The Soviet Union’s and India’s positions on Afghanistan remain as far apart at the end of Mr. Gromyko’s three-day visit to New Delhi as they were before. This is obvious from the absence of any reference to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country in the joint statement issued after Mr. Gromyko’s departure. That by itself would have been sufficient to indicate that the Soviet foreign minister has taken an extremely tough stand in his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister and minister for external affairs. As it happens, confirmatory evidence is also available in his two speeches in New Delhi lambasting Pakistan for its assistance to Afghan guerillas. Mr. Gromyko was clearly determined to drive home the point that Moscow proposes to deal with its opponents and detractors from a position of strength. Otherwise, contrary to the general practice in this country he would not have used his return dinner for Mr. PV Narasimha Rao to make a second speech denouncing Islamabad. This leaves little room for speculation. Whatever Soviet envoys may have said in different capitals, the chances are that the Kremlin has decided to maintain a powerful military presence in Afghanistan in order virtually to manage its affairs and that it will not budge from this position at least in the near future. Indeed, for all we know Moscow may be planning to stay put in Afghanistan for a long, long time as it has done in Outer Mongolia and Eastern Europe.
It is unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi has been taken by surprise by Mr. Gromyko’s tough stance. She is too experienced and pragmatic a leader to have entertained the illusion that she could persuade the Soviet leadership to reverse quickly its decision to take over Afghanistan. As such, she must have taken the possibility and, indeed, the probability of failure for the time being into consideration while planning her initiative to evolve a regional solution to the problems created by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the response of the United States and a large number of Muslim countries. Even otherwise she has no choice but to persist in her efforts. The alternative is an intense cold war with all it implies by way of introduction of foreign arms on a large scale, establishment of foreign bases, intensification of attempts at subversion and the consequent chaos and confusion.
Discerning Americans in influential places are already showing awareness of these risks. Though it is difficult to say the same about the Chinese leaders with the same assurance in view of the secrecy in which they function, it is possible that they, too, are sensitive to the dangers inherent in a military approach. And unless those at the helm of affairs in Islamabad have gone out of their minds, they cannot be spoiling for a direct confrontation with Moscow over Afghanistan. The Kremlin, on the face of it, is less receptive to Indian pleas at the moment and the awareness of their military weakness in Washington, Beijing and Islamabad may encourage it to convince itself that it does not have much to lose by sticking it out in Afghanistan. But it, too, cannot ignore forever either world opinion or the other costs, especially that of the threatened arms race.
In the past India has often been highly and publicly critical of US policies – Washington’s decision to cross the 38th parallel in Korea and to try and establish a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union and China through a series of bilateral and multilateral pacts, its opposition to China’s admission to the UN and its direct military intervention in the civil war in Vietnam, for example, – and yet it maintained reasonably cordial bilateral relations with Washington. There is no good reason why it cannot do the same with the Soviet Union. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Mr. Gromyko’s visit to New Delhi is an indication that this is acceptable to the Kremlin which has as much to gain from friendly bilateral ties as
this country. In respect of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, India’s reaction has been less sharp than its response to similar moves by the United States. Perhaps this involves a recognition of the fact that Moscow has stood by this country on crucial occasions – the debates in the security council on Jammu and Kashmir and Goa, and the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 – and of Soviet sensibilities on the one hand and India’s own possible requirements in a highly uncertain political and security environment on the other. But whatever the calculations, New Delhi has evolved a balanced and responsible approach. While it will not join an anti-Soviet campaign under Sino-US auspices, it will keep up pressure on Moscow for withdrawal of troops. But it must also begin to search for concrete proposals which can meet the legitimate security requirements of the countries concerned, the Soviet Union included. Neutralization of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan under international auspices can be one such proposal.
