Neither America’s Asian allies like Japan, South Viet Nam and Formosa nor China’s friends in Hanoi and elsewhere can legitimately take exception to the Nixon-Chou statement as it stands. In fact both the US President and the Chinese Prime Minister can quote it at length in support of their claim that they have not sacrificed either their principles or the interests of their supporters in their search for normalisation of Sino-US relations.
But no one can take this communiqué at its face value. For instance, it does not make even passing reference to the Soviet Union when it is common knowledge that in arranging the summit both President Nixon and Chairman Mao Tse-tung have to no small extent been guided by their common distrust and fear of Moscow and the subject must have dominated the talks in Peking.
The discussions between Mr Nixon and Mr Chou En-lai have been conducted in great secrecy so much so that even the US Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister have for all practical purposes been kept in the dark. It should therefore be evident that the joint statement cannot provide an adequate insight into what has transpired in Peking. By the same token it cannot serve as an effective guide to what the two governments are likely to do to deepen and widen the understanding that may have been reached between them. It seems that it has been issued largely in order to avoid the impression that the talks have either failed or led to a secret deal.
Dialogue
This is not to suggest that the Sino-US dialogue has already produced a detente which will soon develop into an entente. The differences between the two countries remain serious and it may not be possible to resolve all of them even with the passage of time. But Mr. Nixon on the one hand and Mr. Mao Tse-tung and Mr. Chou En-lai on the other have initiated a process which is bound to acquire its own momentum and logic as it progresses.
Mr. Nixon is indulging in hyperbole when he says that the past one week has changed history or that it has paved the way for a generation of peace. His visit by itself has done nothing of the kind. But it is at once a symbol of the changes that have already taken place in the international scene and a harbinger of those that are likely to occur in coming years. The world is ceasing to be bipolar. It is becoming multi-polar and Mr. Nixon’s visit to Peking is part of this complex process.
It all began at least ten years ago when the Sino-Soviet split came into the open and the more discerning Americans began to recognise that China did not constitute a threat to their vital interests. But two additional developments had to take place before an American President could think in terms of visiting Peking and Mr. Mao Tse-tung of actually inviting him. The US had to be shocked out of its conviction that it was its manifest destiny to dominate the world and Mr. Mao Tse-tung had to create a ruling elite which was not inhibited by the concept of “proletarian internationalism” and was ready to deal with America strictly on the basis of China’s national interests.
These two conditions have now been fulfilled. As a result of the US failure to win the extremely cruel and senseless war in Indochina, despite a colossal investment in men and resources, the American people have lost the will and the desire to serve as the world’s gendarmerie. They have recognised that their power to impose their will on the rest of the world is not unlimited. Simultaneously, through two purges – one at the time of the cultural revolution and the other last summer – Chairman Mao Tse-tung has got rid of colleagues who took the twin concepts of socialist unity and anti-imperialism sufficiently seriously to be ready to make common cause with the Soviet Union against the United States. The two countries are therefore ready to deal with each other on a pragmatic basis.
Anti-Sovietism
On the face of it this is subject to the proviso that orthodox elements do not seize power in Peking when Chairman Mao Tse-tung either dies or is incapacitated. But if the present leadership is around long enough to ensure that the detente with the United States strikes roots, his successors may not have sufficient incentive to reverse the present policy. This may well have been Chairman Mao’s calculation when he told the late Mr. Edgar Snow in December 1970 that Mr. Nixon was welcome to visit Peking. On their part, the Americans, too, have been wanting to place themselves in a position where they can hope to influence the views and policies of China’s would-be rulers.
On this reckoning China cannot be expected to get over its present anti-Sovietism in the foreseeable future. Peking is undoubtedly concerned over Russia’s massive military presence on its borders and Moscow’s willingness to help regimes which are nervous about China’s intentions. But even if these specific points of conflict can somehow be frozen, the present leadership in Peking would need to stick to its anti-Soviet posture out of domestic compulsions.
Mr. Nixon is obviously not working under any such pressure. But if he is serious about the proposed detente with China not only in the immediate future but in the long run he, too, will find it necessary to present the Soviet Union in an unfavourable light even as he negotiates and concludes agreements on questions like mutual restraint on the development of nuclear missiles and reduction of forces in Europe.
The Soviet Union was apparently taken by surprise last July when Mr. Kissinger made a secret visit to Peking and secured an invitation for President Nixon. Apparently it had not calculated that both sides were willing to run major risks to end the anomalous situation that they could not, despite their common antipathy to Moscow, even engage in serious discussions. It probably believed that their differences over Formosa and Indochina could neither be bridged nor circumvented. Since then it has made a series of moves in anticipation of the challenge of a possible Sino-US detente.
It has made concessions on Berlin and compelled East Germany to accept the new four-Power agreement which denies its sovereignty over the routes to the city. It has reduced the pressure on Rumania and has sought to reassure the Yugoslavs that its growing naval presence in the Mediterranean does not constitute a threat to them. It has left President Sadat in no doubt that it does not favour another round of war in West Asia despite Israel’s continued refusal to implement the Security Council’s resolution which requires it to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. It has concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with India. In spite of its earlier reservations, it has backed the people of Bangladesh in their struggle for independence. It has intensified its efforts to woo Japan and it is now getting ready to receive President Nixon and possibly to sign with him an interim agreement on preventing the future development and deployment of ballistic missiles.
This is not all. A careful perusal of their propaganda in recent months will show that the Russians are trying to embarrass Chairman Mao and Mr. Chou En-lai by making it out that the Chinese leaders are prepared to compromise with “US imperialism” on Viet Nam, to split whatever is left of the leadership in Peking by reinforcing the doubts of those who do not approve of the present policy and to strengthen the position of those American leaders who believe that Mr. Nixon will be ill-advised if he jeopardises the prospects of wide-ranging agreements with the Soviet Union for the sake of a shaky detente with China.
Bi-Polar
Only the future will show whether this is an adequate response to the new situation on the part of the Soviet leaders. But it seems that if they ever thought that the Soviet Union could emerge as the dominant powder all over the world in the wake of an unavoidable and substantial cut in US commitments abroad, it will have to look at its assumptions all over again. In fact, its weakness in Eastern Europe and the Arab world can be expected to become more and more apparent as it becomes evident that the advantage flowing from its expanding military prowess is cancelled by the very possibility of a Sino-US detente.
Thus whatever way one looks at Mr. Nixon’s visit to Peking, it is an event of historic significance, it should not be judged in terms of the limited agreements that have been announced in respect of trade, cultural and scientific exchanges and political contacts but in those of the changes in the world scene that have made it possible and of the changes that are likely to follow it. It represents a landmark symbolising as it does the end of a bipolar world and with it of American as well as Russian bids for political influence commensurate with their military power. A multi-polar world may not be more peaceful or stable than a bipolar one. But that is a different story.
It is almost impossible at this stage to spell the consequences of the Nixon-Chou talks for this country. But there is no reason for it to be unduly perturbed. For one thing, the United States has not endorsed the Chinese support for the so-called right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir and thus indicated, however indirectly, its interest in a stable sub-continent. For another, it is difficult to believe that Pakistan can pose too serious threat to India even with such external support as it can mobilise.
The Times of India 29 February 1972