The US would not have backed France in the war against the Viet Minh in the early ‘fifties and then wrecked the Geneva agreement if its ruling elite in the country had not been possessed by a pathological hatred of communism as expressed above all by Mr. John Foster Dulles. And President Johnson would not have vastly increased the US involvement in the Viet Nam war in the mid-’sixties if he and millions of his countrymen had not suffered from what Senator Fulbright rightly called “the arrogance of power”, and if they had not convinced themselves that they could impose their will on Hanoi without paying too heavy a price. But is that all?
In the beginning most Americans, of course, did not view President Johnson’s decision to send combat troops into South Viet Nam as an expression of arrogance of power. They took it for granted that America’s fast growing participation in the war in Viet Nam was part of the overall struggle against communism. And, indeed, the US leadership explained its actions in those terms.
Not Deterred
Since the Sino-Soviet split had taken place by that time, it was no longer possible for President Johnson, his aides and other supporters to justify the US involvement in Viet Nam in terms of monolithic communism. But that did not deter them. They quickly put out the theory that while the Soviet Union had begun to moderate its approach towards the West, China had taken over the role of promoting and sustaining “wars of national liberation”, that the struggle in Viet Nam was in the nature of an experiment and a test of America’s will and that if Hanoi was allowed to succeed similar “wars of national liberation” would be unleashed in other countries in Asia and Africa. Thus President Eisenhower’s domino theory was extended far beyond South-east Asia.
In rational terms this was an extraordinary development not so much because the US image of China bore little relation to reality as because this view was at odds with America’s own perception of Peking in connection with India. For, in 1964, the US policy makers had concluded that China had not committed aggression against India in 1962, that it did not constitute a threat to its neighbour, that New Delhi did not need to acquire sophisticated weapons in order to strengthen its security arrangements to the extent realistically necessary, and that India was not particularly important for the United States from the geopolitical point of view. Washington was doubtless inhibited to some extent in acceding to New Delhi’s request for sophisticated weapons by considerations of the impact on Rawalpindi. But if the inhibition prevailed it was because the US policy makers felt that Pakistan continued to serve an important role in their larger strategy and that China was not hell bent on either expanding its territory at the cost of India or undermining its integrity and institutions by encouraging tribal rebellions and extremist groups.
The obvious contradiction in the American response to New Delhi’s request for arms and Saigon’s for both weapons and men is recalled in order to underscore the point that President Johnson’s decision to send combat troops into South Viet Nam cannot be explained solely in terms of his perception of China. The “arrogance of power” concept resolves the contradiction to some extent, because it can be argued that the American policy makers found it intolerable that Hanoi should have the audacity to undermine their client state of South Viet Nam and thereby challenge the credibility of their power. But does it fully bridge the gap in the US attitude towards the Indian request and Saigon’s?
If it does, one can reasonably take an optimistic view of America’s foreign policy in future. The anti-communist obsession has long been over so much so that most American policy makers view even the competition with the Soviet Union in non-ideological terms. And Indochina has cured them of the arrogance of power. They are in fact obsessed now with the question of the credibility of their power. But the suspicion lurks that something more than a pathological fear of communism and arrogance of power may have informed the American behaviour in Viet Nam.
Estranged
The question would not have arisen if the United States had not been estranged in the past from non-communist nationalists like Mr. Nehru, President Nasser, President Sukarno, and President Nkrumah. But the fact of estrangement itself cannot be said conclusively to establish that America in the post-war period has been adverse to strong nationalist movements and leaders because it can be argued that the men in question incurred Washington’s displeasure primarily because of their refusal to join the anti-communist crusade.
Thus it is neither possible to dismiss the suspicion that the United States has been allergic not only to communism but also to nationalism, nor to conclude that this has indeed been the case. The argument just cannot be settled. But the issue is extremely important because independent-minded nationalist leaders like Mrs Gandhi cannot hope to establish reasonable friendly relations with the United States unless they are assured that it is not opposed to what they regard as their legitimate interests and aspirations.
American policy makers claim that they have not been opposed to the rise of regional power centres and they cite as evidence the support they have consistently extended to the cause of West European unity, economic as well as political and military, and the efforts they have made to persuade Japan to play a political role appropriate to its economic power. But this attitude has been limited to their allies and implicit in it has been the conviction that Western Europe and Japan would remain linked to the United States by virtue of their military weakness in relation to their adversary, the Soviet Union, and their economic inter-dependence with it.
As far as the others are concerned, the fact remains, whatever the reasons, that the United States in the past was estranged from precisely those leaders who have sought to build regional co-operation centred on their respective countries – Mr. Nehru in South Asia, President Nasser in the Arab world, President Sukarno in Southeast Asia and President Nkrumah in Africa – and that even today it is far from certain that it is reconciled to India’s pre-eminence in South Asia. This is not to say that the decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan has been determined primarily by the desire to “contain”. India. The American motivation may well be much more complicated. But Washington cannot be surprised that the decision has revived old suspicions in this country.
The situation which the United States faces in Asia is at once trickier and easier than the one it faced in the past. It is trickier because Washington can no longer depend on old allies. In West Asia, Israel and Iran cannot safeguard its interests – the former because even its military superiority cannot ensure the flow of Arab oil to the West and Japan and the latter because the Shah has led and continues to lead the campaign for higher oil prices and is seeking accommodation rather than confrontation with the Arabs. In South-east Asia, the United States has to readjust relations with its Thai and Filipino allies and at the same time convince Japan and South Korea that its capacity to guarantee their security is not going to decline. The situation is easier for it because Egypt and Indonesia have in recent years lowered their sights and do not look upon themselves as independent centres of regional groupings. That is one reason why they have good relations with the United States.
Basic Problem
But it may be India today, Iran tomorrow and some other country the day after tomorrow. The basic problem is the same. The United States has to come to terms with the fact that the reality of international life is and will remain too complex to be fitted either into the well-worn anti-communist framework or into Mr. Kissinger’s concept of five power centres or into its so-called national interests.
The process of adjustment can neither be painless nor quick because old habits of thought and behaviour tend to persist long after they have lost whatever validity they may have once possessed. Indeed, there is so far not a single influential or potentially influential American who has shown the capacity to move out of the old framework which is essentially the product of how best to “befriend” or “contain” the Soviet Union. But reality cannot be defied indefinitely, except at grave risk to the United States and many other countries, because the former is still too powerful to be brushed aside. As such it is necessary for New Delhi as much as for Moscow, Peking, Cairo and Teheran to maintain a dialogue with it. This may not be a heroic posture but it may be a more effective one than either hostility or self-righteousness or indifference.
The Times of India, 21 May 1975