Mr Brezhnev’s reference to the need for a system of collective security in Asia in his address to the recent world communist conference in Moscow naturally led to the surmise that the Soviet Union was interested in promoting and participating in an Asian alliance. The Soviet authorities are now anxious to remove this impression.
It has been pointed out on behalf of Moscow that the reference to Asia in Mr. Brezhnev’s address followed a lengthier statement on Europe and that the two should be read together. Since the Soviet leader emphasised once again his Government’s support for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the interest of creating what he called a system of collective security in Europe, it follows that the use of a similar phrase by him in connection with Asia cannot imply a Soviet desire to forge an alliance.
An authoritative definition of the concept of collective security has been dug out from the official history of Soviet foreign policy to underscore the same point. The history relates to the 1917-45 period and has been edited, among others, by the present Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, and Mr. Ponomarev, member of the Party Secretariat. It says:
Guarantees
“Regional agreements had nothing in common with blocs directed against definite states or groups of states and pursuing the purpose of encircling and isolating these states. The significance of such agreements was that they embraced all states of a given geographical region and provided their members with identical guarantees of assistance in the event of aggression by any country. They confronted the aggressor with the united front of countries desiring peace. Guarantees of security by strong countries to weaker neighbours had to form part of the system of collective security. The system proposed by the Soviet Union could have guaranteed peace. This was the direction of Soviet foreign policy after Germany became the main threat to world peace.”
Moscow wants this quotation to be so interpreted as to suggest that the system of collective security as envisaged by it is not directed against China and does not seek to exclude it. But this is a disingenuous plea. The Soviet Government’s position in fact is that China has ceased to be a communist state because the dominant faction has decimated the party and installed the army and the bureaucracy in power, that Mr Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are petite-bourgeois chauvinists, that they entertain definite designs on a number of countries in the region and that they follow an adventurist course. Since the Chinese leader is often compared with Hitler in Soviet writings and speeches, it stands to reason that Moscow should be interested in isolating China and building a ring round it. But Moscow can well argue that since the Chinese will not in any case participate in an arrangement’ devised by it, there is no harm in pretending that they are welcome to join it.
In the wake of Mr. Brezhnev’s address in question, some western commentators created the impression that the Soviet Government was concerned over the impending American withdrawal from South Viet Nam and, the British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, and that it subscribed to the theory that these withdrawals would create a power vacuum which the Chinese would seek to fill. The truth is to the contrary.
Western Bases
Moscow welcomes the proposed American and British withdrawals. If it was within its power it would see to it that all western bases in the region were liquidated. For instance, the now famous article which Mr. Matyevev wrote in Izvestia on May 28, only a few days before Mr. Brezhnev’s address to the world communist conference, said: ‘The dismantling of the network of foreign military bases in this part of the world would pave the way for laying the foundations of collective security in which case countries that have gained their freedom would, by pooling efforts, consolidate peace and repulse all machinations of imperialist expansionist forces.”
Thus the American and British withdrawals and the liquidation of all western bases are the prerequisites for the establishment of the kind of collective security system the Soviet leaders have in view. It follows that the plan is designed to reduce, and if possible eliminate, western influence.
This does not contradict the view that there is a certain parallelism in American and Russian policies in regard to countries on the periphery of China, especially India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union co-operates as well as competes with the United States. Sometimes it emphasises the co-operative aspect of its policy and sometimes the competitive, depending on the needs of the situation.
The central question is: If Moscow is not proposing to establish an alliance under its auspices and if it is interested in excluding the United States from the region, what precisely does it propose to do by way of promoting a “system of collective security in Asia”?
On the basis of available indications it appears that the Soviet Government favours the signing by countries of the region of a document whereby they will agree to respect each other’s sovereignty and existing boundaries unless these are modified by mutual agreement. In theory, China need not be excluded from this scheme because nothing will be lost if Peking signs such a declaration.
It is doubtful if countries which do not like the status quo will ever sign such a declaration. But even if some of them are persuaded to append their signatures to a watered down statement, it will lack the necessary sanction.
The Soviet reply to this kind of argument is likely to be that the declaration will change the atmosphere for the better, that it is willing to provide arms to enable countries of the region to strengthen their defence capabilities and that this will give “teeth” to the arrangement. The latter points seem to be the crux of the matter because Moscow has apparently convinced itself that arms are the quickest and cheapest means of winning and extending influence in Asia. Its experience in West Asia has not persuaded it to change its views on this issue.
On a surface view, the Soviet plan bears close resemblance to various ideas that New Delhi has thrown up in recent years. But the Indian Government will be seriously mistaken if it rushes to the conclusion that its and Soviet ideas can be harmonised. Moscow is seeking to supplant US influence in the region. New Delhi has no reason to engage in any anti-western struggle in Asia once Washington has given up the ambition to dominate the region and has decided to withdraw from Viet Nam. It is however, more likely that the Soviet Union will not succeed in achieving its extremely ambitious objectives. In that case India can only hurt itself by identifying itself with the Soviet Plan.
Contradictory
The Government of India’s own position is somewhat contradictory. It holds that a power vacuum will not arise as a result of the American and British withdrawals because the countries of the region will be able to fill it and that China does not constitute a serious military threat. Yet, from time to time it calls for great power guarantees.
The idea of great power guarantees first arose in the context of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China on the one hand and New Delhi’s own reluctance to go in for similar weapons and Anglo-American-Russian pressure in favour of a non-proliferation treaty on the other. After a lot of brave but meaningless talk by American and British spokesmen, the idea was dropped because it was found impracticable. It was then agreed that no nuclear power could guarantee the security of a country which was not aligned with it and over whose military and foreign policies it did not exercise a measure of control.
The same is true in the conventional field. What can America and Russia, for instance, do if the Chinese organise a well controlled and limited aggression on the 1962 model or if they assist guerillas in north-eastern India or northern Burma as they are doing now? After America’s experience in Viet Nam, is it conceivable that the Soviet Union will guarantee the integrity and security of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand? The Australians are having second thoughts regarding their commitment to the defence of Malaysia. They have washed their hands off Sabah and Sarawak.
The impression has spread that the Soviet Union favours economic co-operation among countries of the region. It does, but only under its own auspices. It is highly critical of the Asian and Pacific Council formed at Japan’s initiative and the Association of South-East Asian Nations established at Indonesia’s initiative. Moscow’s opposition to these organisations springs from its view that they are pro-US in their orientation and block the spread of Soviet influence in the region.
The Soviet attitude towards Japan is particularly ambivalent. Moscow seeks Japanese collaboration for the development of Siberia and, in his address to the world communist conference, Mr Brezhnev listed Japan among the countries with whom Russia maintains friendly relations. The Russians cannot be unaware that Japan is the one Asian country which can provide a counterweight against China if it overcomes its pacifist inhibitions and undertakes a programme of arming itself. Yet New Times, Moscow, has recently carried an article which seeks to raise the ghost of Japanese militarism. The Soviet Union is clearly not enthusiastic about India’s efforts to establish closer economic ties with Japan. Apparently the Russians see in Japan a rival who has the economic dynamism and capacity to thwart their ambitions in South-East Asia.
All in all, it appears that the Soviet leaders have come to the conclusion that the awareness of the Chinese danger in countries like India, Burma and Thailand on the one hand and the reduction in American involvement in Asia on the other, present them with an opportunity to establish Russia as the preponderant power in the region. In their search for a framework which can help to legitimatise this power and influence, they seem to have landed on the concept of collective security which does not involve the kind of firm and binding commitments that go with regular alliances. But in reality Moscow will continue to depend on bilateral relations for influence.
The Times of India, 8 July 1969