No great harm will be done to Indo-Pakistani relations if their foreign secretaries do not meet to resume the so-called political dialogue. The ties are in a poor shape and nothing much can be done to improve them at this point of time. Not to beat about the bush, this is a wrong time to reopen discussions, assuming that any meaningful talks have taken place earlier which is open to doubt. A question mark has appeared over the future of the present set-up in Islamabad on account of the continuing turmoil which the campaign for restoration of democracy has produced, especially in Sind. Thus if it can be argued that General Zia-ul-Haq’s chances of survival can improve as a result of easing of tension with India, it can also be said that he cannot afford to be seen to be making any “concession” to this country. The idea may not occur to us in India, but it is possible that General Zia might well be thinking that he should rather wait for the next election to our Lok Sabha. Surely it would not be out of place for him to calculate that the forthcoming poll could weaken Mrs. Gandhi’s position. And on the Indian side, it is self-evident that Mrs. Gandhi cannot wish to lend a helping hand to the general in his predicament and invite the anger of millions of Pakistanis who are waging a valiant struggle to secure early elections and his exit.
But, as at the time of the beginning of the “dialogue” in 1981, New Delhi has acted in a manner as to hand over the propaganda advantage to Pakistan. There could be doubt then whether Mrs. Gandhi was personally responsible for the clumsy performance of the ministry of external affairs or the minister, Mr. PV Narasimha Rao, and his officials had messed up things. But this time there can be no scope for doubt that she is in command. And, to be candid, there is very little to be said for it. By talking about the possibility of an armed conflict with Pakistan, she has only created the impression, both at home and abroad, that she is not interested in improvement of relations with that country, even if she is not looking for a pretext to provoke trouble with it. This risk of adverse publicity could have been understandable either if there was some evidence that Islamabad was indeed planning another adventure (or misadventure as in the past) against this country, or if there was some political advantage to be gained at home. But there is no evidence of Islamabad preparing for another trial of strength and it does not appear that many Indians have taken the Prime Minister’s frequent warnings seriously. It passes understanding that so shrewd a leader as Mrs. Gandhi should act in so unconvincing a manner. Her decision to call off a meeting of foreign secretaries can only add to the surprise.
As India’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has reason to be concerned over two developments – the amount and sophistication of the military hardware Pakistan has secured and can secure from the United States and the possibility that it may be encouraging and assisting the Akali extremists in Punjab. But the answer to the first problem is to take necessary measures to strengthen India’s own defence and to the second greater vigilance, especially better intelligence. As the defence minister, Mr. Venkataraman, has claimed, this country has equipped itself adequately to meet any possible threat from Pakistan or any other source. This has cost a lot of money. But that is a separate matter. Moreover, the Pakistani rulers must be out of their mind if they were to think in terms of military action on their eastern border so long as Soviet forces are lodged across the Khyber on their western border. In strategic terms, they are caught in a pincer which the fact of their close relations with the United States cannot undo. Indeed, it is precisely because Pakistan is in such a vulnerable position that Mrs. Gandhi’s statements lend themselves to the interpretation that she is planning some action against Pakistan. This is, of course, not true if for no reason other than that she knows that India would have nothing to gain by inflicting a defeat on Pakistan even if that was within its means, and that her room for manoeuvre is not what it was over Bangladesh in 1971 when public opinion in the West, including the US, was solidly on India’s side. But the damage is done all the same. As for a possible Pakistani involvement with the Akali extremists, the Union government has failed to produce any worthwhile evidence. In any case, how is the problem solved by calling off talks with Islamabad? Also if the atmosphere is not right for the foreign secretaries to meet, how can it be right for the sub-commissions to meet?