During his one-day visit to Rawalpindi last week, Mr Kosygin sought to create the impression that his principal purpose was to find out if some move could be made to unfreeze Indo-Pakistan relations. While this claim need not be rejected, there were clearly other reasons which could have persuaded the Soviet Prime Minister to undertake the trip.
First, the Soviet Government has been anxious to demonstrate its support for the new military rulers. The statements Marshal Grechko made during his visit to Pakistan last March, Mr. Kosygin’s own message to General Yahya Khan after the takeover and the article in Pravda on April 1 speak for themselves.
Secondly, the Soviet anxiety to win the confidence of President Yahya Khan could have acquired a new edge in view of Mr. Rogers’s recent visit to Pakistan, his statement that the question of allowing the sale of arms to Pakistan was under review in Washington and the report that Mr. Chou En-lai may be coming there soon. In other words, the Russians face the prospect of being outbid by the two powers which they have been wanting to supplant there.
Finally, President Yahya Khan put it on record during Mr. Rogers’s visit that he was determined to augment the country’s military strength and would give topmost priority to it. This was only to be expected because the new regime is wholly dependent on the support of the armed forces and must therefore meet their demands. The relevant inference is that the Soviet Union also may have been under pressure from Rawalpindi to step up military supplies. Mr. Kosygin could have felt that it was best to discuss the matter face-to-face with President Yahya Khan. In this context the possibility of increased Russian arms supplies to Pakistan cannot be discounted.
Very Careful
But whatever the reasons behind the visit, the questions that have been asked in New Delhi in this connection should leave the Soviet Government in no doubt that its bona fides have become suspect in the eyes of a large number of Indians.
The Soviet Prime Minister was extremely careful in all his public statements in Pakistan. He did not utter one word which could open him to the charge that he had deviated in any way from the stated objective of Soviet policy in the sub-continent – Indo-Pakistan reconciliation. But this can at best assuage some of India’s worst fears. It cannot restore the old confidence.
It may be inaccurate and even wrong to say that Moscow is pursuing a policy of mechanical parity between New Delhi and Islamabad, that it is interested in upsetting either the status quo in Kashmir or the power balance in the sub-continent, which is at the moment generally favourable to this country, or that it is cynically promoting an arms race in the calculation that both India and Pakistan will turn to it for supplies.
In fact it is a reasonable view that the Soviet Union has a stake in the viability of Indian defence vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. But it is undeniable that steadily the impression is spreading in this country that the Soviet Government is ceasing to be the dependable friend that it has been all these years. Moscow will be ill-advised to ignore this factor of public opinion.
The Russians and their Indian supporters often argue that Soviet policy is being deliberately misrepresented by persons who are opposed to non-alignment and that the real objective of the critics is to embarrass Mrs. Gandhi who is known to be friendly towards Moscow and to force a pro-western shift in India’s own posture. The argument has obviously been greatly stretched. But even if it is accepted at its face value, it only lends substance to the view that Russia has placed itself in a more vulnerable position in this country than at any time since Mr. Khrushchev’s first historic visit in the winter of 1955.
Transient Gains
Moreover, Russia’s gains in Pakistan for the sake of which it has run this risk may prove highly transient. An American decision to allow the direct sale of sophisticated equipment to Islamabad will, for instance, wipe out at one stroke whatever temporary advantage the Soviet Union may have secured by supplying military hardware. The Russians cannot possibly be unaware that given the choice Rawalpindi will opt for US weapons. As for Chinese influence in Pakistan, it cannot be eliminated, however hard Moscow may try.
For the Pakistani intelligentsia, specially in the politically more influential western wing, Peking represents what Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has called the plus factor in Islamabad’s favour in its dealings with New Delhi. In plain words, it means that Pakistan cannot equal India’s economic and military potential and power and that if it seeks a status of parity in the sub-continent as it does, it needs external support of a kind which China alone is willing to provide.
It was only to be expected that the Soviet Union would seek to take advantage of Pakistan’s alienation from the United States on account of its military aid to India after the Chinese aggression in 1962 and of the stoppage of military supplies to Islamabad at the time of the 1965 war. But it was not necessary for Moscow to agree to provide lethal weapons to Pakistan if it was interested only in establishing friendly relations with that country. But the Soviet Union thought in terms of becoming the predominant power in the region and it is this ambition which finally persuaded it to accede to Pakistan’s demand for military equipment.
The rationale of the Soviet decision, as it has been publicly presented, is well known and need not be detailed here. Briefly, the Soviet Union has contended that it is seeking to supplant American and Chinese influence in Pakistan and that success in this enterprise will be helpful to India because Moscow’s influence will be used to promote peace. Not many Indians have been inclined to accept this argument. In any case this is at best only one part of the story. The other relates to Moscow’s calculations.
Apparently, the limited success of its mediatory effort at Tashkent led the Soviet leaders to believe that they could supplant the United States as the predominant external power in the region and take both India and Pakistan under their wings.
Moscow could also have calculated that India had become so dependent on it in respect of the supplies of sophisticated weapons that it had no real choice but to reconcile itself to the Soviet decision to extend military aid to Pakistan, that the United States was too deeply involved in Viet Nam to be able to react effectively and that the time had come to act boldly and vigorously in view of the British decision to withdraw from east of Suez.
The naval build-up in the Mediterranean, the massive investment in terms of military and economic aid and diplomatic effort in West Asia and the move to establish its naval presence in the Indian Ocean are clearly parts of one and the same jigsaw puzzle.
The snags in the Soviet calculation are obvious. Firstly, the United States is also moving into the Indian Ocean, partly to fill the vacuum that is being created by Britain’s withdrawal and partly to meet the developing Russian challenge. Secondly, unlike India, Pakistan need not make itself dependent primarily on the Soviet Union for its military supplies. Its excellent relations with China and its relatively comfortable foreign exchange position give it access to alternative sources which it will not forgo.
No Advantage
It should be obvious by now to the more discerning among Soviet leaders that their policy has hurt their position in India without gaining for them a compensating advantage in Pakistan and that it has stimulated in India the desire to reach some kind of accommodation with China. It may even turn out that it has paved the way for a revision of the American decision on the sale of arms to India and Pakistan.
This is not the first time that the Soviet Union has blundered in Asia. The consequences of its actions in Indonesia and West Asia are well known. Fortunately, in the present case, the point of no return has not been reached yet and it is still possible for the Kremlin to undo some of the damage if it can only insist that Pakistan must qualify for military aid by restoring the status quo as it existed before the 1965 war with India. Such a move will also influence the American decision regarding military supplies and thus provide a fillip to the forces of sanity in Pakistan.
The Times of India, 3 June 1969