The world has changed greatly since the United States decided to intervene in Viet Nam in the ‘fifties first through the French and then directly. These changes have been so dramatic indeed that the Johnson Administration has been finding it extremely difficult to convince educated opinion either at home or abroad that the war has any relation now to the original American policy of containing communism.
It is not necessary to raise here the question whether the original US policy of containing communism was itself well-conceived. The point is that in the early ‘fifties America, indeed the whole Western world was, by and large, convinced that the communist movement was monolithic, that it was directed from Moscow, that it had no place for any kind of national aspirations or identity, that even so large a country as China with so long and proud a tradition of a unique civilisation was for all practical purposes a Soviet satellite and that the object of the Soviet policy was nothing short of world domination. In this context Washington came to regard the struggle for independence in Viet Nam under the leadership of Dr Ho Chi Minh as part of a world-wide communist conspiracy to seize power.
Aid to France
Viet Nam thus became the first case in which the United States violated its own cherished tradition of anti-colonialism and supported the French in their effort to re-establish the colonial rule. The American aid to France on this account totalled $ two billion on Washington’s own admission. The United States did not waver in its policy of limiting the Viet Minh influence in Viet Nam even when France gave up the struggle as hopeless. It clearly was not interested in the success of the Geneva conference in 1954. Subsequently it extended whole-hearted support to the late Mr Diem to consolidate his power and encouraged him to ignore the Geneva agreement’s stipulation in favour of elections to re-unite the country in 1956. Gen. Gavin has now disclosed that at one stage even a plan was drawn up for the invasion of North Viet Nam. Whether free elections would have been allowed in North Viet Nam is another matter which does not concern us in the present context.
However abhorrent the American actions from the point of view of Asian nationalism with its emphasis on the right of Asian communities to manage their own affairs free from Western interference, these could be justified in the context of the struggle against monolithic communism. The question could be posed, as Mr. Nehru did persistently, whether the fight for democracy against communism in South and South-East Aria could not be won more effectively by coming to terms with the forces of nationalism and change and whether the US policy of aligning itself with non-representative regimes would not in the long run be self-defeating. But that American policy had a rationale could not be denied. At least not many questioned the assumptions behind it in the Western world.
But it is almost a decade now that it has become increasingly obvious that the communist movement is not monolithic, that it is in fact deeply fissured, that nationalism has reasserted itself specially in the case of China and that the talk of communist world domination is meaningless prattle. Mr. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959 and his refusal to endorse Chinese moves regarding Quernoy and Matsu left little ground for doubt that the two communist giants were pursuing divergent policies and objectives. The issue was finally settled towards the end of 1962 when the Chinese attack on India and its denunciation of Soviet retreat on Cuba on the one hand and Moscow’s refusal to endorse Peking’s claims against India on the other confirmed that the Sino-Soviet differences were so basic in terms of both ideology and national interests that they could not be reconciled.
In concrete terms it became possible for the United States after 1962 if not earlier to separate the problems of dealing with the Soviet Union and China. It has recognised this possibility and acted accordingly. It has pursued the policy of detente with Russia and accorded priority to the problem of dealing with China in the allocation of military and other resources. The centre of US military power has consequently shifted from Europe to Asia and America now pursues a strategy which is China-facing and Hawaii-centred instead of the earlier one which was Russia-facing and NATO centred.
Soviet Policy
The steady deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations since 1962 should have persuaded American policy-makers to recognise that the antagonism between Moscow and Peking was far deeper than even the one between Washington and Peking and that it should therefore be possible to secure Russia’s co-operation in the task of discouraging Chinese expansionism. The Soviet policy of extending economic and military assistance to India to help it to stand up to China should have served as an illustration. Washington should have at least tried to explore whether it was possible to come to terms with basically anti-Chinese Vietnamese nationalism and encourage it so that it could serve as a barrier to Chinese ambitions in the region.
It is difficult to believe that the US Government did not seriously consider the two possibilities. The one reason that could have conclusively persuaded it to turn its back on them was the weakness of the regime in Saigon. It is in any case now only a matter of speculation whether the acceptance by the United States of President de Gaulle’s proposal for the neutralisation of South Viet Nam could have provided a basis for Russo-American co-operation in ensuring South-East Asia’s security and freedom and for coming to terms with North Vietnamese national aspirations.
In recent years Washington has justified its ever growing commitments in Viet Nam in terms of solemn pledges and treaty obligations. Americans are a sentimental people and it is possible that their statements have reflected their thinking processes. There can also be no question that the hangover of the cold war continues to influence American thinking and policies and that the personalities of the principal policy-makers like President Johnson and Mr. Dean Rusk have been important factors. The memory of the thirties apparently continues to haunt Mr. Rusk.
Greek Analogy
US spokesmen also make the point that what they are trying to do in Viet Nam is to demonstrate that the so-called wars of national liberation will not be allowed to succeed. Their contention is that if this point is effectively established in Viet Nam the communists will not take to guerilla warfare in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, North-East India and elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Probably American policy-makers have the analogy of Greece in view.
But it is clear that the United States has chosen the worst possible place for demonstrating its determination to protect legally constituted governments against attempts at subversion, and that the cost may be disproportionate to the objective in view. There is also considerable force in the critics’ view that even if a military stalemate can be achieved in South Viet Nam there is no reason why China should not promote insurrection in Burma, Laos and North- East India, or wherever else the local conditions are favourable. In fact the deeper the American commitment and more disillusioning the American experience in Viet Nam the smaller would be its capacity and willingness to come to the aid of other countries.
Last October Mr. Dean Rusk said at a press conference that the real problem was not North Viet Nam or Viet Cong but the threat posed by “one billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons.” The sentence was buried under a mass of verbiage and the US Secretary of State did not elaborate it then or subsequently. But the implication is obvious. On the basis of experience in Europe the Johnson Administration has convinced itself that its military presence on the Asian mainland is necessary to offset China’s growing nuclear and conventional power.
This point continues to command a great deal of sympathy in South-East Asia. That is the main reason why there is hardly any criticism of America’s Viet Nam policy in some countries of the region. Even after the latest exposure of the weaknesses of American policy not a single South-East Asian non-communist leader has unequivocally asked President Johnson to open negotiations with Hanoi and begin the process of de-escalation which can lead to the withdrawal of US forces from South Viet Nam.
China’s Menace
It can be argued that American military presence in the region will not be terminated if President Johnson decides to cut his losses in Viet Nam. The Seventh Fleet and the island bases will remain. But as Coral Bell of the London School of Economics has pointed out in a recent paper published by the Institute of Strategic Studies: “No one has ever produced a convincing demonstration – or even a convincing theory – of precisely how influence may be wielded over the sort of small-scale actions which actually change the pattern of power in Asia by lurking near the coast in the Seventh Fleet or equipping the island chain with Minuteman missiles.”
But even if one accepts the American assessment of likely developments it is difficult to see how South Viet Nam can serve as the redoubt from where America can help other countries in the region to resist Chinese encroachments. Also no possible Asian alliance system can hope to balance China’s growing newer in the foreseeable future. China may thus emerge as the preponderant Asian power irrespective of the unfavourable factors like the turmoil at home and it may do so without having to risk a direct confrontation with the United States. This possibility deserves far greater attention than it has received so far.
The Times of India, 21 February 1968