, Gen Giap would not press the attack on Khe Sanh. He would know that the destruction of the base would not break America’s will to carry on the fight as Dienbienphu did in the case of France. Instead it would unite the American people behind President Johnson and stiffen their determination to win.
It is most unlikely that President Johnson will accept Mr. Trinh’s offer of negotiations not only because Hanoi has not accepted his conditions but also because he cannot afford to take the risk of further undermining the already precarious position of the Saigon Government and of creating the impression that he is looking for a face-saving formula. Any attempt on Gen. Giap’s part to repeat Dienbienphu at Khe Sanh will destroy whatever little chance there may still be for negotiations.
Guerilla Tactics
The comparison between the present offensive and that of 1954 has been overdrawn. It is not just a question of the difference between American determination and resources and French lack of will and resources. The difference in the Viet Minh tactics then and the NLF tactics now is equally striking. Neither in 1954 nor later did the Vietnamese launch an attack on the cities as they have done in the present case. This goes against the Maoist-Giapist concept of guerilla warfare. Both of them have repeatedly emphasised that no attempt should be made to take over the cities unless the hold on the neighbouring countryside has been fully consolidated. The attack on the cities is allowed only in the final stage of a victorious struggle. The Viet Cong themselves did not attempt to take over the cities even when after the assassination of President Diem there was hardly any government in South Viet Nam for months. Why have they then acted in the present fashion this time?
This is a crucial issue. The propaganda advantage can at best provide only part of the answer. Perhaps it is even more relevant that hundreds of documents seized from Viet Cong hideouts in recent months by US and South Vietnamese forces show that the NLF leadership has been promising the rank and file peace through the formation of a coalition government in Saigon after the final “sprint” this spring. The guerilla units possibly descended on the cities to make the last effort before the struggle was crowned with success through a general uprising.
The expectation of a general uprising has featured prominently in the NLF’s propaganda ever since it was formed in 1961. Up to 1963 it tended to play down the importance of armed struggle because its leaders expected that the political struggle would lead to a general uprising which in turn would result in the overthrow of the “Diem-US clique.” This is impressive evidence to suggest that the myth of the general uprising has survived in the NLF internal party propaganda even though the massive American intervention and the introduction of North Vietnamese political cadres and troops have transformed the nature of the conflict.
But it is one thing for the rank and file to believe in the possibility of a general uprising; it is quite another if the leadership comes to the conclusion that the objective situation is ripe for giving the call. The NLF gave the call for a general uprising when it began the spring offensive. But did the leadership really believe that the South Vietnamese people would respond to its appeal? If it did, it has been guilty of the worst miscalculation and of unnecessarily sacrificing the lives of thousands of its best men. The US figure of over 30,000 Viet Cong guerillas killed in the last fortnight may be an exaggeration but there is every reason to believe that the losses have been enormous. If the leadership did not believe that a general uprising would materialise as is most likely, why did it order the offensive?
Power Balance
On the basis of such evidence as is available Mr. Joseph Alsop has concluded that Gen Giap did not expect a general uprising and that his objective was to establish full Viet Cong control in one or more areas. Why then the concerted attack on cities all over South Viet Nam? All in all, even intelligent speculation on Hanoi’s and the NLF’s calculations and motives appears premature at this stage. The prospects of early negotiations between Washington and Hanoi were not particularly bright before the spring offensive. These have receded further still. In realistic terms the US troops are there in South Viet Nam to stay unless they can be pushed out. Rightly or wrongly American policy-makers have come to the conclusion that the maintenance of a power balance in Asia requires their military presence in South Viet Nam. This may be a rationalisation but it is undeniable that a withdrawal from there would necessitate an agonising reappraisal of US foreign aid defence policies and the acceptance of loss of influence in South and South-East Asia.
Peking thinks in this larger context and urges Hanoi and the NLF to think and plan in terms of the struggle lasting a hundred years and longer. The Soviet Government has greatly stepped up its defence aid to North Viet Nam – US sources place it at $ one billion in 1967 – in the expectation that it can thus acquire sufficient influence in Hanoi to be able to persuade it to de-escalate the conflict in the South. It is doubtful if an American defeat and the consequent upheaval and increase in Chinese influence in the region would suit the Soviet Union’s long-term interests. Mr. Trinh’s statements are open to diverse and contradictory interpretations. But there is no suggestion that Hanoi is prepared to postpone indefinitely its plan to unite the two Viet Nams. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight does not look like being the year of peace in Viet Nam.
The Times of India, 14 February 1968