Ideally, Asian societies need to be insulated from external conflicts so that they can at least buy some time to sort out their affairs. The policy of non-alignment was intended to serve that purpose. But it failed so much so that the third world has been a centre of Soviet-US competition since the mid-’fifties. At least four main factors have been responsible for the failure.
First, the leading champions of the concept of non-alignment themselves could not resist the temptation of taking advantage of the cold war. They sought to increase their leverage in world affairs by trying to act as mediators between the Western and Soviet blocs and by setting themselves up as the moral conscience of mankind. In the bargain some of them ironically invited the cold war to their own lands. This process was accelerated as their need for economic and military aid grew on account of their inability to raise enough domestic resources on the one hand and to resolve intra-regional disputes on the other. A genuine policy of non-alignment should have been accompanied by a low profile in international affairs.
Righteousness
Secondly, the leaders of each of the two power blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union, were in the ‘fifties and the ‘sixties so convinced of the righteousness of their respective cause that they were not prepared to concede that Asian countries facing altogether different problems had the right to stand aside and manage their affairs and disputes as best they could. Mr John Foster Dulles, for instance, made no secret of his view that non-alignment was immoral and spared no effort to involve as many Asian countries as possible in Washington-sponsored defence pacts. The Soviet Union, the weaker of the two super-powers, was more circumspect and took a more indulgent view of non-alignment. But it too spared no effort to recruit Asian nations to its side against the West, specially in the post-Stalin era.
The attitude of the United States has changed greatly on account of the Sino-Soviet split, the consequent realisation that the communist bloc is not monolithic, the detente with Russia after the confrontation over Cuba in October 1962 and above all the traumatic experience of the Viet Nam war. President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine whereby the United States has decided not to commit its ground troops directly in future Asian conflicts is an indication of the change. But unfortunately this has come about at a time when the Soviet Union is trying to acquire greater influence all along the Indian Ocean. Plainly a decline in American interest and commitment at this stage will involve the risk of an undue increase in Soviet power.
This will be an unhappy development for two reasons. First, since the Soviet Union is engaged in a fierce competition with China, an increase in its power and influence will increase the danger of Asian countries getting needlessly drawn into this conflict and attracting China’s hostility.
Secondly, Soviet influence will lead to an intensification of the ideological debate in Asian societies and distort their perspective. Since for reasons mentioned earlier they cannot in fact adopt the Soviet model, they will tend to go in for fake radicalism. By hindering capital accumulation this can seriously retard economic growth and foster an inefficient bureaucratic capitalism. Neither can be conducive to their political or economic health.
Non-Alignment
To return to the reasons for the failure of non-alignment, it should be noted that native political traditions have been so thoroughly disrupted that the elites in the Asian countries themselves today think largely in terms of imported political concepts. The result has been artificial ideological division and polarisation at all levels, with rival groups adopting pro-American, pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese postures and programmes when it is evident that the problems facing their countries are altogether different and call for different solutions.
Finally, the Chinese role has been of critical importance in involving Asia in the cold war. It is now widely recognised that its dominant leadership has, from the beginning of its rule in Peking in 1949, been anxious to eliminate Western as well as Soviet influence from Asia generally and from countries on its borders in particular. But it has unfortunately followed policies which have helped to legitimise American intervention and threaten to do the same now in respect of the Soviet Union.
It can be argued that US intervention antedates China’s and that American actions were the result of a thoroughly distorted view of Asian realities. Washington’s policy has been misguided from the time of the Korean war itself when it failed to realise that China was not a party to Pyongyang’s attack on the South and that Stalin had instigated it to strengthen Russia’s strategic position vis-a-vis both Japan and China. But Peking took no steps to disabuse the United States of its misgivings and subsequently to reassure fellow Asian nations that they had nothing to fear from it. Instead after the mid-fifties it has behaved as if it regards its own revolutionary experience and ideology applicable to all other countries.
China’s bark has been worse than its bite. But the bark has been enough to frighten neighbouring countries and make them look for cover. The situation, for instance, could have been strikingly different if Peking had left no room for doubt that it respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all other countries, that it had no intention of exporting revolution or assisting insurrections, communist or tribal, and that it did not wish to restrict the right of other governments to have cordial relations with America and Russia.
It follows from the above analysis that there is no pat solution to the problems of Asia. Even if the Asian nations are exceptionally lucky it will be decades before the new forces of change find a balance and an equilibrium. Meanwhile there will be a great deal of turmoil, stress and strain. But the fulfilment of certain conditions may make their problems a little more manageable and easier to handle.
As in the ‘fifties and the ‘sixties the Chinese role will be important in the ‘seventies and perhaps beyond. This does not mean that China will soon emerge as the third super-power and seek to carve out an exclusive sphere of influence for itself. Possession of nuclear weapons cannot by itself make a country a super power except in a very narrow sense. The critical issue is whether the Chinese will recognise that their revolutionary experience cannot be valid for other countries, that every nation has the right to discover by trial and error the kind of social, economic and political institutions it needs and that their willingness to respect the sovereignty and independence of other nations may well be the quickest and the cheapest method of achieving their own objective of reducing to reasonable proportions the power and influence of America and Russia in this part of the world.
Super-Powers
If the Chinese do not recognise this, the countries of South and South-East Asia will continue to attract the intervention of the two super-powers in one form or another. If, on the other hand, they revert to the Bandung spirit, the region will win some respite to come to grips with urgent problems of economic development and social and political reform.
Much of course depends on the duration and outcome of the present conflict in Indo-China. Since no forecast is possible on this question, any discussion on the future of this part of the world has to be necessarily tentative. But if somehow peace can be restored there, a serious and sustained effort will have to be made to reassure Peking and persuade it to behave as a member of the Asian community. This will require that countries in the Indian Ocean area reject the Russian umbrella which is being offered to them – in fact it is being extended over them in the name of collective security – and that Japan and India should somehow find the means of improving their relations with Peking.
There are already strong indications that Japan is beginning to figure more and more prominently in Chinese calculations. They seem to fear that by virtue of its economic strength and its aid programme which is expected to reach the impressive figure of $4 billion in 1974-75, Japan may come to dominate South-East Asia. Unless these apprehensions are set at rest China is likely to feel impelled to try to export revolution to make its influence felt. The consequences are not difficult to imagine.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 22 October 1970