The U.S. state department has been quick to dismiss President Brezhnev’s five-point doctrine of peace and security in the Gulf as “basically a reiteration of long-standing Soviet proposals.” So, indeed, it is. But that is by itself not a serious criticism. A proposal does not become unworthy of consideration just because it is old. The difficulty lies elsewhere. The United States has for years been concerned about the future political alignments of the Gulf countries and the power balance in the region because it and its West European and Japanese allies are critically dependent on oil supplies from there. As such it would in all probability have decided to establish a permanent and strong military presence in the area even if the Soviet Union had done nothing to add to its anxieties. But as it happens, Soviet actions have aggravated its apprehensions. The issue in this context is not whether the Soviet Union has been within its rights to do what it has been doing, but whether or not its actions have added to Western, especially U.S., anxieties regarding their future oil supplies from the Gulf. The answer cannot be in doubt. It must be strongly in the affirmative.
Mr. Brezhnev would have known all this when he decided to use his visit to New Delhi to spell out his doctrine. He could not have expected the United States to take it seriously. Why then has he taken the trouble to put forward the proposal? The American view is that he wants to reassure Mrs. Gandhi who is naturally concerned over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the growing military presence of the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean. There is obvious merit in this assessment. In fact, it is reinforced by the fact that President Brezhnev has spoken in New Delhi and that he has been keen to endorse the Indian demand that the Indian Ocean be converted into a zone of peace. But that may not be all. Since Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Kremlin cannot be interested in a new arms race with the United States and all that it implies by way of increased tensions all over the world, they should wish to convey it to the U.S. president- elect and his team that they are prepared for a wide-ranging understanding which could include the Gulf.
The speech in the Indian parliament may, therefore, well be addressed as much to Mr. Reagan as to Mrs. Gandhi. One of the key decisions that awaits Mr. Reagan on assuming office on January 20 is whether the United States should extend substantial military aid to Pakistan and persuade it to step up military assistance to the Afghan guerillas. Such a decision will create serious problems for this country. The Soviet Union, too, cannot view it with indifference. It, too, has a stake in seeing to it that a cold war is avoided on its southern border, The best way to do so is for the Kremlin to explore all possibilities for a political settlement in Afghanistan. Mr. Brezhnev has again affirmed his interest in such a settlement. Perhaps he will need to go farther than he has gone so far.