The central committee of the CPM is quite justified in taking the view that the earlier criticism of the emergency and Mrs. Gandhi by the CPI is “now muted”. But that is only a harsh way of saying that, unlike it, the CPI has not settled for Mrs Gandhi being the main enemy.
This is a basic difference between the two parties. Thus, while the CPM leader, Mr EMS Namboodiripad has gone so far as to call for a Nuremberg-type trial, whatever it might mean, of Mrs. Gandhi, the CPI leader, Mr Bhupesh Gupta, has opposed the proposal under the government’s consideration for setting up a special court and enacting a special procedure for the purpose.
Of the two, Mr. Gupta’s position is in conformity with the twin concepts of the rule of law and equality before law. Mr. Namboodiripad will, in fact, be hard put to it to explain what precisely he has in view, if only because for the Nuremberg trial judges and members of the jury were drawn from different countries belonging to the victorious alliance. For surely Mr. Namboodiripad cannot favour an international court to try Mrs. Gandhi.
The more pertinent point, however, is that both parties are in a quandary, the CPI because it cannot define its stand on the highly important issue of the unity of the two Congress parties so long as it is not able to take a firm position towards Mrs. Gandhi, and the CPM because it does not quite know how to fight at the same time the former prime minister and what it calls the “repressive, pro-rich and anti-people” policies of the Janata government. Both talk vaguely of building a united left front. But both are aware that this is not a practical proposition so long as the differences between them remain as sharp as they are and that the front, even if it can be brought into existence by some miracle, cannot amount to much in most states for a long time to come.
Tempting
It is tempting to take sides in this controversy between the CPM and the CPI and the chances are that, despite their reservations regarding the former on account of its past behaviour, many well-meaning liberals will gravitate towards it. This will be a pity for a variety of reasons, not the least being the fact that to date the CPM leaders have not even denounced Stalin and his actions leading, among other things, to the death of millions of Soviet citizens in concentration camps. Neither have they welcomed recent moves by some of the West European communist parties to give communism a human face. The issues are complex and deserve to be studied carefully.
The CPM’s hostility towards Mrs. Gandhi is understandable. It suffered greatly at her hands before the emergency, if not so much during the emergency when, whatever its subsequent claims to resistance, it lay low. Also, it may not be mistaken in taking the view that Mrs. Gandhi, if she had been returned to power in March 1977, would have made it difficult for it to rule West Bengal and Tripura. But it cannot pretend that Mrs. Gandhi’s actions against it in 1969-71 were unprovoked. It cannot deny that its cadres had beaten up its opponents, developed a new technique called gherao for harassing and coercing managers of industrial concerns and incited violence and indiscipline among the workers. In fact, it claims to have learnt the bitter lesson and appears anxious to avoid repetition of old “mistakes”.
There is, however, another aspect of the matter which calls for attention – the attitude of the CPM towards the Centre’s authority in the management of the country’s affairs. For this purpose it is necessary to go back to the Nehru period.
It will be easily recalled that the differences between those who stayed on in the CPI and those who quit it in 1964 centred on the question of the proper attitude towards Mr. Nehru and his policies. The discussions dating back to the mid-fifties when the Soviet Union decided to support the then prime minister were inevitably conducted in ideological terms. But behind all this lay a non-ideological reality which was that while some communists favoured a strong Centre, others were opposed to it. When the split came in 1964, it more or less conformed to this division – the supporters of a strong Centre stayed on in the CPI and the opponents quit it to form the CPM.
Analysis
This analysis is bound to be strongly contested, among others, by those who have disputed and continue to dispute the “nationalist” credentials of the CPI because of its close association with the Soviet communist party and its self-proclaimed adherence to “proletarian internationalism” which under Stalin rightly came to be equated with subordination of other communist parties to Moscow. But on a careful reflection this view cannot hold. Since, whatever its calculations and compulsions, the Soviet Union has since 1955 supported a strong central authority in India, the Soviet connection cannot in practical terms be said to have diluted the “nationalist” credentials of the present leaders of the CPI. Their support to the Indian position in the country’s conflict with China in 1962 should clinch the issue, especially if it is remembered that the present CPM leaders prevaricated to China’s advantage.
Someone who has had intimate contacts with Mr. Namboodiripad tells me that once he asked the CPM leader why he and his party were so virulently opposed to the Soviet Union and that the latter told him without a moment’s thought: “Because the Soviet Union supports the Centre, we are bound to oppose anyone who favours a strong central authority in India”.
I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of this account. But even if it is disregarded, the point that is sought to be underscored survives. In fact, one does not need to investigate the CPM’s past to come to the conclusion that it is opposed to a strong Centre. The West Bengal government’s memorandum on the question of autonomy for the states speaks for itself. It wants to leave New Delhi with little more than control over foreign affairs, defence, communications, and currency.
This, too, would have been understandable if in the CPM’s view, most state governments were more “progressive” than the Centre. But that is not its position. On the contrary, only last week its central committee said that authoritarian forces were well-entrenched in Karnataka, Andhra and Maharashtra. And it does not require much imagination to deduce that it cannot be too happy with either the character or the performance of several other state governments in the Janata-dominated Hindi-speaking region.
No Liberal
Mrs. Gandhi is, of course, very different from Mr. Nehru, He was a committed liberal which she is not. It is, for example, inconceivable that he would ever have tried to hang on to power with the use of the emergency provision in the Constitution. More pertinently, it is impossible to believe that he would have sought to centralise powers in the Union government’s apparatus and finally in himself to the extent she did. The differences are indeed, qualitative and not merely quantitative. But the CPM leaders cannot cite these to explain their intense hostility towards Mrs. Gandhi. For they were equally hostile towards Mr. Nehru and would have been towards Mr. Morarji Desai if they were not obsessed with Mrs. Gandhi.
This analysis cannot give much comfort to the CPI either. If the CPI favours a strong Centre, it cannot but subordinate its revolutionary ardour to that supreme consideration. It may not do so consciously. But that is immaterial. Also, its leaders and supporters cannot be pleased with another implication, which is that they are unable to denounce Mrs. Gandhi with the same ferocity as their CPM counterpart because they are not assured that the Janata can provide a strong Centre. But they can derive some comfort from the fact that many others who grew up in the heyday of nationalism face the same dilemma.
These individuals cannot opt for Mrs. Gandhi because she tends to equate herself with the nation and the state – the proclamation of the emergency was an expression of this dangerous equation – and because she is inclined to establish a dynasty – Mr. Sanjay Gandhi’s emergence cannot be explained in other terms. But they are unable to give their loyalty to her opponents banded together in the Janata party; at least partly because it does not hold out the promise of establishing and maintaining a strong central authority. Its lack of cohesion and its over-enthusiasm for Hindi must cause concern to all those who value India’s unity and progress. Some seek a way out by condemning Mrs. Gandhi and some others by condemning the Janata, or some groups in it. But these are fake solutions.
The Times of India, 21 June 1978