A secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs attended the Chinese National Day reception in New Delhi on Friday for the first time since 1962. This and other similar moves by the two sides show that there is a greater degree of civility in the relations between the two countries now than at any time during the past eight years. This is a welcome development. But politeness and courtesy are not ends in themselves. The two countries have yet to find a way to normalise their relations.
It will be naive for anyone in New Delhi to conclude that the Chinese are keen to make a new beginning. There are a few straws in the wind but the evidence is by no means conclusive. New Delhi cannot lower its guard just because Chairman Mao Tse-tung has smiled at the Indian Charge d’Affaires in Peking and Chinese envoys have attended Indian receptions in New Delhi and elsewhere.
But nor can it dismiss these gestures, small as they are, as of no account? They do represent a change, howsoever slight, in China’s approach. It is not an accident that of late China has also toned down its propaganda campaign against this country. There are a number of factors which can be said to make it necessary for Peking today to take a second hard look at its India policy.
First, though the Sino-Soviet border conflict has been defused and the possibility of a pre-emptive strike by Moscow eliminated, at least for the time being, the Chinese leaders want to make sure that India does not join Russia in the latter’s continuing efforts to encircle their country.
Pertinent
It is pertinent to point out that Moscow has not given up its plan to organise a “collective security system” in Asia, that its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean will be directed as much against China as against the US influence in the region and that Peking is fully cognisant of it. The Chinese went to great lengths in the past to avoid encirclement by the United States and it is only natural they should wish to frustrate similar Soviet moves as well.
Secondly, the Chinese leadership is concerned, if not alarmed, over the rise of Japan as a great power centre in the Far East, the Pacific and South-East Asia. It is already the world’s third most important industrial power and it hopes to surpass not only the Soviet Union but also the United States in steel production in the next five years. It has launched an ambitious nuclear power programme and it is well advanced in rocketry. It is fast expanding its navy and by 1975 it will be spending $4 billion a year on economic aid most of which will go to neighbouring countries.
China cannot possibly match Japan’s effort in any one of these fields and whatever its leadership may believe, its revolutionary ideology is not a substitute for economic strength so much so that even a communist North Viet Nam is, for instance, likely to regard it most profitable to develop close economic ties with Japan. All in all, it does not make much sense for Peking to direct its hostility towards India when Japan is rapidly emerging as a third super-power.
Thirdly, its dispute with India over the borders has for all practical purposes been frozen to the satisfaction of China. No sane person here thinks it feasible to change these to his country’s advantage. The issue does not figure in the programme of any major political party. This means that if it is indeed true that Peking undertook the border war with India in 1962 primarily with a view to securing its control over the strategically important Aksaichin plateau, it has nothing more to gain by allowing old bitterness to poison its relations with this country indefinitely.
Assumption
In the past it has been widely assumed that the Chinese attack on Indian positions in 1962, specially those below the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, was a prelude to an expansionist drive southward. The Chinese withdrawal did not assuage these fears for understandable reasons. But since Peking has not after 1962 made any serious move either to upset the status quo, which is generally favourable to India, in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, or to intrude into territories south of the McMahon Line, New Delhi owes it to itself to re-examine its assessment of Chinese intentions and policies. If it comes to the conclusion that Peking is not pursuing an expansionist policy in the traditional sense, it can suitably revise its own approach.
Peking is no doubt encouraging the Naxalites and has provided a certain amount of assistance to Naga rebels. But these actions cannot be regarded as anything more than irritants. Judging from the experience of other countries, there is reason to believe that once some improvement takes place in Sino-Indian relations, the Chinese Government may not hesitate to disown the Naxalites and the Naga rebels. Generally it does not allow either relatively unimportant issues like these or so-called ideological considerations to complicate its relations with States with whom it has decided to establish friendly ties.
All this means that while it is far from certain that the Chinese are interested in restoration of normal relations with this country, the possibility that they are need not be dismissed, particularly in a somewhat long-term perspective. How then should the problem be approached?
To begin with, it is futile to think in terms of border negotiations with or without conditions now or in the near future because a formal agreement is just not possible. The Chinese have been, and are in all probability still, prepared to give up their claims in NEFA against an Indian acknowledgement of their sovereignty over Aksaichin. But whatever one’s view of the advantages or disadvantages of such a deal for this country, no government here can in the foreseeable future go in for it.
New Delhi can at some point expect to reach an informal though firm understanding with Peking that the latter will continue to honour the status quo in the Himalayas in its totality. This implies that China will recognise India’s special position in the border States, as it did once, and stop interference not only in this country’s domestic affairs but also in Northern Burma. But such an understanding can only follow and not precede an improvement in relations and a consequent restoration of trust in each other’s bona fides.
In a sense this is the crux of the matter. The deterioration in Sino-Indian relations in the ’fifties and the ’sixties can be attributed to the lack of mutual trust. Both sides suspected each other’s motives even during the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai period. While the Chinese thought that India did not like their occupation of Tibet and wanted somehow to undo it, New Delhi feared that Peking’s control over Tibet might serve as a stepping stone to the realisation of its wider ambitions. Much of the misunderstanding and the consequent tragic war could have been avoided if Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai had been candid in the early stages of their contacts. Instead they evaded issues of direct interest to the two countries, apparently in the mistaken hope that these will either disappear or become easier to handle with the passage of time.
Neighbours
That tragic story must not be repeated again. If and when it becomes possible for the two countries to start a dialogue, the exchange must be frank and free from any kind of sentimentalism and make-believe. They face each other as neighbours as they have never done before in history and they cannot hope to establish stable relations by dodging painful issues.
Such a dialogue is however not yet a practical proposition. The question is: what can be done right now to break the stalemate?
It is much easier for China to take an initiative than for India. It can, for example, put an end to its hostile propaganda and its aid to the Naxalites and the Nagas. But this does not mean that India can adopt a passive position.
The Soviet Union has negotiated agreements with the Chinese for the exchange of ambassadors and resumption of border trade. India can do the same. Even if it is not possible to resume border trade immediately, there is no reason why New Delhi should not sound Peking on the question of exchanging ambassadors.
Mr. Swaran Singh has already made it known that India fully supports China’s admission to the United Nations. He should also take steps to remove whatever misgivings exist in Peking regarding this country’s attitude towards Formosa and Mr. Brezhnev’s proposal for a collective security arrangement in Asia. India has in fact not been involved in any move to frustrate China’s claim to Formosa or to encircle it. But it may still be useful for New Delhi to reaffirm its policy on both these questions in unambiguous terms.
It is impossible to predict China’s response to the proposed moves. But it is obvious that the situation has changed greatly since 1962 and that it should therefore be possible for the two countries to feel their way towards some degree of understanding. Their national interests may diverge but not to the extent that a measure of accommodation is not possible.
The Times of India, 5 October 1970