Peking seems to have changed its mind on the question of improving relations with New Delhi. It is difficult otherwise to explain the absurd charge of expansionism it has levelled against this country in connection with the current developments in East Bengal.
The Chinese like all other powers, may have been taken by surprise by the strength and sweep of the armed resistance of the people of East Bengal against the West Pakistani troops. But they cannot be so naive as to believe that India has instigated the revolt or that it nurses any territorial ambitions.
They are shrewd enough to realise that nothing would have pleased New Delhi more than a negotiated settlement between Gen. Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman giving East Bengal its due share in political power and economic opportunities and a sufficient leverage to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy in favour of friendly relations with this country.
The Chinese also know that India faces a cruel dilemma. While it cannot be indifferent to the war of independence in Bangla Desh in view of the deep emotional involvement of millions of its own people, specially in West Bengal, it knows that it will have a terrible problem on its hands if the war in Bangla Desh is prolonged and the resulting hunger and destitution compel millions of people to seek shelter here. Even in normal times East Bengal is desperately short of food; it had to import as much as 1.7 million tons of cereals last year.
Massive Influx
The international community may to some extent help this country to cope with this problem. But this is not merely a question of material resources. A massive influx of refugees from Bangla Desh can strain India’s administrative resources to breaking point and greatly add to the feeling of uncertainty and instability in the whole north-eastern belt.
Apparently this is precisely the kind of development the Chinese wish to promote by encouraging Pakistan to defy the United States and the Soviet Union and to persist in its foolhardy efforts to conquer Bangla Desh in the name of national unity and hold it down by force. The Chinese know that the longer the war lasts the greater the advantage they can hope to reap from it.
It is immaterial how far the Chinese are embarrassed at having come down heavily on the side of the military regime and to what extent they will disappoint their supporters in the two Bengals. The so-called Maoist groups are at present so small and ineffective that they hardly figure in Peking’s calculations. The point is that prolonged warfare in Bangla Desh will in all probability further radicalise the political scene in north-east India and thereby impose impossible burdens on New Delhi.
In launching the present campaign against India and the two super-powers, specially the Soviet Union, China also has another end in view. It will be only too glad if the hawks in West Pakistan interpret its anti-Indian propaganda blasts as a green signal for a war against this country. Irrespective of whether the Chinese do or do not activise the Himalayan border, they have much to gain from an Indo-Pakistani military confrontation.
Even if the military regime in West Pakistan is not so reckless as to initiate military action against India, Peking will have at no or little cost to itself won its gratitude for ever, frustrated Russia’s efforts to befriend all countries on its southern flank and strengthened the position of its firm supporters like Mr. Bhutto.
Vague Interest
The Chinese showed a vague interest in slightly improving relations with this country last year but this was before Mrs. Gandhi’s landslide victory in the parliamentary elections.
Apparently Peking thought it worth its while to find out whether a weak government in New Delhi would be prepared to reciprocate its insubstantial gesture by moving away from the Soviet Union but had second thoughts after the emergence of Mrs. Gandhi as the undisputed leader of India. Developments in Pakistan have expedited the process and influenced its outcome.
The crisis in Pakistan leading to a regular war between the West Pakistani troops and the freedom fighters in Bangla Desh, in the context of the consolidation of political authority in New Delhi, left the Chinese with two alternatives. They could either accept the emergence of India as the dominant power in the sub-continent and do business with it on the basis of equality or they could try to complicate matters for New Delhi by encouraging Islamabad. Since they have obviously chosen the latter course, it will not be surprising if Peking’s posture becomes even more hostile in the coming weeks.
New Delhi cannot be cowed down by Chinese threats. But it cannot also allow its policy to be framed in the streets of Calcutta. It has to steer a middle course. It cannot either disown its moral obligations to the freedom fighters or move too far ahead of the world community. It has good reasons to be sore that the international response, specially that of Afro-Asian countries, to the massacre in Bangla Desh has been so lukewarm. But it cannot ignore the reality that world opinion will not endorse any active intervention on its part at this stage.
Top policy makers in New Delhi will do well also to bear certain other points in mind. First, however strong and deep the sympathy of the people here for the victims of the West Pakistani aggression in Bangla Desh, this country cannot clinch the issue quickly. Secondly while Russia is invulnerable to Chinese threats, India cannot easily ignore them. It must do all it can, consistent with its national interests, to avoid being caught once again in the Sino-Soviet struggle.
It may not be polite but it is necessary to recall that President Nasser paid a heavy penalty in 1967 when he allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the Soviet view of the Israeli threat to Syria and that the subsequent Soviet aid has not compensated for all the trials and tribulations of the UAR since then. In plain words, this country should undertake only such commitments as it can sustain on the strength of its own military and economic capabilities.
Though New Delhi cannot but be glad that the Kremlin has been so unequivocal in its condemnation of the massacre in East Bengal it cannot act as a reconnaissance team for anyone. Whatever action it takes should be on a sober calculation of its long-term national interest.
Three other points deserve more than passing attention. First, Mrs. Gandhi’s foremost task is to use the political authority she has won to tackle urgent domestic problems. This means that she must not drift into a situation where she loses control over events. This is precisely what happened to Mr. Nehru in 1959-62 period. Those who egged him on then were the very persons who were the loudest in decrying him when he ran into predictable difficulties.
Quickest Means
Secondly, the stoppage of all forms of aid to Pakistan by the United States and its allies like Britain and West Germany on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran on the other may well be the quickest means of ending the war in Bangla Desh.
West Pakistan’s economy has been in poor shape for a long time. Its foreign exchange holdings have been so low that it cannot meet its debt repayment obligations and the World Bank has been pressing it to devalue its currency. Its position is bound to deteriorate as a result of the loss of East Bengal’s market for its manufactures like textiles, cement and sugar on the one hand and foreign exchange earnings on the other. East Bengal accounts for about 45 per cent of Islamabad’s total exports. If on top of it all West Pakistan is denied aid – China cannot possibly fill the gap – its capacity to sustain the military operations in Bangla Desh will be seriously affected.
Thirdly, though India can do a lot to help the freedom movement in East Bengal and it should do what it can, the final outcome of the struggle will depend on the spirit of resistance and the determination of those who are the victims of West Pakistani aggression.
The Times of India 14 April 1972