It must be a matter of some, indeed considerable, concern that Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee’s proposed visit to China continues to be discussed exclusively in terms of India’s relations with that country. For the communist takeover in Afghanistan and the upheaval in Iran are threatening to change dramatically the security environment in the region and to pose far more serious problems for New Delhi than the ones it has faced since 1971, if not 1965 when the United States cut off free military supplies to Pakistan not to resume them again so far. In plain terms, New Delhi must review its approach to the entire region and work out its China policy in that broader context.
Indian policy-makers, including the minister for external affairs, could have managed to maintain the pretence that the pro-Soviet communist coup in Afghanistan has not changed the overall situation in the region, at least not significantly enough to oblige them to re- examine their own broad approach, if a formidable challenge had not emerged in Iran to the Shah and all that he has stood for – military cooperation with the West, especially the United States, to ensure stability in the region, prevent a communist or even a radical Arab takeover in the Sheikhdoms on the other side of the Gulf, keep the Hormuz Strait open for the free movement of over 20 million barrels of Gulf oil a day to America, Western Europe and Japan, and so on. But such a challenge has arisen, leaving Mr Vajpayee and his aides no choice but to drop the pretence, face up to the reality of turbulence in that key country and beyond, work out its possible consequences and relate their China policy to these.
Connection
There is not the slightest evidence of any connection between developments in Afghanistan and Iran or of Soviet involvement in the upheaval in Iran. But that is not likely to bring much comfort to the West. Indeed, the resulting situation is not too dissimilar from the one its leader, the United States, had dreaded or invented (depending on one’s predilection) in the late ’forties to justify its massive intervention in the affairs of the region via mutual security pacts with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in the early ‘fifties, substantial military assistance to them and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact now known as the CENTO.
In a letter to The Times, London, (September 13), Lord Alport writes:
“I have just returned from a private visit which has taken me to Japan, China and Pakistan. A few days ago on the Afghan border, looking out towards the plain beyond which lies Kabul, I got a vivid impression of the nearness of the threat which the recent Russian-inspired coup there poses to one of the most sensitive areas in the world. The situation, which it was the historic policy of British India to avoid, or at least neutralize, seems now an accomplished fact. The Russians are pouring men and war material into Afghanistan, along lines which must have been carefully prepared, to reinforce a presence which was already well established. Soon the situation will be irreversible.
“Then will follow, so it is foreseen, the attempt to penetrate into Pakistan and to increase pressure on Iran. The political situation in the former is not yet stabilised and in the latter the Shah’s regime is under threat from a powerful religious movement, which cloaks subversion manipulated from Moscow. Beyond, in the Indian Ocean, a strong Russian fleet is on patrol ready for any eventuality.”
The Times carried an editorial on the subject the same day containing a specific reference to Lord Alport’s letter. It says: “The Soviet Union is contained to the West by NATO and to the South by China. Between the two there are soft patches in its frontier. The softest is formed by Afghanistan, which has been sliding more deeply under Soviet influence since the coup in April. From the southern frontier of Afghanistan it is only about three hundred miles across Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. To the west of both countries lies Iran, holding the key to the Persian Gulf…
Tempting
“It is obvious that this whole area is intensely interesting for the Soviet Union. It is the least stable and most vulnerable of the Soviet frontier areas and offers access to very tempting parts of the world. From Afghanistan, in particular, Soviet power begins to loom over both Pakistan and Iran. There are now reports of about four thousand Soviet advisers in Afghanistan who are training the armed forces and penetrating more deeply into government….”
It is hardly necessary to underscore the point that the Western stakes in Iran and the Persian Gulf region as a whole are far, far greater than in the late ’forties and the early ’fifties when Sir Olaf Caroe formulated the famous concept of an alliance of northern tier states and the United States and Britain brought the Baghdad Pact into existence in the teeth of opposition by Mr Nehru and Col. Nasser. For Western Europe and the United States and their most valuable Asian ally, Japan, are now critically dependent on Gulf oil – in the ’fifties America was self-sufficient in oil. Indeed, a serious and prolonged disruption of the Iranian production of 5.5 million barrels a day alone can send oil prices skyrocketing and place an intolerable strain on the Western and Japanese economies.
This raises three interrelated questions. What is the West likely to do to deal with the challenge as it perceives it? How is that likely to affect this country? And how best can we hope to cope with the consequences for us of Western moves and actions?
In the editorial quoted above, The Times, writes (September 13): “Soviet influence can be countered in two principal ways. The first is by seeking good relations with stable governments in the area. This is easier said than done. Iran is in the process of showing that stability which is not based on adequate popular support is vulnerable. Western governments cannot wholly rule this factor out of their strategic considerations, though it will not be the only one. Secondly, Western governments can raise the subject in their direct dealings with the Soviet Union.
“It must already be clear to the Soviet Union that the oil supplies of the Middle East are one of the West’s essential interests. This makes them tempting for the more ambitious of Soviet policy-makers but it also makes them risky. If there is one thing for which it is possible to imagine the Western allies going to war it is Middle East oil. So far the Russians have pursued their ambitions with restraint and caution. They are not risk-takers, and they tend to respect limits when they encounter them. They should be encouraged to see that there are limits along the road they are now exploring”.
Both these “solutions” are in my view non-solutions. The first because apart from Iran, there is no country in the Persian Gulf region which can even in theory be said to be capable of sustaining a “popular” government in any sense of the term and in Iran the Shah’s belated moves towards limited liberalisation have ended in a fiasco. The second partly because the Soviet Union is not directly involved in the upheaval in Iran and partly because it has in the past rejected similar advice and is bound to do so again. As I see it, the West is likely to opt once again for what may be called the military solution – that is, it is likely to prop up strong men, step up the export of military hardware and personnel to them and promote military cooperation among them, perhaps this time without the framework of a formal alliance.
Difficult
It is clearly difficult to say at this stage whether the Shah can be fitted into this likely Western scheme. That will depend primarily on whether members of his pampered military officer corps remain loyal to him and whether they can manage to retain the support of the men who, it is reasonable to assume, are as liable to be influenced by the religious appeal of the Mullahs (Ayatollahs) as the ordinary Iranians. But however valuable the Shah’s role from 1953 to 1978, the West can do without him if it is assured of the reliability of the officer corps which the United States has trained and equipped. The West can also in the final analysis live, though, of course, uneasily, with the Islamic fundamentalism that is sweeping the Muslim world from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.
If this assessment turns out to be reasonably accurate, it can safely be assumed that once again the Western world will view with sympathy Pakistan’s clamour for sophisticated arms, that it will encourage cooperation between Iran and Pakistan on the old plea of containing Soviet expansionism and that it will be only too glad to support a military junta if only the latter can produce a measure of stability in that country. There is at the moment not the slightest evidence to suggest that General Zia-ul-Haq’s decision to take over as president has anything to do either with the events in Iran or the Western response that is beginning to shape up. But I, for one, shall not be surprised if this turns out to be the case.
(To be concluded)
The Times of India 24 October 1978