Peking’s ping-pong diplomacy and the slight thaw in Sino-American relations cannot alter the fact that Washington and Moscow remain the principal centres of power and that the future course of developments in the world will continue to depend a great deal on their policies and actions.
China has finally come out of the isolation it imposed on itself during the period of the cultural revolution. It has lived down the notoriety it earned during the 1966-68 upheaval and resumed normal diplomatic and trade relations with many of the 53 nations which recognise it. It has indicated its desire to join the United Nations and it has a reasonable chance of being admitted next year if not next October. It has made a dramatic gesture to the United States and thereby demonstrated once again its capacity to pursue a more flexible foreign policy.
But in spite of its intrinsic importance by virtue of its size, rapidly growing nuclear arsenal and economic performance, China is caught in a basic contradiction and its influence in the international community is likely to remain limited and even precarious unless it overcomes that obstacle.
Undecided
Unlike the Soviet Union, China has not yet decided that it seeks prestige and influence as a great power and not as a revolutionary centre. In theory the two roles may be said to reinforce each other. But in practice they often contradict each other. Moscow has made its choice and settled for a great power role. Peking has so far evaded this issue to its detriment.
China has also not settled its revolutionary priorities. It is, for instance, not at all clear whether it is interested principally in promoting communist revolutions or in building up an Afro-Asian-Latin American united front which can help these under-developed regions to deal with the rich industrialised north on a basis of greater equality in respect of trade and aid.
Peking can, of course, quote what it has said on various occasions to prove that it has a coherent world view and that its policies flow from it. But this is make-believe. Surely the Chinese know on the basis of their own experience in the last 15 years that they cannot act as leaders of Afro-Asia-Latin America and at the same time run a worldwide revolutionary movement.
As before their open split with the Soviet Union in the early ‘sixties, the Chinese can once again take advantage of the fact that the Russo-US rivalry remains the dominant feature of the international scene by leaning this time towards Washington. But they will soon discover that there are severe limit to the gains they can make in this way.
The United States will clearly go some distance to accommodate them. President Nixon spelt out his views on this issue in a chat with Mr. Howard K. Smith, ABC TV commentator as early as last July. Mr. Smith quoted him as having said:
“Russia is engaged in a puzzling and dangerous strategy”, including “pushing missile production”, expanding naval activity, sending pilots to Egypt, putting divisions on China’s borders.
“Nobody here has a good explanation of why, in a time of bland peace with the United States, Russia is pushing so hard. But she is visibly doing it. It endangers the world balance which keeps peace.”
“One counter-measure would be to regularise relations with her neighbouring opponent. No one knows what information and advantage might come once channels have been opened.”
Other factors can also facilitate a Sino-US thaw.
First, since America is gradually pulling out of South Viet Nam and is reducing its military presence in Thailand, Japan and South Korea, Peking need not be obsessed by the fear of encirclement by it.
Secondly, while Russia and China have deployed about 750,000 troops along their common disputed borders, there is no similar confrontation between Washington and Peking.
Thirdly, though the United States is and will remain a Pacific power, unlike Russia, it is not an Asian country with common frontiers with China.
Fourthly, despite the hostilities of the last two decades, there are no historical memories of enmity and racial antagonism between Washington and Peking. Apart from Viet Nam, Formosa is in fact the only major issue of contention between them and it is not beyond human ingenuity to freeze it if not resolve it.
But when due allowance has been made for all these factors the fact remains that the United States can neither abandon its search for widening the area of agreement and co-operation with the Soviet Union because there is no other means of stabilising the world situation nor feel comfortable in the company of China so long as it does not give up its attempt to subvert other regimes.
Failed
In the second half of the ‘fifties China tried and failed to coerce the Soviet Union into abandoning the policy of a limited detente with the United States on the one hand and of extending aid to so-called bourgeois governments like that of Mr. Nehru in India on the other. It has even less leverage today in its dealings with Washington and cannot therefore expect to push it towards a confrontation with Moscow.
China will undoubtedly have some room for manoeuvre so long as the relations between the two super-powers remain fluid, as they in all probability will in the foreseeable future, for the simple reason that Washington and Moscow will co-operate as well as compete. But on the present reckoning, it will be premature to say that a triangular world is about to change into a bipolar one. It will be even more unrealistic to believe that America and China can gang up against Russia. The Soviet propaganda on this point is as flimsy as the Chinese charge of Russo-American collusion against Peking.
Much of the present trouble between the United States and the Soviet Union is the result of Russian actions in West Asia. Moscow has introduced several thousand of its own personnel and extremely sophisticated missiles and aircraft, including the world’s fastest MIG-23 interceptors, into the UAR and thus posed a major problem for Washington. The latter is worried that the former is trying not only to acquire a dominant position in the oil-rich Arab world but also to turn the southern flank of NATO. But this problem, however complicated, should be viewed in the light of the premise of both American and Russian policies that they will somehow always manage to avoid a direct and headlong confrontation.
Three other points should be borne in mind in a discussion of Russo-US relations. First, both are essentially status quo powers. Right now they are co-operating in Ceylon in helping the government there to crush the extremists. Secondly, the virtual elimination of the ideological rhetoric from the contest has made it much more manageable. Thirdly, in spite of their competition they are irrevocably opposed to the Chinese concept of wars of national liberation.
Realistic Basis
If it is correct to say that Russo-US cooperation is not only more meaningful for world order but also more practical than a Sino-American detente, it follows that while New Delhi should do all it can to open a dialogue with China and to normalise relations with it, it has no good reason to behave as if it has no other option but to bend over backwards to please Peking. It is in fact far more important for India to ensure that its communications with both Moscow and Washington are put on a more realistic basis.
The Ministry of External Affairs made a number of false moves in recent years. It ordered the closure of American cultural centres, sided with the Soviet Union in its border dispute with China and even endorsed the wholly nebulous Brezhnev doctrine of collective security in Asia. Mercifully, that phase is over and whatever its grievances against New Delhi, Washington does not bear any permanent grudge against it.
As for Peking, there were some indications last year that it was perhaps interested in improved ties with this country. But following the outbreak of the crisis in Pakistan the Chinese rulers seem to have reverted to their old formulation that the Indian government is “reactionary” and “expansionist” and that it is colluding with US “imperialists” and Soviet “social imperialists.”
It is more than possible that this propaganda line does not represent a well-defined Chinese policy. The brevity of their references to developments in East Bengal and alleged interference by India undoubtedly leave room for the hope that Peking may adjust itself to the new emerging reality in the sub-continent when it recognises, as it must in course of time, that Pakistan can no longer serve as a counterweight against this country. Meanwhile India should put it on record that it seeks normal and good relations with Peking. China swears a great deal by Panchshila these days, so can India.
The Times of India 5 May 1971