Mr Charu Mazumdar, leader and chief theoretician of the CP(M-L), and his close associates know only too well that there is not a single instance in the post-war period where guerillas have seized power merely on the strength of their communist or socialist ideology. All independent communist revolutions since 1945 – in China, Yugoslavia, North Viet Nam and Cuba – have been based on nationalism. Yet the Naxalites have adopted a clearly anti-national posture.
If the CP(M-L) had advocated a friendly approach towards China and even some concessions by New Delhi to Peking on the question of the Aksaichin plateau, one might have been able to understand its position or even sympathise with it. A fairly good case can indeed be made for accommodation with China in India’s own national interest.
Alienated
But it is one thing to advocate a policy of friendship with China and quite another to behave as a creature of Peking. The CP(M-L) has identified itself with China’s foreign policy goals to the point where it is not interested even in this country’s survival as an entity. It has actively aligned itself with the separatist Naga and Mizo rebel movements. It has even allotted a central place to the so-called ‘right for self-determination’ to every linguistic group in its programme thus providing for the eventual dismemberment of the country.
Two explanations are possible for the programme of fragmentation and disruption that the Naxalites have adopted. Either both as individuals and as a group they are so completely alienated from the national ethos that they revel in destruction for its own sake or they have been so mesmerised by what they mistakenly regard as Maoism that they have become willing pawns in China’s hands. Either way they are not the kind of people who can lead a successful revolution. These self-proclaimed Maoists do not seem to be aware that Chairman Mao himself has always been a strong nationalist and that he went in for an anti-Japanese united front in 1936 with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek for patriotic reasons – not tor tactical considerations or in obedience to the Comintern which had swung over to the united front line in 1935. Even if there was some scope for misunderstanding on this score earlier, Chairman Mao’s behaviour since 1956 should have convinced the Naxalites that he was as dedicated to the task of restoring China to what he considered to be its legitimate place in the world as to that of radically transforming it.
In fact Chairman Mao has never looked upon these as two separate tasks: He came to Marxism-Leninism in his search for a solution to China’s weakness which had led to internal fragmentation and foreign domination. He reshaped the doctrine to suit the country’s needs as he understood them and fused nationalism and communism in such
a way that the two reinforce each other. It is difficult to imagine a Chinese who is more proud of his country’s past than Chairman Mao, who is more sensitive to the slightest affront to the nation’s dignity and who is more determined to make China a super-power.
When Japan attacked China, Chairman Mao made common cause with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek in spite of the five extermination campaigns that the latter had conducted against the communists and the Long March in which three-fourths of the communist army had perished. That this proved to be a sound decision from the tactical point of view is a different matter. The pertinent point is that only a dedicated nationalist passionately devoted to his country and all that it implies can be an effective communist leader. Mr. Charu Mazumdar and his colleagues are, on their own testimony, poor nationalists and cannot, therefore, ever hope to carry the nation with them.
The Chinese have sought to provide an ideological justification for the anti-national activities of their cohorts. They have put out the big lie that India is still a semi-colony, that it is subject to the joint exploitation of US “capitalist imperialism” and Russia’s “social imperialism”, that the big bourgeoisie and feudal landlords who allegedly rule the country have betrayed the cause of national independence and anti-imperialism, and that this “reactionary ruling class” must be overthrown.
Claptrap
But no one can possibly be taken in by this claptrap. It is simply ridiculous for Peking to suggest that India is in any way subordinate to the United States. There is in fact impressive evidence to show that New Delhi retained its independence of America even in 1966 and 1967 when it needed ten million tonnes of wheat each year to ward off a widespread famine. If India leans towards the Soviet Union today, it is largely because of China’s hostility and its encouragement to Pakistan. Similarly, it is just not true that the big bourgeoisie and the feudal elements rule the country. On the contrary, these classes are on the defensive. Adult franchise has given the people the power to reshape the country’s social and economic life and they are rapidly acquiring the necessary skill and confidence to do so. Thus the ideological facade for the activities of the CP (M-L) is wholly deceptive.
Peking began to denounce the CPM in 1967 when it joined coalition Ministries in West Bengal and Kerala after the General Election and actively worked for a split which led to the formation of the CP (M-L) last year. China was then going through the worst phase of the cultural revolution and the turmoil at home could not but influence its attitude towards other communist parties. It was during the same phase that the Chinese alienated the hitherto loyal Japanese communists and North Koreans and launched a sudden campaign against General Ne Win and even Prince Sihanouk.
But this is not all. The CPM’s crime was not only that it agreed to use constitutional means to further its own cause but also that it began to assert its independence of Peking and failed to line up behind it in its disputes with the Soviet Union. Once the CPM proved ideologically “unreliable” it became necessary for the Chinese to promote the formation of another communist party which would be available to them as a subservient tool.
The fusion in the Chinese mind of their conflicts with the Soviet Union and India is reflected in their attitude to the communist movement in this country. In plain words they want a communist party which swears by the export model of Maoism, is irrevocably hostile to the Soviet Union and does not mind hurting India’s own national interests. The CP (M-L) meets the bill.
The fusion in the Chinese mind of their conflicts with the Soviet Union and India is reflected in their attitude to the communist movement in this country. In plain words, they want a communist party which swears by the export model of Maoism, is irrevocably hostile to the Soviet Union and does not mind hurting India’s own national interests. The CP (M-L) meets the bill.
Four Points
This is not to suggest that there is nothing in the Indian situation which encourages extremism and violence. The CP (M-L) is a product of local conditions as well as of Chinese machinations. Four points are relevant in this context First, those who advocated the use of violence even in the generally pro-Soviet united Communist Party of India needed a new organisation when the CPM leaders disappointed them. Secondly, the younger communists who were excluded from leadership positions in both the CPI and the CPM felt impelled to form a party of their own. The generation gap has undoubtedly been a factor in the split of the CPM. Thirdly, many frustrated intellectuals are attracted to violence because the slow moving democratic processes do not satisfy them. Finally, the tribal people are getting restive as they come into closer contact with the rest of the community and, as a result of economic development and the spread of education, are fully exposed to the unsettling consequences of de-tribalisation. There can be no denying that they have been badly exploited by plainsmen who have in thousands of cases deprived them of their ancestral land.
But to state the factors which sustain the CP (M-L) is not to provide a rationale for its extremism. The authorities must make this distinction unless they are looking for an excuse which can justify inaction. Violence feeds as much on itself as on social grievances. In course of time extremism comes to provide its own justification. The Government must act firmly to curb the activities of the CP (M-L). If it waits till the grievances of the people are removed it will wait forever. Much time has already been lost in West Bengal because the CPM feared that its own extremists would go over to the CP(M-L) if it used the administrative machinery to deal with the latter. The UF Government in the State under the influence of the CPM prevaricated at the time of the Naxalite trouble in 1967 and it did the same last year. The Union Government cannot afford to repeat the story.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 23 April 1970