Even if President Nixon is telling the truth when he says that he has not made any secret deal with Mr. Chou En-lai, it is reasonably certain that the statement issued at the conclusion of his visit to China is not an adequate guide to their discussions. This is evident from the fact that it does not contain even a single reference to the Soviet Union or Bangladesh.
It is fatuous for Mr. Nixon to say that he “will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs”. He cannot do so even if he wants to. The question is whether he is keen to ensure that the interests of other countries as well as their relations with the United States do not suffer as a result of his new-found love for China. There is little to show that he is. India is a case in point.
There was no compulsion for him to have turned a blind eye to the terrible sufferings of the people of Bangladesh at the hands of the Pakistan army or to adopt a blatantly hostile attitude towards India last year as he went ahead with his plan to open a dialogue with Peking. But he did so in the hope that this would facilitate his task of wooing China.
Disregard
India was taken by surprise last June when American newspapers revealed that Mr. Nixon had authorised continued arms supplies to Pakistan within a couple of weeks of the beginning of the military crackdown in East Bengal on March 25 and that he had done so in disregard of the recommendations of both the State Department and the Pentagon and in full knowledge of the magnitude of the reign of terror in Bangladesh. Since this action did not make sense in view of America’s generally sympathetic attitude towards the aspirations of the people of Bangladesh in the past, the moderate and democratic character of the Awami League and the massive influx of terrorised refugees into this country’s highly sensitive border states, it came to be widely accepted that he had been guided primarily by his past association with the Pakistani military junta. But in retrospect it seems that this was only part of the truth.
On the eve of his trip to Peking, Mr. Nixon himself disclosed that though he took steps to open talks with the Chinese soon after he assumed office in 1969, it was only last April that he received a message from them that they were prepared to receive his representative. It was about this time that he decided to continue military supplies to Islamabad. It is hard to believe that this was a mere coincidence.
It is not known whether the Chinese conveyed in that message their interest in the survival of Pakistan in the old form to Mr. Nixon as early as last April. But it is no secret that on April 2 last year Mr. Chou En-lai came out openly in support of Islamabad in its confrontation with the people of Bangladesh and assured Genera Yahya Khan of Peking’s support in preserving Pakistan’s “state sovereignty and national independence” against alleged encroachments and threats by India. His message to Mr. Nixon and the US decision to continue military supplies to Islamabad followed. Apparently the US President read the Chinese Prime Minister’s communications to General Yahya Khan and himself together, drew the appropriate conclusion, and accordingly modified the US attitude towards India and the people of Bangladesh.
This was by no means the end of the story. After his secret visit to Peking and marathon talks with Mr. Chou En-lai there last July, Mr Kissinger is reported to have told the Indian Ambassador in Washington that the Chinese will intervene – Peking itself made no significant moves on the border – if this country showed the temerity to act in defence of its vital interests and that the United States would not in that event come to its assistance. This was not only a thinly veiled attempt at blackmail but also a repudiation of the earlier assurance that India could depend on American support in the event of a Chinese attack. President Johnson, it may be recalled, had even offered this country the US nuclear umbrella against a Chinese threat.
It was obviously in this framework of a search for a detente with China that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger deliberately distorted the facts both before and during the Indo-Pakistan war last December. Other factors may have influenced their conduct but their bid to woo China was clearly the dominant one.
Predicament
Japan finds itself in a somewhat similar predicament as a result of the change in the US policy towards China and is now trying belatedly to assert its independence in international relations. Ignoring American advice, it has established diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia and sent a high-power delegation to Hanoi.
The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, has been aggrieved that he was not taken into confidence in connection with Mr. Kissinger’s first trip to Peking last July and that he was informed of Mr. Chou En-lai’s invitation and Mr. Nixon’s acceptance of it only a fewer minutes before the latter’s broadcast. But this is by itself not the central issue.
The crux of the matter is that after having persuaded Japan to expand its defence forces and make investments in Asian countries as part of its own policy of containing China, the United States is now beginning to behave as if the containment of Japan’s economic power is one of the principal objectives of its policy.
The point is not whether the previous approach was better suited to serve the cause of peace, stability and progress in the region than the present one. It is that Mr. Nixon cannot in all honesty claim that Japan’s interests, as Tokyo has come to see them at least partly under the influence and even pressure of Washington, will not suffer as a result of his studious courtship of China.
He can, of course, argue with some justification that even if the previous administrations were not mistaken in pursuing a Japan-centred Asia policy, it has become out of date on account of two major developments – the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China and the expansion of Japanese economic power to the point where it has come to constitute a major challenge for America itself. But this is not what he is saying. Instead, he is claiming that it is possible to build bridges with China within the existing framework of America’s Asia policy. This is plainly absurd. He should have the honesty and courage to declare that he is trying to build a new structure and that he cannot help it if in the process large chunks of the old have to be demolished or suitably modified.
Pledge
Mr. Nixon cannot also convince anyone that he has not whittled down US commitment to Formosa. This is not to suggest that the United States should have rearmed Marshal Chiang Kai-shek’s forces but to point out that it is now backing away from its solemn pledge to protect the island republic as a separate entity.
All this cannot but feed the fear in a number of Asian countries that from the one extreme of unremitting and senseless hostility to China, the United States may swing to the other extreme of ignoring the legitimate interests of others. This apprehension could have been avoided at least in India’s case if only Mr. Nixon had not shown utter insensitivity to the carnage in Bangladesh and recognised that, faced with the burden of ten million refugees, New Delhi had no choice but to act. Even now he can undo some of the damage to Indo-US relations if he recognises Bangladesh, resumes credits to this country and uses his influence in Islamabad to persuade it to abandon the dangerous policy of confrontation with Delhi.
It may not be fair to suggest, as some of his countrymen have done, that Mr, Nixon has already given away a lot without any quid pro quo by Mr. Chou En-lai. But this can happen unless the US President and his advisers face up to the fact that the Chinese are extremely tough negotiators and that, unlike the Americans, they do not look for quick results. It is notable that despite their obsession with the Soviet Union and their weakness resulting from the repeated purges in the leadership, they have made sure that all serious negotiations take place in Peking and not in Washington.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung may be mistaken in comparing Mr. Nixon with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek. But there can be little doubt that he has already succeeded in promoting misunderstanding between the United States on the one hand and India and Japan on the other. He, too, faces serious problems at home as well as in his relations with North Viet Nam and North Korea. But that is a different question.
The Times of India 3 March 1972