It is, on the face of it, somewhat surprising that President Ford should be planning to undertake a journey to Peking next autumn when no important Chinese leader has returned his predecessor’s visit of February 1972. The surprise is all the greater because there has been no progress towards resolving the crucial issue of Taiwan and even the trade between the two countries has sharply declined in the past one year.
But, on another level, there is no mystery about the reasons which seem to have persuaded President Ford to follow in Mr. Nixon’s footsteps. Like his predecessor, he needs reasonably good relations with Peking in order to convince the men in the Kremlin that the cost of abandoning the policy of detente and of not reaching an early agreement on limiting the development of ballistic missiles can be prohibitively high. Since Washington is no longer involved in active hostilities in China’s neighbourhood, the US chief executive does not require its good offices as Mr. Nixon clearly did in respect of the Viet Nam war in 1972. But Peking’s behaviour is bound to influence the course of events in South-East Asia, South Asia and far beyond.
Succession
Above all, since there cannot be the slightest doubt, especially in view of the current campaign against “capitulationism,” that neither the 10th party congress in August 1973 nor the National People’s Congress last January has settled the issue of succession to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Mr. Chou En-lai, the United States cannot but wish to place itself in a position where it can influence, in some degree, the outcome of the struggle between the contending groups. The Soviet Union, too, is trying to do the same through its massive propaganda build-up against Maoism. The approaches of the super-powers differ. But they appear to share the objective of influencing developments in China.
Broadly speaking, three groups are competing for power in the post-Maoist era. There is first what is known as the Peking group headed by Mr. Chou En-lai. It includes among its members central economic planners and many rehabilitated high-ranking officials from the pre-cultural revolution party and state bureaucracy like Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping. These men are said to be pragmatists who favour rapid industrialisation through the use of economic incentives and imported high-level technology from Japan, Western Europe and the United States.
There is then the Shanghai group of radicals which is led by Mrs. Chiang Ching (Chairman Mao’s wife), Mr. Yao Wen-yuan and Mr. Chang Chun-chiao. Mr. Chang spoke for the group at the National People’s Congress to emphasise its continuing commitment to the elimination of inequalities between workers and peasants, between the towns and the villages and mental and manual labour. These men are more wary of dependence on foreign countries, specially the two super-powers, and they are opposed to allotting the first priority to economic growth per se.
Finally, the major PLA commanders can be said to constitute the military group. Despite the transfer of eight of the most important regional commanders from posts they had held for years in January 1974 and the appointment of two civilians, Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping and Mr. Chang Chun-chiao, to the key posts of the PLA’s chief of staff and head of the general political department respectively, the group seems to have considerable leverage.
In view of the PLA’s role in the revolution before 1949, it cannot be compared with the Red Army which has always been subordinate to the Soviet Communist Party. And in the given context of industrial unrest and of continuing conflicts in the party between the old and rehabilitated cadres on the one hand and men who attained prominence during the cultural revolution on the other, the importance of the military group in a succession battle is self- evident.
It follows that the super-power which is able to address itself to this group will be placing itself at an advantage, though it is obviously impossible for anyone to predict whether or not this will clinch the issue. In a sense the Soviet Union is better placed than the United States in this particular regard. It can either strengthen or reduce its massive military deployment on China’s borders and thus demonstrate its capacity either to punish or to reward the would-be successors to Chairman Mao. Indeed, it has been said by some knowledgeable commentators that this is one of the calculations behind the Soviet build-up in the region.
Underscored
Such a course of action is not open to the United States. But by the same token it cannot be said to constitute a threat to China – a point which is further underscored by the fact that in the wake of the communist takeover in Indochina, Japan has not thought in terms of a substantial military build-up and that Washington has not tried to push it in that direction. This point has not been lost on the Chinese leadership., What is more important, hints have apparently been emanating from Washington that it may be willing to consider favourably requests for sophisticated military hardware from Peking. The article “US-Chinese Military Ties?” by Mr. Michael Pillsbury in the fall 1975 issue of Foreign Policy, New York, may perhaps be one such public hint.
Mr. Pillsbury belongs to the well-known Rand Corporation which is largely financed by the US Air Force. He studies China’s defence policies and has personal contacts not only in Washington but also in Moscow and Peking, according to the editors who add that his article “should not be viewed simply as an exercise in abstract speculation” because “the day may come when the issues addressed become crucial choices for America.”
The Soviet Union has already been treating possible Sino-US military co-operation as a major propaganda theme for almost two years. Mr. Pillsbury has listed some of the relevant broadcasts, one of these going as far as to state that Washington had already set up a tank factory and a helicopter assembly plant in China and another that Peking was conspiring with the CIA to carve a new state out of Bangladesh and India by supporting the Naga insurgency and overthrow the government of Nepal. That Bangladesh has no Naga problem and that both the USA and China are well disposed towards the present Nepal government obviously did not bother the Soviet commentators. That is, however, less relevant than the point that Moscow has been concerned about the possibility of such co-operation.
Mr. Pillsbury favours the sale of only “defensive or passive systems” to China and cites a “military reconnaissance system or a phased array or over-the-horizon radar system” as examples of what he has in mind. Peking, according to him, might also be interested in the establishment of a hot line with Washington which can be used to provide it advance warning of an intended Soviet surprise attack to enable it either “to begin slowly refuelling its liquid fuel missiles” or to launch “its jet bomber nuclear retaliation forces.”
Delegations
He suggests that a beginning can be made through exchange of military academy delegations, defence attaches and even defence ministers, intelligence exchanges through covert channels and limited military sales by America and its allies. This, in his opinion, will not hurt either America’s allies in Asia or its relations with the Soviet Union and it will improve the military balance between Peking and Moscow and thus contribute to peace.
The Foreign Policy issue also carried two articles on the rapid emergence of China as a major oil producer which, according to Mr. Selig Harrison, is “fundamentally transforming the geopolitical map of Asia.” He says that China’s crude production has been increasing at an annual average rate of 24.6 per cent rising from 6.4 million tons in 1963 to nearly 70 in 1974 and that by drawing only on its onshore reserves and those of the Po Hai gulf, Peking may by 1988 or thereabouts reach Saudi Arabia’s present output of 400 million tons a year. The estimates of offshore reserves vary greatly but on all accounts these are substantial.
Clearly these issues are interrelated. China can boost its oil production quickly only if it imports western technology and it will be interested in doing so if on the one hand rapid industrialisation raises domestic consumption and on the other it needs foreign exchange in order to be able to import technology. And since such a strategy of economic development will link the country closely to Japan and the West, it will not be odd for the Peking regime to establish military ties of a limited nature with the United States. Meanwhile the very prospect of China becoming a major producer and exporter of oil has strengthened Japan’s reservations regarding extensive co-operation with the Soviet Union for the exploitation of Siberian reserves and led the Ford administration to warn American companies not to annoy Peking by drilling in the disputed parts of the continental shelf
The Times of India 17 September 1975