The political situation in southeast Asia has been highly unstable for almost three decades. But seldom has uncertainty about the future been so great as it is now.
The outcome of the war in Viet Nam holds the key to future developments in the region. But it cannot be divorced from the parallel struggles in Cambodia and Laos and other elements of uncertainty and confusion that have crept in.
Even a few months ago it was widely believed that the withdrawal of US troops would go on till it is completed in about a year or two years’ time, that the anti-war sentiment in America would leave President Nixon little room for manoeuvre in his dealings with Hanoi, that the North Viet Namese and the Viet Cong would launch a major and perhaps a final offensive at a time of their choosing in the south, that Washington’s Vietnamisation programme was either a facade behind which to disengage itself or an exercise in self-deception; and that in either case it was only a matter of time before the war ended in favour of the North.
Most of these assumptions are now open to question though it will be wrong to suggest that the opposite propositions are any more valid. The movement in favour of peace at any price in the United States is at the moment quiescent; the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces in South Viet Nam has advised President Nixon to stay further withdrawals for the time-being; the Administration can accept his advice without too much trouble at home; reasonably well-informed commentators are beginning to show greater respect for the Vietnamisation programme than till recently; Saigon’s eagerness to become involved in the Cambodian conflict suggests that it is more confident of its strength than before; and the North Viet Namese and Viet Cong forces have not launched a major offensive for a long time.
Hanoi’s Inaction
The logic behind the North Viet Namese and Viet Cong inaction is not quite clear. The broad American assessment however is that the political organisation in Viet Nam has suffered considerable damage as a result of war losses and that thousands of North Viet Namese troops are required to fill in gaps in the political structure. Also on the basis of the party secretary, Le Duan’s recent article in Nhan Dang and recent broadcasts from Hanoi some Western commentators have drawn the conclusion that this allegedly pro-Soviet leader has won the struggle for power that broke out after President Ho Chi-Minh’s death last summer and that he has successfully initiated a changeover from war economy to peace economy.
Mr. Victor Zorza who was probably the first Westerner to put out this interpretation in his columns in The Guardian, London, has drawn the inference that implicit in this switchover to Hanoi’s version of Lenin’s New Economic Policy is the decision to de-escalate the war in the south in a big way.
Some French diplomats who have followed developments in their former colonies in that part of the world with great interest tend to think that war-weariness is fairly widespread in North Viet Nam. They trace it back to the stoppage of American bombing raids in 1968 which they believe has led to the demand for somewhat easier living conditions and consequently a different order of priorities. If Le Duan’s victory is in fact a reflection of war-weariness in North Viet Nam as Marshal Stalin’s was in Russia in the early ‘twenties, the development has major implications.
New Priority
Events in Cambodia and Laos in recent weeks do not by themselves invalidate the view that the North Viet Namese leadership at the moment accords a higher priority to economic improvement at home than to the extension of revolution to the south. It is in fact possible that it was such an assessment of the prevailing mood in North Viet Nam that led Gen. Lon Nol and his colleagues to take the rash step of overthrowing Prince Sihanouk in his absence last month.
No other explanation is wholly satisfactory. It is, for instance, difficult to take at its face value the report that Gen. Nol decided to act just because Prince Sihanouk would not sanction an increase of 10,000 men in the Cambodian army. It appears equally facetious to suggest that disenchantment with the Prince’s failure to get the North Viet Namese and the Viet Cong troops out of Cambodia had left the coup leaders little option. Prince Sihanouk had after all transferred much of his powers to General Nol and his present associates last August and they must have been very naive indeed to think that a slightly bigger army could evict the North Viet Namese and the Viet Cong. They would not have organised the coup if they did not believe that Hanoi had run into difficulties and that it was time for Cambodia to modify its neutrality in favour of the United States.
General Nol appears to have made a grave miscalculation inasmuch as he grossly underestimated Prince Sihanouk’s popularity with Cambodian peasants most of whom still regard him as a god-king. If the Prince indeed carries out his latest threat and arrives in Cambodia to lead an armed struggle the new regime may find itself in an untenable position. But it does not necessarily follow that his information and assessment regarding the mood in Hanoi were also wrong to begin with.
Cautious steps
Hanoi will not give up the use of Cambodian and Laotian territory for infiltration of men of and material so long as the war in the south goes on. It may also not be averse to helping Prince Sihanouk to set up a rebel army on the model of the Pathet Lao and to recapture power in Pnom Penh if the upsurge in his favour is strong and sustained. Even so, it is doubtful if it is keen at this stage to extend its military commitments. Apart from the compulsions of the popular mood at home, it cannot ignore the possibility that its active and open association with him may in the long run divest Prince Sihanouk of much of his present popularity, inflame Cambodian nationalism, unite the people against it and provide a justification for Americans to bomb its bases in that country. President Nixon is obviously not under as much pressure to desist from such a course as President Johnson was during the second half of his term.
It is not easy for General Nol to ask for air and artillery support and it is not easy for President Nixon to accede to his request. But Hanoi cannot be sure that Pnom Penh and Washington will not enter into an informal alliance if they are pushed too far. This means that reports of Hanoi trying to seize Cambodia must be treated with a certain measure of caution.
The confusion is worse confounded because the long-term, and even short-term, plans of Moscow and Peking are difficult to define. The Soviet government appears to be caught in a dilemma. It has been trying to reassure non-communist regimes in south-east Asia in the interest of a loose anti-China coalition that they are not in any danger of being overthrown by communists. This objective cannot but be compromised if North Viet Nam, which is largely dependent on its aid, threatens to take over Cambodia through an insurrection supported by it.
It is interesting that Prince Sihanouk should have made a public declaration that Mr. Kosygin offered him all the necessary assistance to recapture power and that he declined it. If this statement is read in the context of the Prince’s subsequent decision to take up residence in Peking and to issue appeals for the overthrow of General Nol’s regime from there, it is reasonable to draw the inference that Moscow advised him to pursue a more cautious policy. If this is true the Soviet government can be expected to restrain Hanoi as well.
China’s interests in south-east Asia clash with Russia’s and do not coincide with North Viet Nam’s except in relation to the withdrawal of the US forces. It has been widely accepted that Peking has nothing to gain and much to lose from the unification of the two Viet Nams and the extension of Hanoi’s influence to Laos and Cambodia. The construction of roads linking Yunuan with Thailand through Laos underscores the point that China is determined to establish independent means to influence the course of events in the region. It may therefore well regard Prince Sihanouk as a prize catch which it will not want to share with Hanoi.
All in all the situation in the region is so complicated that it defies a neat assessment. It is out of the question that a rather ineffectual body like the International Control Commission can help to sort it out. A meeting of big and interested regional powers on the model of the Geneva conferences in 1954 and 1962 may offer a more promising approach. But the issues that the earlier conferences tackled with some measure of success were relatively simple. The whole region is in turmoil now. Even countries like Malaysia and Thailand can no longer be regarded stable and free from tensions which can wreck their social fabric.
The Times of India, 8 April 1970