Most of those who are convinced that the Naxalites are not Maoists, in spite of wearing the Maoist label, have come to assume that they are in fact following Che Guevara’s path. This is only partly true. On basic questions of strategy and tactics, there is considerable divergence between Cheist theory and Naxalite practice.
Before discussing the points of agreement and disagreement between Che and Charu Mazumdar, it is worth mentioning that unlike Mao, Che Guevara did not formulate his views on guerilla warfare during the Cuban struggle in which he participated as Castro’s lieutenant. He based his theories on a model that was never put into practice either in Cuba or elsewhere. His own independent adventures ended in a total fiasco in Congo and in his death in Bolivia, and his pronouncements on revolutionary strategy and tactics were made largely to enable him to stake a claim to the leadership of the upsurge in Latin America. He was Castro’s rival though neither admitted it.
Technique
The Naxalites agree with Che that “one does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise” and that a relatively small group of determined men can serve as a spark that will set off a prairie fire. They have also probably learnt from his writings and speeches some of the techniques of sabotage. But there the convergence ends and the divergence begins – with one exception. This is that in spite of all their prattle about Marxism-Leninism, the Cheists as well as the Naxalites depend almost wholly on educated young men belonging to the middle class to provide a cadre.
The violence which the Naxalites have let loose in the towns in West Bengal is itself a major departure from Che’s handbook on guerilla warfare. While he did not, unlike Mao after 1935, spurn sabotage, he did not believe that this could be the decisive or even the main form of revolutionary action. He was in fact convinced that urban detachments would be exterminated unless the city in question was already besieged by a revolutionary army. If he did not wish to discourage their activities, it was mainly because he took the view that their liquidation would not extinguish the revolutionary “spirit” and leadership. Both, according to him, would be preserved in the “rural stronghold.”
Che Guevara has written in his famous book Guerilla Warfare: “We do not wish to under-estimate the importance of armed resistance by organised workers, but in the cities, armed revolt can too easily be smothered when customary civil liberties are suspended or ignored, thus forcing resistance movements to act clandestinely, without arms, and against enormous dangers. This does not hold true in rural areas where guerillas and inhabitants cooperate closely beyond the reach of oppressor forces…..
“But first let it be stated that a guerilla band never arises by itself in a suburban area. Such a band will form only when a favourable environment has been created by others, and the band will always be under direct order of superiors situated outside… Such a band should not number more than four or five men. This is important because the suburban guerilla is working in exceptionally unfavourable terrain where the risks and consequences of exposure are tremendous. There is only a little distance between the guerilla’s point of action and his refuge, so night action must predominate. He does not emerge into the open until the insurgents besiege the city”.
Violation
It is hardly necessary to make the point that the Naxalites are violating each one of these rules and that in the process they have exposed themselves to grave risks. If they have not been smashed, it is mainly because the forces of law and order in West Bengal were virtually paralysed during the 13 months of the United Front’s rule and are still severely handicapped for want of firm direction and suitable legislation like the Preventive Detention Act.
Che himself grossly violated the central rule of guerilla warfare regarding peasant support during his operations in Bolivia. He landed there on November 7, 1966 and his diaries for1967 make pathetic, though from a different point of view, instructive reading. In April he admitted in so many words “… the peasant base has not yet been developed although it appears that through planned terror we can neutralise some of them; support will come later!” It did not come and finally on the eve of his own capture and death in October 1967 he noted that “… the army appears to be more effective in its actions and the peasants do not give any help and are turning into informers.”
But all the time Che the ideologue linked, and rightly so, the fate of his guerillas with their success or failure in winning over poor peasants. The guerillas, in his scheme, were to operate only from peasant bases.
The Naxalites, as the description itself indicates, began their violent activities in the rural area of Naxalbari in West Bengal. The choice of the place was itself wrong because it violated the cardinal principle that the base must be inaccessible to Government forces. In this case even a lightly armed police force, which was not specially trained to operate in thick jungles, marshes and mountains, was able to deal with them effectively once the State Government in Calcutta gave the signal. After they were flushed out of the area, the Naxalites do not appear to have concentrated their effort on building up an impregnable rural base but have instead let loose an orgy of violence in urban centres.
There is no provision for a political party in Che’s concept of guerilla warfare. His French disciple, Regis Debray, has written in his Revolution In The Revolution,“The subordination of the guerilla force to urban political leadership not only creates practical problems for the guerillas but also a sense of dependence and inferiority complex.”
Debray goes so far as to say: “In certain conditions, the political party and the military are not separate but form one organic whole, consisting of the people’s army whose nucleus is the guerilla army. The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerilla base itself. The guerilla force is the party in embryo. This is the staggering novelty introduced by the Cuban revolution”.
And so it is indeed. Castro did not form a party even after he had retreated to Sierra Maestra and established a base there. The Naxalites have deviated from this concept and created a party of their own – the CP (M-L). Since they claim to conform to the Chinese model in form if not in content, the guerillas have to function in subordination to the party leadership.
But Chairman Mao himself has not, since 1966, in practice observed his famous maxim that the party must command the gun. He has in fact smashed the party organisation and used the People’s Liberation Army for the purpose. But he has not produced a new formulation which can be said to supersede his earlier statements regarding the relationship between the party and the guerilla force, which means that in theory the party still remains superior to the PLA.
Not Familiar
Che was not family with the working of a democratic Government. He dealt with an extremely tyrannical and corrupt military regime in Cuba whose head, Gen. Batista, had himself salted away millions of dollars in foreign banks. Other Latin American countries which he regarded as being ripe for revolution have also been ruled in most cases by military dictators generally belonging to the landed oligarchy who have stifled all reform movements. Yet he had the perspicacity to recognise that it was not easy to mobilise popular support for guerilla activities in a democracy. He wrote in Guerilla Warfare:
“If a Government has come to power through some form of popular vote, whether fraudulent or not, and if that Government maintains at least the appearance of constitutional law, a guerilla uprising cannot be brought about until all avenues of legal procedure have been exhausted.”
The Naxalites have however, chosen to ignore the fact that Governments in India at the Centre and in the States have come to power as a result of elections, that these elections have been fair, that the authorities are responsive to popular aspirations and that grievances can be redressed through constitutional processes and through the agitations and demonstrations which are legitimate in a democracy.
Finally, like all other successful revolutionaries of our time, Che linked, or at least gave the appearance of having linked, the revolutionary struggle with anti-colonialism and nationalism. To cite some instances, Mao succeeded in seizing power because he came to represent the Chinese people’s determination to throw out western imperialists and Japanese invaders. Ho Chi Minh was able to mobilise support in South Viet Nam because he successfully convinced a sizable section of the people that the fight against the United States was a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle against France. In Cuba’s own case, America’s economic and political domination provided a powerful leverage to Castro in his fight against Batista.
But the Government in India is not a stooge of any foreign power and, thanks to Mr. Nehru’s policy of non-alignment, the charge of its being a semi-colony does not make much sense to the people. Thus the Naxalites cannot win mass countrywide support on the strength of their anti-colonialist verbiage.
This is not to suggest that the Naxalites do not represent a serious threat or that the authorities can afford to take a complacent view. The point that is sought to be made is that the Naxalites are neither Maoists nor Cheists and that either label is more likely to confuse rather than clarify the true nature of the problem which the country can no longer brush aside.
The Times of India, 29 April 1970
*Cheists – followers of Che Guevara