Rumania’s dramatic withdrawal from the recent meeting at Budapest cannot but strengthen the impression that the Soviet Union intends to utilise the proposed world communist conference in November-December in Moscow to reassert its leadership of the movement and to put China beyond the pale. This is however too simplistic a view of the compulsions behind the Soviet move and should not therefore be accepted at its face value.
There is an element of mystery about the Rumanian decision to participate in the Budapest conference as well as its almost theatrical performance there. The leaders in Bucharest could not have been so naive as to think that the issue whether the world communist conference should be held was still open or that they could block the move after more than 60 other parties had extended their support to the Soviet Union. Why then did they agree to go to Budapest? One possible explanation is that since Rumania has in recent years cast itself in the role of a brave little David engaged in a heroic struggle against the Soviet Goliath it finds it necessary to go on playing this role. Another possible explanation is that the Rumanians were provoked by the Soviet delegation’s ham-handed tactics at Budapest.
Leader
Mr Brezhnev said on the eve of the Budapest meeting that the Soviet Union had no desire to claim to be the undisputed leader of the world communist movement and to re-establish its centre in Moscow. This statement as well as the editorials and articles in the Soviet press to the same effect have generally been interpreted as gestures to the Rumanian, Italian and other parties which were reluctant to join the conference because they saw in it a threat to their independence. This interpretation is valid to the extent that Russia’s past record has been so bad that it has to keep reassuring friends and foes alike that it has changed. In fact Mr Brezhnev’s statement represents the Soviet assessment that it is antediluvian for Moscow to think in terms of the leadership of the communist movement except in the sense that common interests continue to provide the basis of a measure of cooperation on specific issues from time to time.
Any doubt on this score can easily be removed by even a cursory reference to Moscow’s position in the ideological dispute with Peking. The Soviet Union began to show signs of its reluctance to maintain its claims to the leadership of the communist movement even before Mr Khrushchev’s denigration of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. At the Moscow conference in 1957 it was Mao Tse-tung who spoke of the East wind prevailing over the West wind and insisted that Russia remain the leader on the ground that it had sent two sputniks into outer space whereas China did not possess even one-quarter of a sputnik.
As is well known the compromise of 1957 failed to resolve the ideological and other policy disputes between Russia and China and representatives of 81 parties met again in Moscow in 1960. At this conference the Soviet Union specifically abandoned its claims to a “leading role” in the communist movement. Since then the Soviet leaders have repeatedly called for an ideological truce with China. Particularly since Mr Khrushchev’s overthrow in 1964, the Kremlin has been more interested in avoiding outside (Chinese and now Cuban) ideological criticism of its actions than in enforcing ideological conformity on other parts. It is the Chinese who have been claiming for nearly a decade that their leader, Mao Tse-tung, can alone interpret Marxism-Leninism correctly in the present historical epoch.
Hegemony
Moscow cannot be expected to be jubilant over the loss of its hegemony in the international communist movement. It may not yet be wholly reconciled to the assertion of independence by parties, many of which were its creatures. But it has had the good sense to recognise that the status quo ante cannot be restored. The emergence of China as a communist power and Mr Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin as a cruel and often unprincipled tyrant ended the era of monolithic communism. Since then the Soviet leaders have been trying hard to evolve a new basis for dealing with other communist States and parties.
A great deal of confusion persists because it continues to be assumed that the revival of nationalism has been the principal source of disruption in the communist movement. Another equally, if not a more, powerful factor, has been at work. All ruling communist parties including the CPSU have found it necessary to adjust ideology to new social and economic conditions created partly by the success of their own drive towards industrialisation. This means that in the new era there can be no model as there was in the Stalinist phase. Mr Khrushchev’s statement that there can be many roads to socialism partly reflected a realisation of the changed situation. De-Stalinisation and de-satellisation in Eastern Europe are not two different processes as they might appear on the surface. They are interrelated and reinforce each other.
Russia’s own case provides an excellent illustration of the way in which a communist leader is compelled to adjust ideology to the facts of life. Mr Khrushchev’s denigration of Stalin was the result of his desire not so much to discredit his rivals as to reassure the new technical, managerial and professional elite that the days of personal insecurity were over. The complex industrial machine in the Soviet Union could no longer be run effectively on the old basis of terror. By the time of the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, economic rationality had won over ideology.
The rise of nationalism and the erosion of ideology thus make it impossible for the Kremlin to think in terms of leadership in the old sense. Moreover as a super-power the Soviet Union cannot allow other parties the right to influence its foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung tried hard to establish such a right. It was only when he failed that he decided to bring the dispute into the open. Why have the Russians then been so keen to organise a world communist conference?
It is possible to argue that it is a case of conditioned reflex. But this argument cannot be taken seriously in the context of the sea-change that has taken place in the Soviet Union itself. One has only to remind oneself of the supernatural powers that used to be ascribed to Stalin to realise that we are no longer dealing with the same institutions though they may bear the same names. In any case the Russian leaders have by now received so many shocks in their relations with fellow Communist States and parties that they cannot possibly go on reacting in the old way.
It would be more plausible to take the view that since the legitimacy of the Soviet regime at home is based on its professions of continued adherence to Marxism-Leninism, the Kremlin cannot give up its interest in the world communist movement. Though the Soviet Union is becoming less and less of an ideological State, it is not a nation State in the traditional sense. Orthodox elements opposed to change in Moscow formulate their views in ideological terms and the challenge has of necessity to be met in similar terms. But even this consideration does not offer a wholly convincing explanation for the Soviet anxiety to organise a world communist conference.
Mystery
The mystery is resolved once it is recognised that the Soviet Union has been on the defensive against China since the early ‘sixties if not the late ‘fifties. China has from time to time shown an interest in proclaiming itself as the new centre of the communist world and in organising a fifth International. Moscow cannot dismiss this possibility and allow the initiative to pass to Peking. It is worth noting that it was China that first proposed in 1962 that another conference be convened to sort out ideological issues. Peking has since insisted that Marxism-Leninism can be interpreted only in one way – the Mao way.
It is the same compulsion of competition with China that obliges Moscow to pour military and economic aid into Cuba though it disapproves of Castro’s policy of promoting insurrections in Latin America. In 1963 the Soviet Union had virtually withdrawn from Viet Nam. Mr Khrushchev had even indicated that Russia was no longer interested in being the co-chairman of the Geneva conference with Britain. But it has had to revise this policy and to provide massive aid to North Viet Nam to prevent it from passing under Chinese control.
China is in a hopeless minority in the world communist movement today. But this fact cannot by itself reassure the Soviet leaders. They know that in spite of the internal turmoil in China and the Maoist excesses, Peking represents the revolutionary élan. Moscow has ceased to do so because it has become the capital of a have, white status quo super power. The Chinese ghost will continue to haunt the Kremlin for a long, long time. It cannot be exorcised whatever Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin may do. In sum, the Soviet strategy has been defensive and it is likely to remain so in the near future. Its professions of anti-imperialism cannot enable it to seize the leadership of the communist movement or of the nationalist struggles in the third world.
The Times of India, 13 March 1968