Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s attack on the record of the CPM-dominated West Bengal government at the Calcutta session of the Congress has created a great deal of confusion. Indeed, some people have gone so far as to say that he spoke without prior intimation to Mrs. Gandhi and that she was embarrassed. The first proposition may or may not be accurate; at least we have no means of knowing. The second is certainly difficult to sustain because she herself spoke quite harshly about the CPM at the public rally in Calcutta at the end of the Congress session on Friday. In fact, she could not have acted differently. The Congress and the CPM are more or less evenly matched in West Bengal in terms of electoral support and she cannot hope to retain and increase this support unless she is willing to take on the CPM. Even so, it is understandable that a lot of people should be asking what Mrs. Gandhi is about. For she has created the impression in recent months not only that she has decided to adopt a leftist and a more pronouncedly pro-Soviet posture at home and abroad but also that she is interested in reviving old ties with the CPI.
The posture and the question of relationship with the CPI are not necessarily linked. They could have been kept separate. But Mrs. Gandhi has not done that, or at least, she has not been seen to have done so. The link in question is her recent letter to the Soviet communist party chief, Mr. Andropov. In that communication, she complained about the CPl’s policy of making common cause with some “rightist and reactionary” organisations and she used a “friendly” CPI leader, Mr. Yogendra Sharma, to carry that letter to Moscow, Since the CPI leadership had been known to be divided on the issue of extending broad support to Mrs. Gandhi or opposing her, it was not too far-fetched to conclude that she was trying to use the Soviet leverage available to her to tilt the balance within that party in favour of pro-Congress elements. And why would she want to do so unless she was interested in some kind of relationship with a “reformed” CPI?
Some commentators pointed out even then the untenability of this assessment, arguing that neither Mrs. Gandhi nor the CPM leadership could possibly think of an alliance (or adjustment) in view of the polarization of the electorate in West Bengal between them, and that the CPI could not possibly survive without remaining close to the CPM. But they too could not provide a viable explanation for Mrs. Gandhi’s action in writing to Mr. Andropov on a strictly domestic issue. So when the political resolution with its trenchant criticism of “rightist” parties and a relatively mild one of leftist organisations was put before the subjects committee at the Calcutta session and it was followed by Mrs. Gandhi’s speech to the same effect, the impression spread that she was proposing the formation of a patriotic front with leftist parties such as the CPM and the CPI in it.
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s sharp criticism of the CPM-led West Bengal government has been viewed in this context. This is obviously understandable in view of Mrs. Gandhi’s letter to Mr. Andropov and the writings of a number of pro-Soviet leftist editors and correspondents who have been particularly active in recent months in her cause. But if it is accepted, as we have argued more than once in these columns, that a Congress-CPM-CPI or even a Congress-CPI arrangement is not practical and that Mrs. Gandhi is too shrewd and hard-headed not to know it, it follows that we cannot accept the proposition that she is trying to form a patriotic front with the two, or at least one, of the communist parties in it, her letter to Mr. Andropov notwithstanding.
Once that is firmly ruled out, as it should have been from the very start, the pieces fall into place. Mrs. Gandhi sees, quite rightly, that the so-called rightist parties constitute the main challenge to her. She has concluded, rightly or wrongly one cannot be sure, that the leftist stance is an asset for a variety of reasons. It appeals to aggrieved sections of the community; it establishes a clear link between her and her father and thus strengthens her legitimacy; it makes it difficult for the CPI leaders and others to accuse her of seeking the Hindu vote on a communal platform; and it helps divert attention from the weaknesses of Congress governments, especially in the states. Leftism is a good shield for corruption and inefficiency, as we have seen in so many instances in the past.
Such a strategy may explain the letter to Mr. Andropov and the careful cultivation of a pro-Soviet posture in international relations and of pro-Soviet (often non-party) intellectuals and writers. Finally, some other points may be made briefly. First, it is possible to appeal to the patriotic sentiment in the name of protecting the country’s unity and security without wanting to form a “patriotic front”. Secondly, Mrs. Gandhi cannot afford to be seen to be looking for allies in the context of the poll to the Lok Sabha. That will be an admission of weakness which can be disastrous for her and the Congress. Thirdly, she has to project herself as the country’s only hope and appropriate whatever platform she thinks appeal to the people. Fourthly, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has to be seen to be an independent factor if he is to make a mark on the national scene. He appears to have succeeded in doing so in Calcutta, as he had done earlier in connection with the removal of some chief ministers and appointments of their successors. All in all, Mrs. Gandhi may have worked out her strategy more carefully than most of us may have given her credit for.