A pretty good case can be made in support of Mr. Dinesh Singh’s action in coming out squarely on the side of the USSR in the Sino-Soviet border dispute. After all India has had a terrible experience of dealing with China. It knows to its own cost how Peking distorts historical facts and blows up its territorial claims. It is in its own interests to see to it that historical and traditional borders are not changed forcibly by one party just because it feels that “unequal” treaties were imposed on it at some point in the past.
This is not all. A close relationship has developed over the years between New Delhi and Moscow and since the early sixties this has centred on the question of the containment of China. Finally, as the sole supplier of sophisticated military equipment to this country, specially since 1962, Russia can be expected to ask for India’s support in its dispute with China.
It is no secret that the Soviet Government has been keen on New Delhi making a public statement supporting its stand in its border dispute with China. Marshal Grechko raised this issue during his visit to New Delhi last month. Reports from Moscow at that time said that the Russians were disappointed at India’s reluctance to come out openly on their side. Last month the Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union made a special visit to New Delhi to take part in high-level discussions on the propriety of India defining its position on the Ussuri confrontation in precise terms.
Pressure
There is another reason to suspect that the Soviet Government brought considerable pressure to bear on New Delhi. Moscow is extremely sensitive on the question of its borders precisely because its case is not all that foolproof. This is particularly so in regard to its western frontiers where it incorporated large chunks of German, Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian and Czech territories into its own at the end of the last war. The Soviet Government cannot afford to allow its frontier to be questioned in one sector for fear of adverse repercussions elsewhere.
No country has less justification to talk in terms of historical frontiers than the Soviet Union because it drastically revised its own as recently as 1945. It will be absurd for anyone to insinuate that India faces any such embarrassment in relation to its borders and it will be tragic if New Delhi behaves as if it has been guilty of having encroached on someone else’s territory.
New Delhi can legitimately argue that it is not its business to be concerned with the wrongs that Russia may have done to any of its neighbours and that it cannot be expected to jeopardise its relations with the Soviet Union in a quixotic attempt to champion the cause of East European countries. But it should keep in view Moscow’s record in territorial matters. The more relevant point however is that strictly in terms of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and India it would have been far more prudent for New Delhi to have adhered to its original decision to observe a discreet silence. Two pertinent points may be mentioned here.
First, the Russians have not endorsed India’s borders vis-à-vis China. In fact they continue to publish maps in their most authoritative publications which fully support the Chinese view of the Sino-Indian frontier in the Himalayas. New Delhi has drawn Moscow’s attention to these maps many times both before and after the Chinese aggression in 1962 but to no purpose. It is doubtful if India has received even the courtesy of a proper reply from the Soviet Government. Even the deterioration in their relations with the Chinese has not persuaded the Russians to redraw their maps in a just manner. A Soviet journalist has at last been bold enough to say that the Chinese committed aggression against India in 1962 but it still remains to be seen whether the maps will be suitably amended to accord with the facts of the case.
Insensitive
Secondly, the Soviet leadership after Mr. Khrushchev’s exit has been insensitive to India’s susceptibilities and interests in its dealing with Pakistan. It has adopted a posture of strict neutrality in Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kashmir. Since last year it has also been supplying military hardware to Rawalpindi. Even the collapse of the Ayub regime and the reimposition of martial law specifically for the purpose of crushing the autonomy movement in East Pakistan do not seem to have made the slightest difference to Russia’s decision to provide arms to that country.
Judging from Mr. Kosygin’s message to President Yahya Khan and Marshal Grechko’s reported speeches during his recent visit to Pakistan, it will not be surprising indeed if the supplies of Soviet military hardware to Pakistan are stepped up. Mr. Swaran Singh gave expression to India’s concern in Parliament last Thursday when he admitted that Soviet policy towards Pakistan had changed since the Tashkent summit in January 1966.
It is to the credit of New Delhi that even after the Chinese aggression it did not allow itself to be drawn into an anti-Peking alliance or arrangement which the United States had been only too anxious to promote until recently. It resisted the immense pressure brought to bear on it by the US Administration at a time when this country faced the threat of a widespread famine if the American supplies of wheat were not available. It refused to endorse the American policy in Viet Nam even indirectly. There is no reason why it should compromise this record of having maintained a correct attitude towards China in spite of endless provocations by the latter.
The importance of this point cannot be over-emphasised in the new context when there is a distinct possibility of a Sino-American “disengagement” in south-east Asia as a result of a settlement in Viet Nam. Such a “disengagement” does not require an abandonment by China of its claims to Formosa, its long-term ambition and its hostile posture towards the United States. Similarly, it is not contingent on a drastic modification in Washington’s China policy. Yet it can radically change the situation in south and south-east Asia.
A settlement in Viet Nam is still some way off. As of now ever the outlines of an agreement have not been settled between Washington, Hanoi, Saigon and the National Liberation Front. At this stage one can therefore only speculate on the likely nature of the agreement, the future of American bases in Thailand, the response of other south-east Asian countries to the new situation and the likely Chinese behaviour. All the same a settlement in Viet Nam, if and when it is reached, will mark the end of an era in the life of the region and open up new possibilities for an imaginative Indian diplomacy. It is possible, to put it no higher, that India can once again play a meaningful role in the implementation of the proposed settlement in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.
India is well placed to do so by virtue of being the chairman of the international commissions which were set up to supervise the original 1954 Geneva agreement and by virtue of having excellent relations with the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and countries of the region including the two Viet Nams on the other. Its one handicap is China’s hostility. New Delhi cannot hope to endear itself to China or even to wear down its hostility. But it need not needlessly provoke Peking by gratuitously creating the impression that it is aligned with Russia against it.
Quixotic
For no fault of its own India got caught in the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late ‘fifties and early ‘sixties. To the extent that it is within its power it should avoid involvement in the present Moscow-Peking confrontation. It will do well to bear in mind the well-known Chinese proverb “when two tigers fight it is better to sit on a hilltop.”
It is perhaps quixotic to think in terms of a Sino-American detente in the near future, of Washington and Peking ganging up against the Soviet Union, of the Chinese directing all their hatred against the Russians and of their wanting to break the so-called encirclement by making conciliatory gestures towards India among other countries. Since Chinese foreign policy has become subordinated to the exigencies of the multi-faceted internal struggle Peking may not be able to take a rational view of its position and prospects for quite some time. But a major change in the world situation will become unavoidable when the war in Viet Nam is finally ended.
New Delhi’s ability to operate effectively in the new framework will depend a great deal on its flexibility and resilience on the one hand and its capacity to anticipate events on the other.
The Times of India, 16 April 1969