China could not have disrupted the Russo-American detente even if it had gone ahead with the Warsaw talks with the United States. The detente is an expression of the realisation on the part of the two super-powers that they cannot afford an unrestrained competition for power and influence because it can lead to a nuclear confrontation. Nothing that a third power does is therefore likely to persuade or force them to abandon the present course.
But Peking could have caused a great deal of confusion if it had pursued the idea of opening dialogue with Washington. It could have exploited a number of psychological and political factors.
First, there is still an influential body of opinion in the United States and Western Europe which believes that the Soviet Union is the principal menace to their security because it alone can challenge them in terms of military strength and technology. The implication is that the Nixon Administration would have come under considerable pressure to make concessions to Peking in case the latter gave the slightest indication that it was seriously interested in some form of accommodation. The pro-Chinese sentiment remains strong in America in spite of all that has happened in the last two decades.
Secondly, the Soviet Union is haunted by the fear that the United States and China might gang up against it. The growth of the Han population on the Chinese side of the border and the presence of vast empty spaces on the Soviet side which Moscow is unable to fill because no amount of incentives can induce a sufficient number of people to migrate there, add to the Kremlin’s anxiety. Russia will certainly be far more wary of doing business with America in case the latter begins to respond to Chinese overtures. The more vulnerable the Soviet position gets in Eastern and Central Europe the more apprehensive will Moscow become of a Sino-American rapprochement.
Demoralisation
Thirdly, there will be widespread demoralisation all over South-East Asia in case the impression spreads that Washington is trying to make a deal with Peking and may gradually withdraw its military forces from there.
The cancellation of the Warsaw talks and the Sino-Soviet border clash will ensure that China will not enjoy much leverage in international diplomacy in the near future. Neither the proposed recognition of the Peking regime by Canada and Italy nor the possible adoption of a moderate policy by the latter towards small neighbouring countries like Burma and Cambodia will alter the situation much. China’s overall position has to be viewed in the context of other developments which have an intimate bearing on Russo-American relations.
On the day of Mr. Nixon’s inauguration itself the Soviet Government suggested early talks on the question of limiting the development of both offensive and defensive missiles. This was followed by the Soviet proposal for four-power (America, Russia, Britain and France) discussions on West Asia. President Nixon has responded enthusiastically to both these proposals. He is in fact asking for Soviet cooperation in settling even the Viet Nam war. That in his recent discussion with West European leaders he gave top priority to the question of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union shows the importance he attaches to it. A Russo-American summit in the near future is a distinct possibility.
At the same time President Nixon seems to have reached the realistic conclusion that just now there is no scope for any improvement of relations with China. He has also put it on record that he will not abandon Formosa and that thinking in terms of withdrawing America’s opposition to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The new American administration has not spelled out its South-East Asia policy but it is difficult to believe that it is thinking in terms of withdrawing its forces from Thailand and for some years even from South Viet Nam.
Small Gesture
Meanwhile the Soviet Union has made the first small gesture of goodwill towards Formosa by sending a newspaper correspondent there. This by itself does not amount to much and in any case Moscow will find it difficult officially to go back on its policy of recognising Peking’s claim to Taipeh. But the Soviet Government can perhaps be expected at a suitable time to give discreet support to the emergence of Formosa as an independent entity. It is thus on the cards that America and Russia will be following parallel policies regarding Taipeh.
In the new context it may not therefore be particularly relevant to raise the question whether the Chinese regard the Soviet Union or the United States as the principal enemy and whether they would find it easier to settle disputes with the former or the latter. Peking did not exercise the choice in the latter part of the ‘fifties and the early ‘sixties when it was probably in a position to do so. The option is no longer open to it in spite of the continuing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The more pertinent questions are whether Maoist China can go in for the limited objective of gaining a recognised place within the given international system, whether it must out of ideological compulsions pursue what Prof Richard Lowenthal has called the “unlimited objective of overthrowing that system as a whole” and whether it can succeed in doing so.
Prof. Lowenthal and Mr. Roderick MacFarquhar agree that the Maoists must attempt to overthrow the international system as a whole. They cannot seek accommodation within it. Prof. Lowenthal writes:
“The ideological need to maintain that sense of irreconcilable conflict has been made more acute by the tremendous internal problems attending the present difficult stage in China’s process of industrialisation: the failure of the attempt at domestic relaxation undertaken by the regime in 1956-57…has convinced Mao and his supporters that the necessary sacrifices can only be imposed on the Chinese people in a climate of the “besieged fortress”, that is, by representing every opposition to their policies as counter-revolutionary and by proclaiming the unceasing struggle against domestic counter-revolution as a sector of a world-wide front in a single irreconcilable conflict, in which all the advanced industrial nations are in the enemy camp.”
Mao’s Obsession
According to Mr. MacFarquhar, “To Mao’s life-long hatred of imperialism is now added his obsessional fear of the degeneration of communism; a compromise with either the chief imperialist or the chief revisionist power would represent not just a tactical retreat but an abandonment of the Maoist vision of a truly communist world in the interest of more limited national objectives. In other words, the policy of hostility towards both superpowers may undermine some short-term objectives, but in the long term it will not be self-defeating because it is in fact the only policy that could lead to the attainment of the ultimate Maoist vision.”
As to the last question there can be no doubt that China cannot succeed in overthrowing the system. In its determination to do so it has in the past endorsed Dr. Sukarno’s mad plan to establish a rival United Nations of the so-called emerging forces and provided arms and ammunition to tribal leaders in Congo and elsewhere in Africa. Its efforts to split as many communist parties as possible have also been related as much to its struggle against the Soviet Union as to its desire to overthrow the international system. The net result of it all is that China has never been more isolated than it is today.
Maoist China has set itself up as a model for all developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has proclaimed the doctrine of the villages of the world (predominantly agricultural societies) surrounding and overwhelming the world’s cities (rich and industrialised nations). But the appeal of the model as well as of the doctrine has been strictly limited outside China. It is doubtful if even such faithfuls as Albania and the tiny communist party of New Zealand share Chairman Mao’s messianic vision.
As the Russo-American detente is consolidated and expanded, as the two super-powers come to pursue parallel policies in more and more places, and as their respect for each other’s national interests becomes increasingly explicit, the Chinese capacity to wreck the international system will decrease still further. This point should be borne in mind by those who fear that in case Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto comes to power in Pakistan he can declare war on India with China’s assistance.
All this does not mean that a China armed with nuclear weapons can be ignored while it continues to rant against the whole world. It will have to be accommodated within the international system. Its legitimate security interests will have to be respected. It will have to be given a place at the top table in the comity of nations. But it is now possible to think that it may be possible to do so without whetting China’s expansionist ambitions, without recognising its hegemonistic claims in South and South-East Asia and without throwing the international system into utter confusion.
(Concluded)
The Times of India 13 March 1969