It is obviously too early to try to predict the outcome of the current agitation in Pakistan. Indeed, it is too early to assess its true nature. Even so, an attempt at assessment must be made, however tentatively.
To begin with, two points may be made as if to clear the ground. First, General Zia-ul-Haq has failed to win any kind of legitimacy with the people of Pakistan in the more than six years he has been in office. This is evident from the fact that since he seized power in a military coup against Mr. Bhutto in July 1977, he has continued to rule the country with the help of martial law. He has so far not sought, as General Ayub Khan did, to institutionalize his rule in a manner that would reduce his dependence on the army.
General Zia has of course spoken a great deal all these years of his plan to established “Nizam-e-Mustafa” (an Islamic order) and he has introduced for some crimes punishments prescribed by the Shariat. But martial law remains the fundamental law of the land. The Shariat punishments are carried out by the martial law administration under martial law. Similarly, while General Zia has had a working alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami, he has relied principally on the armed forces to keep himself in power. Again, unlike General Ayub Khan, he has retained the office of the army chief of staff.
Secondly, the people of Pakistan have never reconciled themselves to prolonged military rule. They rose in revolt against General Ayub Khan in 1968 and they would in all probability have risen against General Yahya Khan (or some other general who might have taken over from him in 1971) if he had not handed over power to Mr. Bhutto. They rose against Mr. Bhutto as well in 1977 when he rigged the election and thereby forfeited his legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the politically conscious intelligentsia. Even otherwise, his regime had resorted to terror against its critics and opponents and thus discredited itself.
Sindhi Nationalism
On this reckoning, the agitation in Pakistan has to be accepted as opposition parties grouped together under the banner of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) describe it. And so it would in fact become in an unqualified sense of the term if it were to acquire in Punjab the same kind of intensity it has in Sind. But it may perhaps be pertinent to ask whether it is just an accident that so far at least the movement has by the large been concentrated in Sind.
It goes without saying that one should not be in a hurry to come to any firm conclusion on this issue. One has to be wary of a rash judgment in such a fluid situation. Even so, the question is relevant on the basis of developments to date. It becomes even more pertinent if it is recognised that the agitation has been most intense not in Karachi, Pakistan’s industrial and financial capital and therefore a natural central of anti-regime activities, but in Sind’s other, much smaller towns. For Karachi is predominantly a city of refugees from India who migrated from this country at the time of partition. And in Karachi itself, the predominantly Sindhi localities appear to have been worse affected than most others.
Several explanations can be offered for the upsurge in Sind. The Sindhi Muslims have felt discriminated against since the very establishment of Pakistan m 1947. Within their own province, they lost their main city to refugees from India and their language was subordinated to Urdu. This sense of grievance grew more acute as newly irrigated lands were allotted to Punjabi farmers in the sixties. Since Mr. Bhutto was the only Sindhi to have made it to the top of the political ladder, his overthrow and subsequent execution must have added to their feeling of alienation regardless of what they might have thought of his style of leadership. Sind has not benefited from remittances from the oil-rich Gulf to the extent Punjab has. It is difficult to say whether or not these grievances add up to form the nucleus of Sindhi nationalism on the pattern of Bangla nationalism in the sixties. But the possibility should not be dismissed out of hand.
No in-depth Reporting
The scene is complicated. So we have to be extremely careful lest we unduly simplify it and draw wrong conclusions. In-depth reporting from Pakistan has been conspicuous by its absence, especially since the 1965 war when Indian correspondents were thrown out from there. So we do not know enough of what has been happening in Pakistan. Many Indian journalists have visited the neighbouring country in recent years. But they have been more concerned with Islamabad’s foreign policy, especially towards this country than with developments there. Even American specialists such as Mr. Selig Harrison have paid more attention to Baluchistan than to Sind if only because Baluchistan borders Afghanistan where 10,000 Soviet troops are present.
The lack of adequate information apart, there is another reason why we have to tread warily. As far as we know, the Pakistan People’s Party led by Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto is the most popular political organisation in Sind and it stands for democracy in the whole of Pakistan. Indeed, when in office it was not at all sympathetic to the Sindhi demand for greater autonomy, not to speak of Sindhi aspirations for recognition of their cultural-linguistic identity. And in the present context, Mrs. Bhutto’s first public political act has been to appeal to the people of Punjab to rise in revolt against General Zia’s military rule.
But the struggle for democracy waged by the PPP under the MRD banner need not necessarily supersede Sindhi aspirations. Relevant in this context may be the view which the English-language Islamabad daily, The Muslims, has expressed. It has said that while the leadership of the movement in Sind is in the hands of the banned PPP, the forces of Sindhi nationalism represented by two student organisations and the left-oriented Sind Awami Tehrik have provided the necessary organizational support. This is rather thin evidence. But it deserves to be noted.
Sind is not another East Bengal. While East Bengal was separated from West Pakistan by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, Sind is contiguous to Punjab. So the military junta can bring to bear on it the full weight of its might. General Zia’s task will also be facilitated if he can convince the people in Punjab that they are facing a potentially secessionist movement in Sind. But that will be the surest way to give the forces of Sindhi nationalism their head.
Attitude of Generals
On the available (quite meager, as noted earlier) information, Sindhi nationalism is still not secessionist in its aims. But it can become so if the Sindhi people are driven to desperation, which they will be if General Zia seeks to arouse, and succeeds in arousing, Punjabi chauvinism in an attempt to legitimate his efforts to crush them with the help of the army.
Where does Pakistan go from here? Frankly, we do not know. For we are in no position to answer a number of key questions, the most central being whether or not the generals are firmly lined up behind the self-styled president, and whether or not they will abide with him if the movement continues in one form or another. The behaviour of Pakistani generals in 1968 and 1977 cannot be reassuring for Mr. Zia. But history need not repeat itself.
We have also no idea what advice if any, the Reagan administration will tender to the Pakistani generals with whom it must be in close touch. A spokesman of the State Department has noted the fact that “the demonstrations … have to date been largely concentrated in one part of the country (Sind) and may be motivated by a variety of regional and political concerns”. He has expressed the hope that “the Pakistanis can work out a reasonable accommodation which can restore calm in those parts”. At face value, this is a non-committal statement. But perhaps the absence of a friendly reference to General Zia may be significant. In any case, the decision in regard to Pakistan is likely to be taken in the White House in consultation with the CIA and the Pentagon and not in the state Department.
Within Pakistan itself, the Baluch militants, thousands of them ensconced in Afghanistan, have yet to reveal their hand. Perhaps they are waiting to see whether the campaign holds out in Sind and whether it spreads to Punjab. Perhaps they are being restrained by their Soviet friends who may calculate that their long-term interests will be best served if they demonstrate goodwill towards the Zia set-up in this hour of peril for it and thus place it under a debt of gratitude.
But all this uncertainty notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that the current agitation marks another watershed in the brief and chequered history of Pakistan. Its ruling elite once again faces a dilemma to which there may not be a painless resolution.
The Times of India, 27 August 1983