The Soviet government has launched a ‘peace’ offensive on Afghanistan. That is the plain implication of the proposals the Karmal regime has made to Pakistan and Iran. It could not possibly have acted on so sensitive an issue without the Kremlin’s consent. Since President Zia-ul-Haq has not disclosed the contents of the letter Mr. Brezhnev has written to him, it is not possible to say with certainty whether its contents are more or less identical with the proposals Kabul has made. But it will be surprising if they are not. Anyone who has been reading the Soviet press carefully could have anticipated the Afghanistan government’s ‘initiative’ in precisely these terms. There is nothing surprising about its timing either. It is intended to soften the attitude of the leaders of the Muslim countries who will be assembling in Islamabad on Saturday (May 17) to review developments in Afghanistan and define their stand on it. The regime in Kabul has been trying to establish that it is not anti-Islamic. It has sent its foreign minister to various Muslim countries to persuade them to press its case for being allowed to attend the conference. This is a matter of crucial importance for Mr. Babrak Karmal and his Soviet backers. For President Zia’s decision on whether to agree to talks with him will depend on the outcome of the conference. Having recognised the peril of risking a confrontation with the Soviet Union, he himself may not be wholly averse to the proposal. At least one report from Islamabad suggests that the Pakistan government may be coming round to the view that the Karmal set-up is there to stay and that it may be advisable to accept this unpleasant reality.
The initial reactions of Mr. Edmund Muskie, the new US secretary of state, and the officials accompanying him on his trip to Europe suggest that they do not take the view that the Soviet-backed Afghan initiative is influenced mainly by the timing of the Islamic conference. Associated Press quotes the officials as saying that the proposals have “new and interesting aspects” and Mr. Muskie as speculating that the Kremlin’s interest in arms control and business and cultural contacts with the United States may be so strong as to persuade it to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in order to promote better Russo-American relations. If this US response survives Mr. Muskie’s discussions with the Soviet foreign minister, Mr. Gromyko, in Vienna this weekend, it will be a welcome development because it will hold out some hope that it may be possible to avoid a new cold war between the two super-powers. Irrespective of whether or not the Soviet Union is willing to withdraw from Afghanistan, and irrespective of whether it has acted with the limited objective of stabilizing a pro-Moscow regime in Kabul or with the larger objective of improving its capacity to influence the course of developments in the Gulf region, it is necessary in this nuclear age that Washington-Moscow do not move on to a collision course. Perhaps Mr. Muskie’s response to the Afghan proposals has been influenced by this enormously important consideration and by the desire to pacify public opinion at home.
The initiative itself appears to be premature and to suffer from serious weaknesses. It would have made better sense if it had been mooted after the Babrak Karmal set-up had consolidated itself to the point where it was in a position to do without the prop which now sustains it – 100,000 Soviet troops. It has not so consolidated itself. It may not need such a massive Soviet presence if it is assured that Pakistan and Iran will not train and arm the guerillas. But it can be overwhelmed by internal opposition. Almost the entire Afghan populace is hostile to it and its supporters are not numerous enough to carry on with indirect Soviet support. It just cannot survive without the prop of the Soviet troops. As it happens, with the best will in the world President Zia cannot stop the movement of tribals and guns across the border. He just does not have the resources to police the mountainous frontier. This would not have mattered too much if the rulers in Kabul had been prepared to accept intrusions of this kind as part of the reality as it has existed throughout the ages. But they are likely to insist on foolproof guarantees which Pakistan cannot provide. And in Iran there does not even exist a government which can negotiate an agreement and make Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic radicals stick by it.