Indian policy-makers have been most inept in failing to take the initiative to open a dialogue with China during the current crisis resulting from the Pakistan army’s carnage in East Bengal and the resulting influx of over three million refugees into this country. This may well come to be regarded as a major blunder when the history of this anxious period in the sub-continent comes to be written.
The Indian Government should have explored the chances of an improvement in relations between the two countries last year when the Chinese dropped fairly broad hints – Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s friendly remarks to the Indian Charge d’Affaires on the occasion of the May Day celebrations in Peking, a call by the Chinese Ambassador in Cairo on his Indian counterpart and a return to more polite norms in diplomatic exchanges and notes – to indicate that they were interested in mending fences with this country. But it failed to do so.
Passive Attitude
It does not speak too well of the Ministry of External Affairs that it took up a wholly passive attitude and repeated the inane statement that Peking had not made a specific move and that it was ready on its part to respond to a more positive Chinese initiative. It should have known that this was by no means the most effective way of doing business with Peking.
Its inhibition was evidently the result of an obsession with the past, the lack of awareness of changes in the international scene, and preoccupation with domestic problems. The atmosphere in New Delhi was so vitiated throughout last year that even the External Affairs Ministry officials took more interest in the internal power struggle than in external developments with results that are there for anyone to see.
The passivity of India’s response to the Chinese moves was also the result of three other factors. The country lacked a strong government last year capable of acting firmly on a ticklish problem like relations with China; the Government was afraid that an overture to China might have an adverse effect on its relations with Russia; and in the absence of a new and urgent problem between the two countries it felt that the task of improving relations with China could be postponed to a more propitious time.
But the policy-makers should have woken up to the need for proper communications with China at least when the Pakistani military regime embarked on a reign of total terror in East Bengal and created conditions in which millions of ordinary people were bound to flee their homes and take refuge in India. As it happened, the midterm poll to the Lok Sabha had meanwhile produced a government which had the necessary authority to tackle the most awkward problems.
Several alternative means were open to New Delhi for breaking the ice with Peking. Mr. Bahadur Singh in Cairo could have taken the initiative to meet the Chinese Ambassador there as the latter had done last October. Some other Indian envoy in a friendly capital could have sought out his Chinese counterpart. New Delhi could have requested Belgrade or Bucharest to convey its viewpoint to Peking. Mrs. Gandhi could have included Mr. Chou En-lai among the heads of governments to whom she wrote personal letters explaining the tragic consequences for India of the Pakistan army’s savagery in East Bengal. Finally, either the Minister for External Affairs or the Foreign Secretary could have invited the Chinese Charge d’Affaires for a friendly discussion.
It is possible that the Chinese would have rebuffed the Indian initiative. It is equally plausible that after having listened to its views, they would have gone ahead and done precisely what they have done now, that is, accuse India of expansionism, endorse General Yahya Khan’s claim that what has happened in East Bengal is entirely an internal affair of Pakistan, assure support to the military regime against this country’s alleged designs and provide Pakistan’s military machine with a limited amount of hardware.
Even so, New Delhi had no reason to assume in advance that any attempt on its part to open a dialogue with Peking was bound to fail. It is in fact more than likely that Peking itself may be finding it necessary to re-examine its policies towards the sub-continent.
Counter-Weight
Thus while the Chinese look upon Pakistan as a useful counter-weight against India which, according to them, has been acting in collusion with the Soviet Union and the United States, it does not and cannot follow that they are not appraising the situation in the light of what is happening in East Bengal. They have not only refrained from condemning either the Awami League or the Mukti Fauj but also tried to sidetrack the issue. The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Han Nien-lung, has gone out of his way to assure support to Pakistan on Kashmir when what the military regime wants just now is a complete endorsement of its policy in East Bengal.
Three points can bear mention here. First, Chinese comment in the Press and on radio on East Bengal has been remarkably brief and non-committal. Secondly, a careful reading of Mr. Chou En-lai’s message to General Yahya Khan last April shows that he favours a political, not a military, solution. Finally, China has not mounted anything like a campaign against this country which suggests that either it does not accept at their face value the Pakistani charges of intervention against India or it does not regard alleged Indian interference as a threat to its own long-term interests in the region.
This is not to suggest that Peking will not object to and oppose direct Indian military intervention in support of what Chairman Mao Tse-tung himself will in different geographical circumstances describe as a just war against colonial exploitation. But since India has not thought in these terms, it has no good reason to feel inhibited in explaining its assessment of developments in East Bengal to Peking and in requesting it to use its influence in Islamabad in favour of a just political settlement.
Irrespective of whether one approves or disapproves of India’s modest view of its role in South Asia, it has never taken the position that by virtue of its size, culture and potentialities, it is entitled to expect other countries to follow its lead in international relations. On the contrary, it has accepted more or less explicitly since the early ’sixties, if not ’fifties, the right of the two super-powers to have a say in the affairs of the region. Why should it then so staunchly oppose the Chinese claim to a similar role?
Power Structure
This opposition can make some sense if New Delhi can depend on the wholehearted support of the United States and the Soviet Union for a fundamental and far-reaching reorganisation of the power structure in the sub-continent as necessitated by the popular revolt in East Bengal and if they have the desire and the capacity to act firmly and decisively in disregard of China’s wishes. But this is not the case.
It is a matter of speculation whether there is a causal connection between Mr. Chou En-lai’s letter to General Yahya Khan on the one hand and the toning down of the Soviet condemnation of Islamabad’s brutal actions in East Bengal and the cautious US attitude on the other. But the fact remains that two super-powers have not shown the will to call a halt to the carnage in East Bengal and to assure India of support in case of the crushing burden of looking after millions of refugees compels it to act. Instead they have been counselling this country to observe “restraint” though they know that the influx of millions of fugitives will disrupt its economic and social fabric.
It is hardly necessary to say that India would have been in a much stronger position to deal with the present menace if it had mended its fences with China in good time. The relevant point now is that on the present evidence this country is finding it extremely difficult to secure even its minimum vital interests without Peking’s acquiescence.
There is scope for honest differences of opinion on whether this is the proper time for India to make an approach to China and seek its assistance in ending the genocide in East Bengal and arranging a political settlement between the military regime in Pakistan and the freedom fighters. But New Delhi’s need for a better understanding with Peking is too urgent to allow mere tactical considerations to prevail.
The Times of India 3 June 1971