It is impossible for anyone to be wholly objective about the tragic developments in Indo-China. Inevitably everyone’s views are coloured to some extent by his ideological predisposition.
If, for instance, one is allergic to communism in any shape or form, one is inclined to have a sneaking sympathy with the American effort and dilemma. If, on the other hand, one accepts Hanoi’s right not only to unite the two Viet Nams under its auspices but also to establish some kind of hegemony over Cambodia and Laos in pursuit of its historical ambitions, one cannot but denounce Washington’s policy and actions. There can be no true middle ground in this case.
The relatively dispassionate observer’s task is further complicated by the fact that in international relations there is no immutable principle which can serve as a sure guide in all situations. Equally laudable concepts clash and cancel out each other. In our era the right of self-determination can be said to have won wider recognition than any other political principle. Yet there is hardly one important country whose policy is determined exclusively on this principle.
Exception
With the rare exceptions of Switzerland and Britain, no multilingual, multi-religious and multi-racial society can afford the luxury of extending the right of self-determination to its minorities. This is as true of strong and well-established States like the Soviet Union and China as of Nigeria and Malaysia. Moscow and Peking talk incessantly of the right of self-determination in respect of others but ruthlessly put down any sign of what they call nationalist deviation in their own territories. The Soviet Union has even proclaimed the doctrine of limited sovereignty in respect of Eastern and Central Europe and has imposed it forcibly on Czechoslovakia.
Similarly, while China waxes eloquent against American intervention in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, it conveniently ignores the fact that its own concept of wars of national liberation violates the principle of national sovereignty. And, whatever the rights and wrongs of the war in Viet Nam, the fact remains that Hanoi has infringed the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia by establishing bases, supply depots and sanctuaries in those countries.
This is not to suggest that the law of the jungle must prevail in international relations or that there is no place at all for moral judgments of any kind in situations such as those which have arisen in Czechoslovakia and Viet Nam. All that is implied is that the issues are extremely complex and that in dealing with them moral self-righteousness is not a sure guide. Nations and States are guided by assessments based on their own interests though they may clothe them in ideological and moralistic jargon.
This point is once again emphasised by the reactions of two of America’s important allies in different parts of the world, Britain in Europe and Japan in Asia, to its Cambodian adventure. While the British Foreign Secretary has been critical, the Japanese Foreign Minister has said that President Nixon had no alternative but to act in the manner he has done. The reason is that while the United Kingdom is not perturbed at the change in the balance of power in Asia resulting from an American withdrawal, Japan cannot but be alarmed at the thought that the disappearance of the US presence from the region might leave it to its own devices to cope with the consequences of guerilla warfare on the one hand and the growth of China’s nuclear power on the other.
It is perhaps relevant to add that most Governments in South-East Asia share the official Japanese view. They do not wish to see the United States humiliated and forced to leave. They are not unduly influenced by the views of critics either within America or among its West European allies except to the extent that they fear that the resulting pressures may make it extremely difficult for President Nixon to stay the course. It is not for others to say that this reaction is wrong-headed or that it is the response of frightened men who are unable to manage their own affairs and to win the support of their own peoples.
Inconceivable
But where do we go from here? Some propositions can be suggested with a reasonable measure of certainty. China will not directly intervene in the Indo-China war in spite of Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s ostentatious action in personally conferring with Prince Sihanouk. It will step up aid to North Viet Nam and so will the Soviet Union. But the world is not any closer to a major war now than before the US forces moved into Cambodia and it is inconceivable that Russia and China will set aside their own sharp territorial and ideological disputes to unite against the American “imperialists.”
It is also reasonably certain that the US and South Vietnamese troops will withdraw from Cambodia within the stipulated period of six to eight weeks. President Nixon cannot renege on his commitment to do so without gravely undermining his credibility and exposing himself to the same charge of double-talk that deprived President Johnson of all moral authority in the eyes of millions of Americans.
But the United States has asserted the right to bomb and destroy North Vietnamese and Viet Cong bases in Cambodia and will in all probability continue to do so in future. Beyond this the picture is murky. It is, for example, impossible to say at this stage whether limited air support and the supply of small arms to the Cambodian army will enable the Lon Nol regime in Pnom Penh to stabilise and consolidate its position. By all available accounts, this Government appears to enjoy the support of the army, the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia but its base in the countryside is insecure. One cannot say whether the present US action will win it more than a temporary reprieve.
Speculation
How Hanoi will respond to the new situation is also anybody’s guess. The evidence is conflicting. Before the Cambodian coup last March, it appeared that the Secretary of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, Le Duan, had established his supremacy after President Ho Chi Minh’s death and that he favoured a generally doveish policy with the emphasis on economic reconstruction and concessions to farmers. Since then Hanoi has behaved as if it can take on the task of “liberating” Cambodia and Laos as well. It is a matter of speculation whether and to what extent North Viet Nam’s actions in Cambodia in recent weeks were the result of the conviction that the local army was too weak to resist its troops and that President Nixon was under such strong pressure from public opinion in his own country that he could not possibly intervene to halt their advance. But even if Hanoi discovers that its calculations have gone wrong, there is no evidence to suggest that it will now adopt a softer line. The North Vietnamese have shown remarkable heroism and defied all rational calculations in the past and may do so again with unpredictable results. If they, for instance, seize Vientiane as they apparently can, they will have confronted the United States with an even more painful dilemma than it already faces.
Finally, it has yet to be seen whether President Nixon can fight a two-front war, on the battlefield in Indo-China and in the Senate and elsewhere in the United States itself. His willingness to pay the price in terms of loss of popularity for himself and his party is no guarantee that he can withstand the pressure for any length of time.
The strategy that President Nixon has followed so far has been open to two different interpretations. It has been maintained by some that the United States has decided finally and firmly to cut its losses in Viet Nam and to withdraw from the South-East Asian mainland. Others have taken the view that once the combatant troops are withdrawn and American casualties thereby more or less eliminated, the President believes he would be in a position to continue to provide South Viet Nam air and logistical support for many years.
Hanoi seems to have favoured the second (and in the circumstances more plausible) interpretation, in view of America’s total refusal to admit defeat, its own idea of its role in the world, the President’s general approach and the energy with which the Vietnamisation programme is being pushed ahead. The intervention in Cambodia also points in the same direction.
If therefore President Nixon has indeed been trying to do two different things at the same time, silencing critics at home by withdrawing combat troops and continuing to give massive military support to the Saigon regime, he has run into more than temporary difficulty. On the one hand pressure will build up in the United States for a firm commitment on a total withdrawal; on the other, further reductions in the strength of the American forces in Viet Nam will become difficult because of the extension in the scope of the war.
President Nixon knows that Hanoi will not negotiate on the basis of the status quo so long as it is confident that it can win the war on the campuses and the streets in America. That is one reason why Mr. Spiro Agnew, the Vice-President, has been pouring ridicule on American liberals and radicals. But a campaign of this sort is hardly likely to silence criticism.
In a situation where there are so many imponderable factors, no prediction about the likely course of events is possible. One can only hope that Washington and Hanoi will not throw all restraint to the winds and will find some means at least of continuing the talks in Paris.
The Times of India, 6 May 1970