The intensity of the anti-Zia agitation in Pakistan comes as a surprise as much to most of us in this country as to observers of the Pakistani scene elsewhere. On the face of it, General Zia has been firmly in control; the armed forces, his principal constituency, have been reasonably content with the status quo in view of the privileges he has heaped on them and the sophisticated weapons he has secured for them; if he has had some rivals in the army he has managed to neutralize them; he has ensured for himself the support of the Jamaat-i-Islami and its well-armed thugs; the level of discontent among the people has not been particularly high because the economy has been doing well and the remittances from abroad continue to flow in; and the mosque; storm centre of the anti-Bhutto agitation in 1977, has not been available for the same purpose against the present dispensation. But obviously behind the facade of stability, discontent has been simmering. Or else, the present explosion would not have taken place. But even with the advantage of hindsight, it is not clear why the outburst has taken place just at this time. In a sense, the explanation is obvious which is that various opposition parties united under the banner of the movement for restoration of democracy (MRD) have given the call. But in reality that only raises another question. Why have opposition leaders suddenly felt so emboldened?
This is the third such agitation in Pakistan. The first one in 1968 overwhelmed Field Marshal Ayub Khan and the second in 1977 led to the overthrow of Mr. Bhutto. In 1968, Mr. Bhutto was riding the crest of a wave of popularity in West Pakistan on an anti-India platform on the one hand and on the populist slogan of “Roti, Kapda Aur Makan” (bread, clothing and shelter for everyone) on the other. And Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s six-point autonomy programme had stirred the imagination of the people in what was then East Pakistan. The two movements reinforced each other, making it difficult for President Ayub Khan to cope with the situation. He himself was not a ruthless man and he had had a stroke which had sapped his will to rule by force. In 1977 Mr. Bhutto had incurred the wrath of the people by rigging the election. Even before the ill-fated poll, he was on the defensive in the face of the assault by the Jamaat-i-Islami and other orthodox ulema as was evident from his surrender on the issue of putting the Ahmediyas outside the pale of Islam and his decision to ban drinking and night clubs. The mosque was also firmly ranged against him. One cannot even be sure that some powerful external agencies were not at work. But one common element proved of critical importance on both those occasions. The army was not willing to back either Field Marshal Ayub Khan or Mr. Bhutto. While the field marshal “transferred” power to General Yahya Khan, Mr. Bhutto yielded only at the point of the gun. The difference, however, was more apparent than real. Once again, the issue will be settled in the final analysis not in the streets but at the army headquarters in Islamabad. It will be rash to speculate at this stage on what the Pakistani generals will do. But it may be safe to say that if the battles in the streets continue, they will dump General Zia and put someone else in his place. In that limited sense the Pakistani generals can be said to be responsive to the popular sentiment.