The first official-level talks between India and Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet takeover in Afghanistan have gone off reasonably well. These have enabled the two governments to appreciate each other’s anxieties and perspectives and possibly paved the way for further discussions. But the talks have not produced a common approach to the problems arising out of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Indeed, they were not even expected to. It is open to question whether the people of Pakistan genuinely feel threatened by the presence of Soviet troops across the Khyber. But it is obvious that its military rulers are convinced that they have to step up their defence preparedness to cope with the new situation and that they can do so only with the help of the United States, China and such other countries as Saudi Arabia which are willing to cough up the necessary funds. It is possible that they have taken the stance that they have, not so much because they fear either a direct Soviet assault or a Soviet-backed insurrection, as because they believe that the Russian intervention in Afghanistan has given them an excellent opportunity to extract from the West, especially the United States, and other friendly countries, military and economic aid which they were reluctant to give earlier. Either way, the Indian foreign secretary, Mr. R.D. Sathe, and his colleagues could not have hoped to persuade President Zia-ul-Haq and his officials to take a different view. In fact, they could not have even argued that the Soviet takeover in Afghanistan does not create security problems for Pakistan or that Islamabad should not seek to overcome these with the help of its friends.
The Pakistan foreign secretary, Mr. Shah Nawaz, is factually wrong when he says that once Soviet troops have entered a country in the last 30 years, they have never withdrawn. They withdrew from Austria in the mid-fifties. But generally the point is well taken. This fact creates a major problem for Indian diplomacy. New Delhi cannot hope to convince the Pakistanis, the Americans, the Chinese and the Saudis that it can, if the circumstances are otherwise favourable, persuade the Kremlin to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. This weakens the effectiveness of its plea for keeping the superpowers out of the region. One superpower has moved into the area in a big way and the other is bound to follow. One can of course, argue that the American’s have been interfering in the affairs of the region for decades and that the Russians have only responded to this challenge. But all that is immaterial as far as the essential issue is concerned. The superpower rivalry is a fact and it is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. It does not follow that Pakistan has no choice but to involve itself in this contest on the side of the United States and China. It could have stayed out without in any way endangering its security. A civilian regime headed by a shrewd leader like Mr. Bhutto might well have chosen such a course. But Pakistan is ruled by a General whose responses are military and not political and whose own sense of insecurity is possibly a factor in Pakistan’s decision to seek massive military aid from the US. Like the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, that too, is given. India can do precious little about it.
All this inevitably weakened the possibility of a common approach emerging at the talks in Islamabad. But it does not mean that the dialogue has been fruitless and that it need not be continued. On the contrary, the dialogue must go on. For, as Pakistan seeks and secures substantial military assistance, it becomes more and not less urgent to ensure that the newly acquired hardware is not used against this country one day. Reports from Islamabad do not say specifically that the Indian officials sought a credible guarantee against that happening from President Zia. But it is reasonable to believe that they did. And it is obvious beyond question that President Zia cannot assure this country of his bona fides so long as he continues to rake up the Kashmir issue from time to time. He has acknowledged that the Simla agreement provides the basis for improving and strengthening Indo-Pakistan ties. If he is sincere, he should be willing to recognize that the Kashmir issue was for all practical purposes at least frozen, if not settled, at Simla on the basis of the status quo – the agreement gives the line of control all the attributes of an international frontier – that, under the pact, it can be reopened for a final settlement only with the consent of both governments and that a settlement is possible only on the basis of the acceptance of the status quo with some minor modifications. General Zia cannot have it both ways. He cannot possibly argue that his country’s security is in danger as a result of Russian action in Afghanistan and seek India’s co-operation in this regard and yet not regard the Kashmir issue as having been virtually settled.