It is not at all surprising that the CPI is upset over Mrs. Gandhi’s decision to explore the possibility of improving relations with the United States and the Jana Sangh over her gesture of goodwill towards Pakistan in respect of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Their reactions are determined so completely by worn-out dogmas and shibboleths that it is just not possible for either of them to appraise objectively the fast changing international scene and come up with proposals which can answer the concrete problems facing the country.
The CPI leaders can, of course, argue that in spite of the slight change in its stance implicit in the US secretary of state’s immediate response to Mr. Swaran Singh’s statement and appointment of Mr. Patrick Moynihan as ambassador to this country, the Nixon administration continues to pursue policies which not only seek to perpetuate US power in this part of the world, but also hurt India’s vital interests. They can add that Washington is giving large-scale aid to Bangladesh in order to reduce New Delhi’s influence there and that it has not given any assurance that it will not rearm Pakistan and promote further the existing military ties between Islamabad and Teheran.
Lopsided
But this kind of approach is as lopsided as it is self-righteous. The continuing US presence in southeast Asia, for instance, need not damage India’s interests if it balances, as it undoubtedly will, Chinese and Japanese influence in the region. It could have been a different matter if India, in cooperation with other local powers, was in a position to fill the gap resulting from an American withdrawal from there. But it does not possess the necessary economic and military capability and it is difficult to name a country in southeast Asia which is willing to cooperate with it except on a strictly bilateral basis. Moreover, even if it were possible to bring about an arrangement which would exclude external powers, it would have been in all likelihood dominated by Japan in view of its overwhelming economic strength.
Similarly, it is possible to take a less unfavourable view of the massive economic assistance the United States is providing to Bangladesh, specially when it is fairly evident that Indian assessment of Dacca’s needs earlier this year was wide of the mark. Plainly, New Delhi was mistaken in its belief that Bangladesh’s needs were temporary and limited and that it could meet them. In fact, if the United States had not stepped in quickly, the result could have been worse shortages which would have undermined both the friendly Mujib government and Indian influence in Dacca.
The Nixon administration’s thinking on the question of military supplies to Pakistan and promotion of co-operation between Islamabad and Teheran remains obscure. It is, in fact, doubtful that it has thought through these problems and come to firm policy decisions. But it is commonsense that friendly relations with India will inhibit it from doing anything which seriously offends New Delhi. It may be added here that in dealing with Iran, Indian policy-makers have not shown the imagination they have displayed in other fields. If they had turned into specific contracts the broad agreement which Mr. Dinesh Singh had negotiated with Teheran some years ago, the Shah would have thought twice before deciding to step up military cooperation with Pakistan.
It is only right and proper that New Delhi has made an earnest effort to establish close economic and political ties with Iraq. This should serve as a reminder to the Shah that this country is not, to borrow President Nixon’s phrase, a helpless and pitiable giant who can be pushed around. But essentially India wants peace in the Persian Gulf and not an intensification of lranian-Iraqi rivalry. It would therefore be only too willing to conclude long-term mutually beneficial economic deals with Iran.
Yardstick
The CPI leaders claim that they are guided by what they call proletarian internationalism. But in view of the wide-ranging co-operation which Moscow itself is developing with Washington – the well-known French leader, editor and writer, Mr. Jean-Jacques Servan- Schreiber, has gone so far as to describe Russia as the “new Far West for America” – they should be willing to tone down their talk of US imperialism. By the yardstick laid down by Lenin himself, the Soviet Union is voluntarily exposing itself to neo-colonialist exploitation in that it will be exporting raw materials and importing sophisticated machinery and technical know-how.
The Government of India has gone out of its way to emphasise again and again that improvement of relations with the United States would not involve a downgrading of ties with the Soviet Union. Mr. Swaran Singh has in fact described the treaty signed last year as the foundation of this country’s foreign policy. If this does not reassure the CPI leaders, they should have the good sense to realise that nothing can undermine Indo-Soviet friendship as effectively as excessive expectations and increasing dependence on the part of the weaker ally on the stronger one. In other words, the present Indo-Soviet friendship can survive and prosper only if New Delhi has the sagacity to maintain cordial or at least reasonable relations with other major power centres.
As for Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s demand for abrogation of the agreement between the Indian and Pakistani army chiefs last week, he has clearly missed the historic significance of the Simla accord whereby Pakistan has agreed to accept the line of control resulting from last December’s war and thereby to scrap the old cease-fire line and do away with UN supervision. He also seems to have learnt nothing from the consequences of the lack of resilience on India’s part in dealing with China in the ‘fifties and early ‘sixties. He will do well to recall two points in this connection.
First, during his visit to New Delhi in early 1960, Mr. Chou-En-lai offered to recognise the McMahon Line as India’s border in the east in return for its acceptance of his claim to Aksaichin. Such a deal could have avoided the subsequent deterioration in Sino-Indian relations leading to the border war in 1962 without doing violence to this country’s prestige and vital interests.
Secondly, on the basis of public record it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Nehru would have handled the entire affair very differently if he was not harassed by men who knew little either of history or of geography. In the situation that developed as a result of the actions of a raucous and ill-informed opposition and his own style of leadership, he was left with no room for manoeuvre.
It is to Mrs. Gandhi’s credit that she has handled the problem arising out of Pakistan’s unjust claim to Thako Chak very differently. While not giving in on the specific question which would have unsettled a settled border, she has made a minor concession elsewhere. The country has reason to be grateful to her because the cost of a prolonged deadlock would have been fairly heavy. Soon the details of the dispute would have been forgotten by most of the world and India would have faced at the UN the charge of being unreasonable. More significantly, the deadlock would have ended New Delhi’s efforts to persuade Pakistan to settle all problems through bilateral negotiations, pushed Islamabad still closer to Peking and made the task of reconciliation with the United States impossible.
Stronger
President Bhutto’s negotiating position is much stronger than the Jana Sangh leader might wish to believe. The adoption by the UN general assembly of a resolution which ties up Bangladesh’s admission to the UN with the release of Pakistani prisoners of war is one indication of it. China’s unqualified diplomatic support and supply of arms is another. Islamabad is also assured of financial and other forms of assistance from oil-rich countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia. But even if Mr. Bhutto had been negotiating from a weaker position, it would not have been in India’s interest to appear to impose a settlement on him. However ironical it may seem in view of his past record and some of his present actions, this country has a stake in his survival and Pakistan’s stability.
Indian policy-makers have in fact to square two circles. They need to improve relations with the United States and, if possible, with China without in any way weakening those with the Soviet Union, and to enter into economic agreements with Iran without jeopardising the growing ties with Iraq. But a careful management of relations with Pakistan must remain their first concern. Much else hinges on it. They will have to remain firm and vigilant – the talk of any reduction in military expenditure at this stage is highly premature if not positively dangerous – but they will also have to be accommodating.
The Times of India, 13 December 1972
