The Israelis are at pains to make it out that the Soviet Union had decided to install Sam-3 missiles and to send its own pilots to man MIG-21s in operational flights in the Nile delta even before they began deep penetration air raids into the UAR last January. But the evidence they have advanced in support of this claim is far from convincing. Even if their claim is taken at its face value, they cannot deny that they have provided a strong justification for the Soviet move. As such they must accept at least a part of the responsibility for their present predicament.
The Israelis have been guilty of arrogance of power ever since their victory in the six-day war against the Arabs three years ago. This explains to a large extent their insistence on direct negotiations, their vehement opposition to four-power talks, their rejection of the US proposals for a peaceful settlement, their refusal to spell out their minimum demands and their decision to bomb targets close to Cairo itself.
The Israeli government took the last step in opposition to the advice of almost all its friends and well-wishers abroad. It tried but failed to convince foreign experts that it undertook deep penetration raids primarily to reduce its losses resulting from UAR artillery attacks and occasional raids on its positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.
There can in fact be little doubt that the Israeli leaders acted in the belief that the raids would further expose the impotence of the UAR military machine, undermine the Egyptian people’s faith in President Nasser’s leadership and sap their morale. They hoped that in such a situation he would either be overthrown or forced to accept peace on Tel Aviv’s terms.
Hatred
The Israelis had at that stage worked themselves up into such a pitch of hatred of President Nasser that, contrary to the near unanimous view abroad, they regarded him as the single greatest, if not the only, obstacle to peace in West Asia. They therefore wanted to secure his overthrow.
They did not pause to ask if President Nasser might not be succeeded by a leadership even more intransigent from their point of view. Their calculation clearly was that once he was disposed of, the UAR would collapse into utter confusion and disorder and that it would be a long time before a new leadership capable of uniting the people and leading them in the struggle against Israel could arise.
The tragedy of it is that they persisted with the raids even after it had become evident that these did not shake either the people’s morale or their faith in President Nasser. It did not even cross their mind that the UAR leader would turn to the Russians and that in view of their vast investment in terms of military and economic aid in the region, they would have no option but to come to his rescue, specially for the defence of the heavily populated Nile delta.
There has of late been a good deal of speculation in some circles in the West that the hawks in the Kremlin, who were responsible for the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, have again strengthened their position and that the decision to install Sam-3 missiles in the UAR reflects a general hardening in the Soviet policy vis-à-vis the West. There is, however, little evidence to support the second inference.
Moderate
On the contrary, Soviet talks with the West German government have gone on satisfactorily; the negotiations with the United States for limiting the strategic nuclear arms race continue in spite of the US intervention in Cambodia; and Moscow has taken an unexpectedly moderate line in respect of the widening of the war in Indo-China. Also the Soviet Union’s strong denunciations of Peking in recent weeks show beyond reasonable doubt that the containment of China remains the Kremlin’s first priority.
On this reckoning, it follows that the Soviet moves in the Nile delta are largely defensive in nature. The Israelis and a number of Western publicists challenge this view. They suggest that the Russians are installing Sam-3 missiles in the Suez canal zone, that this will be followed by the introduction of Soviet pilots to deter Israeli raids on Egypt’s military positions and that these two moves will greatly strengthen the UAR’s offensive capability and endanger Israel’s presence on the canal and in the Sinai. They also allege that the Soviet objective is to reopen the Suez canal because this will facilitate the task of establishing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, influencing the course of developments along the Persian Gulf in the wake of the withdrawal of the British military power next year, and extending its trade and other economic links with all countries this side of the Suez. The implication is that the Soviet Union is prepared to run considerable risks in the service of its ambitions in the Indian Ocean area.
Since the Soviet Union is the only great power which suffers from the closure of the canal, it is naturally interested in having it reopened. But the real question is how far it is prepared to go to achieve this objective. It is difficult to give a categorical answer to it. It is however relevant to recall that since 1962 Moscow has followed an extremely cautious course in international relations. Even its intervention in Czechoslovakia does not invalidate this broad assessment.
It is being argued that the Kremlin has decided to abandon its cautious approach because it has come to the conclusion that the Nixon Administration is immobilised because of the turmoil in the United States over Cambodia and that no great risk is involved in turning the heat on Israel. But Mr. Brezhnev cannot possibly entertain such a view in the face of massive support for Israel’s request for 125 Skyhawks and Phantoms in the American Senate. He knows that the United States will come to the aid of Israel if the latter is hard pressed.
But President Nixon will be well advised not to be guided by conjectures and speculations regarding Russia’s alleged designs. He must bear in mind that Russian and Arab interests are not exactly identical, that Moscow may begin to lose some of its present leverage in the Arab world if it enables the Arabs to win back the territories they lost in 1967 and that the Soviet leadership may not possess a strong enough motivation to overcome its known reluctance and inability to act decisively because in all probability it is not particularly dissatisfied with the present situation in West Asia.
No Danger
An immediate American decision to accede to Tel Aviv’s request for 125 more Skyhawks and Phantoms can be justified either if Israel is in mortal danger or if it increases Washington’s leverage to a point where it is in a position to persuade Mrs. Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan to adopt a more reasonable attitude towards the Arabs. As of today, Israel is not in mortal danger and there is little evidence to show it is receptive to a US initiative for a peaceful settlement. On the contrary Tel Aviv is trying to make it appear as if it is holding the line for the United States against the Soviet Union and as if it is in America’s own interest to meet its requirements of military hardware.
In the prevailing situation, a move by the US to provide more planes to Israel can only embarrass its Arab friends like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and deny President Nasser the room for manoeuvre which he is evidently trying to secure. Witness his recent Cabinet reshuffle whereby Mr. Heykal, a known advocate of the desirability of a dialogue with the United States, has been appointed Minister for National Guidance.
It is unfortunate that an attempt is being made to revive the cold war atmosphere. Many argue that the Soviet Union can still be denied access to warm waters and a measure of influence in regions which were until recently either Western colonies or the West’s exclusive preserves. It should be evident by now that this hangover from the past cannot serve the interests of the West and must not be allowed to influence policies.
Whether the West likes it or not, the USSR will be present all over the world. While its influence cannot be eliminated, it can be contained within reasonable and proper limits provided the West is not out of sympathy with the aspirations of the countries concerned, as it is in West Asia. Thanks to Soviet moves, the United States has got an opportunity to persuade Israel to review and revise its ideas on security. It will be a pity if it throws away this chance.
The Times of India, 10 June 1970