Reports from Washington leave little room for doubt that the Nixon Administration has become highly suspicious of Moscow’s intentions primarily because it believes that Soviet experts have helped the UAR to introduce additional Sam-2 and Sam-3 missiles into the standstill zone along the Suez canal in violation of the cease-fire agreement.
The sudden shift in the Russian position on Berlin last week and the activities of the Soviet fleet in Cuba have only reinforced the American view that Moscow is testing President Nixon’s nerves and that it has not given up the aim of overtaking the U.S. in military power and political influence.
Russia’s return to the hardline on Berlin is relatively easy to understand and need not cause much concern because it is likely to be a temporary affair. Moscow’s policy of detente with West Germany has caused much confusion in East Germany and any concession by it on Berlin at this stage can only make Mr. Ulbricht’s position well nigh impossible. He needs time to realign his foreign policy which has so far rested on the hostility of both Moscow and Pankow to Bonn. On a long-term view it is inconceivable that the Kremlin will jettison its policy of stabilising the status quo in Central Europe. The stakes are too high. The Soviet Union needs access to the technology, capital and market of West Germany and the freedom to concentrate on the Chinese threat in Central Asia.
Not Sure
As for the activities of the Soviet naval fleet in Cuba, the American intelligence community itself is not yet sure that the Russians intend to set up a base for nuclear submarines there. It was in fact said to have been taken by surprise when the White House decided to leak the information to the press. This means that the deterioration in Russo-U.S. relations is largely the result of the American appraisal of Soviet actions in West Asia.
In spite of repeated denials by Moscow and Cairo it can safely be assumed that additional missiles have been set up in the standstill zone after the cease-fire agreement came into force on August 7 and that the UAR has done so with the help of Soviet experts. The question is: why has the Kremlin acted in this fashion?
It is self-evident that various Soviet moves in West Asia in the last one year need to be reexamined in the light of Mr. Heykal’s recent disclosure that President Nasser had a heart attack in September last year, that he never recovered fully, that he found it painful to stand for more than ten minutes on account of arthritis, that he wanted to retire and that only his sense of duty to his people persuaded him to carry on.
Since the Soviet Union had made massive investment in the UAR and depended a great deal on President Nasser’s prestige for its power and influence in the Arab world, it could not but be alarmed at this development. In view of the latter’s failing health it had to think in terms of acquiring a new leverage in the country.
The Russian decision to pour highly sophisticated equipment into the UAR in the past one year and to allow its own personnel to man the Sam-3 missiles and fly the improved version of MIG-21s needs to be viewed in the context not only of Israel’s deep penetration raids last year, but also of the Kremlin’s desire to acquire a more direct control of the military machine in the UAR. It is by no means fanciful to suggest that the same logic may have persuaded Moscow to permit or even encourage President Nasser to violate the cease-fire agreement.
Failure
Western commentators who rushed to the conclusion that President Nasser’s death had thrown the Soviet Union’s entire West Asia policy out of gear apparently failed to take into account the possibility that Moscow may have anticipated this eventuality and provided for it. The same failure accounts for the earlier speculation in the West that Moscow would use its influence to see to it that Mr. Aly Sabri succeeded President Nasser.
The crux of the matter is not the Soviet involvement in the violation of the ceasefire agreement but its remarkable success in stabilising its position in the UAR after President Nasser’s death. Even Washington would concede that it could not have executed a similar scheme with greater finesse.
The West Asian scene is full of contradictions with the result that it is impossible to predict the course of events there. But in spite of the many imponderables it is obvious that the region will witness a fairly intense and prolonged competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
This need not exclude a measure of co-operation between the two. Both are interested in ensuring that the Arab-Israeli conflict does not once again flare up into a full-fledged war and that they do not get drawn into it. The Soviet Union can therefore be depended upon to use its influence in Cairo in favour of an indefinite cease-fire. This has an additional attraction for Moscow in that it will enable it to pursue the policy of no-war-no-peace and to gain time to consolidate its influence with the new regime in Cairo.
If it is indeed true that the Kremlin was seriously interested in a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arabs last July, it seems to have reappraised its policy in the wake of President Nasser’s death and come to the conclusion that it is not in its interest, at least for the time being, to compel President Sadat to facilitate the resumption of negotiations with Tel Aviv under the auspices of Dr. Gunnar Jarring. There can be no other explanation for the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s statement whereby it has not only repudiated the specific U.S. charges but also dissociated itself for the first time from the ceasefire agreement. It has said that it has never been a party to any agreement. This contrasts sharply with the pressure which the Soviet leaders had brought to bear on President Nasser last July.
The new Soviet posture suits President Sadat. He can adopt a tough position towards Israel and the United States without being called upon to take bold and risky decisions. He can also claim that the UAR continues to fight for the interests of all Arabs, specially the Palestinians, and is therefore entitled to enjoy the same pre-eminence in the Arab world as under President Nasser.
Tel Aviv also has no good reason to be alarmed at the turn of events. It can depend on whole-hearted U.S. support without being called upon to withdraw from almost all the territories it seized in 1967. But the Russian moves create serious problems for Washington.
In a sense it is ironical that West Asia should have become the focal point of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in this age. As Mr. Walter Laquer has noted in his authoritative study, The Struggle for the Middle East (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London):
Low Rating
“The Middle East has long ceased to be geographically important; there are no cross-roads in the air age. Military bases in the area are desirable but by no means essential; the ICBM has changed all that. The United States is not a major importer of oil; less than 3 per cent of the oil consumed in America comes from the Middle East, and this could be easily replaced…. As far as American national interest is concerned, Middle East oil does not figure high…. Despite the traditional Russian interest in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has no vital economic stake in the region, nor does the Middle East constitute a military threat. The Soviet drive to the south is basically a forward political-prestige operation, potentially rewarding, but not essential.”
But Mr. Laquer himself adds: “The fate of the area as a whole will remain a matter of supreme concern for all American policymakers, for if it were to become an exclusive Soviet sphere of interest the repercussions on the world situation would be immediate and far-reaching. It would decisively shift the balance of power and would have incalculable consequences all over the world.”
The picture is perhaps overdrawn. The Arabs are deeply divided and President Nasser’s death has destroyed even the myth of Arab unity. In other words, no one power, be it the Soviet Union or the United States, can possibly dominate the entire Arab world.
The Soviet Union may find that the returns are not commensurate with the massive investment in military and economic aid and it may once again revise its priorities and give greater importance to a détente with the United States.
But right now Moscow seems to be willing to bear the cost and is not deterred either by the emotional and unstable character of Arab nationalism or by the deep hostility of Arab governments against one another.
The Nixon Administration has, in any case, convinced itself that West Asia is far more important than south-east Asia and that it has no choice but to contest the Russian bid for hegemony there. The larger implication of this conclusion is that once again the United States is more concerned with maintaining the power balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than with meeting the Chinese threat which has obsessed it since the Cuban crisis in 1962. Unless Moscow reassures Washington, the United States will rearrange its foreign policy and defence priorities with very wide-ranging consequences. The Government of India will need to watch the ever changing power play in the America-Russia-China triangle with great care.
The Times of India, 14 October 1970