No one can be blamed for being confused by reports regarding the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on the proposed peace treaty. If one day it appears that the treaty has been more or less finalized, the next day it is said that the talks are deadlocked. Hope gives way to despair which in turn yields place to hope. The Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, signs the Camp David accord whereby it is understood, though not explicitly stated, that he would not send new Jewish settlers into occupied Arab territories. He follows it with statements that he is entitled to send and would send new settlers into existing settlements on the West Bank. This causes “dismay” in the U.S. administration. Mr. Begin then happens to be visiting New York on a private visit. There he meets President Carter who had earlier said he would not be meeting the Israeli Premier. This is followed by a statement by the U.S. Secretary of State that the substantive issues had more or less been resolved. If this is not confusing, what else is?
In reality, the settlement issue may not be intractable as it appears. For the settlers and would-be settlers do not trust the Israeli authorities to keep them there for long. Hundreds of houses in the settlements are standing empty, according to The Economist, which adds: “Not only are new settlers failing to move into the houses built for them, but veteran settlers in the Jordan valley are beginning to drift away, and their villages to break up. In Maale Effrayim, which was to have become an urban centre for the Jordan valley settlements, only 40 of the first 150 houses to be built are occupied. A typical remark from a settler … ‘we have stopped investing and developing and when self-rule comes, we’ll go’.” Apparently Mr. Begin is keen to ensure that the settlements do not melt away sooner, depriving him of one important card in his negotiation with President Sadat on the future of the West Bank. And if the intention behind his belligerence is, indeed, defensive, it would be logical to conclude that President Sadat’s position is stronger than his and that this position would be further strengthened once the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is signed and the Israelis pull out of the Sinai. This view is, of course, subject to a qualification which is that President Sadat’s opponents at home and in other Arab countries do not meanwhile manage to undermine his power base – the Egyptian armed forces and bureaucracy. At the moment the odds appear to be weighted in his favour. But who can forecast developments in West Asia with any measure of confidence?