Pakistani officials have confirmed that early last year the Soviets dropped a hint that they would be willing to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in 18 months provided Islamabad in turn closed its border and stopped the infiltration of arms and men into that neighbouring country. So we cannot question the authenticity of the report. But it only raises questions; it does not settle anything. To begin with, if the Soviets were really serious, why they did not pursue the hint and table it as a proposal in the subsequent talks with Pakistan under UN auspices? Also, how could the Soviets possibly convince themselves that Pakistan could effectively seal the border even if it so desired?
Two possible explanations have been offered for the Soviet hint. First, that as the KGB chief, Mr. Andropov was opposed to the military intervention in Afghanistan, found it costly and wanted to end it. Secondly, that the Soviets were convinced that they could not end the stalemate in the war against the guerillas. The first is speculative; no one outside the Kremlin can say what was Mr Andropov’s position when he headed the KGB and whether he stuck to it when he took over as the boss of the Soviet Union. The second too involves an element of speculation. For, even if it is assumed that the war in Afghanistan is stalemated and that the Soviets cannot win it, it does not necessarily follow that they find the stalemate and the cost unacceptable. Indeed, several western experts have come to think that the Soviets have not fared too badly in Afghanistan and that the cost in terms of loss of lives and support among third world countries is not intolerable.
It can be argued that the intervention was a mistake and that the Soviet Union has nothing much to lose by withdrawing. The intervention took place in certain circumstances and depending on whether one regards the Soviet leadership as being set on an expansionist course or as pursuing a defensive policy, it can be said that it exaggerated either the opportunities or the dangers. It also cannot be denied that the Soviets have lived with loss of face in the past as, for example, when President Sadat ordered their military personnel out of Egypt in 1973 and can do so again in the case of Afghanistan. But they did not have much of a choice in Egypt and other similar cases. In Afghanistan they have a choice; they can hold on so long as there is nothing to compensate them for the loss of face. That is perhaps where Pakistan’s overall foreign policy comes in. Islamabad cannot seriously expect Moscow to ease pressure on it (in the shape of refugees and Soviet military presence across the Khyber) if it is to serve as a US surrogate in the region. That might also explain why the US takes a dim view of Soviet-Pakistani talks. It fears that the Pakistanis may begin to review their foreign policy approach. The fear might explain much else – US hostility to Mr. Agha Shahi, former Pakistan foreign minister, and its resolve to continue to back General Zia-ul-Haq despite his obvious lack of popular support.
The Soviet hint about withdrawal could thus make sense as an attempt to test how the Pakistanis would respond. Some Pakistanis responded as well as perhaps the Soviets would have wanted them. The foreign minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, for example, left no opportunity to make it known that he was confident of an early deal with the Soviets. But this was bound to invite the ire of the US government and it did. So the Soviets must have waited to see whether Islamabad would stand up to Washington. It did not, for whatever reason. All this is speculation. But it may not be too wide of the mark. In any case, we should not ignore any possibility in this matter of vital interest to us.