An ordinary Indian must be forgiven if he finds the developments in Amritsar rather confusing. He hears the Prime Minister’s broadcast on Tuesday telling him that the token presence of the army was being withdrawn from the Golden Temple; he then reads in his newspaper on Wednesday that the army has been completely withdrawn leaving only a small BSF unit to guard the Toshakhana and the main entrance pending the handing over of the temple to the five head priests soon; on Thursday he finds that President Zail Singh visits the sacred shrine, holds a closed door meeting with the head priests who in turn announce that since he had assured them that the army would be withdrawn by Friday evening and the temple handed over to them, they had called off the march scheduled for October 1, and finally addresses a “divan” to express regret over the army action without saying a word of criticism against those who had made that operation unavoidable. He cannot be blamed if he asks some obvious questions; whether or not the army was in fact withdrawn on Tuesday; if not, why not; and if yes, how can it be withdrawn a second time unless it was reintroduced either to look after the security of the President or to enable him to claim credit for its exit. In the last eventuality, other rather inconvenient questions would arise. Was it really necessary for Giani Zail Singh to rush to the temple in case the army’s presence there was regarded necessary to ensure his security? Similarly, was it unavoidable that he should convey to the head priests what the Prime Minister had told the whole nation two days earlier? And since when has the President of the republic started playing such an intermediary role between the Union government and an aggrieved party, in this case the head priests and the SGPC and the Akali Dal standing by them?
Our ordinary Indian must also wonder whether it was appropriate for the head of the not insignificant Indian state to send personal emissaries to the head priests, explain his actions to them and even furnish evidence in support of his plea of innocence in order to persuade them to withdraw their earlier “hukumnama” declaring him a “tankhaiya” (guilty of religious misconduct). The charges against Giani Zail Singh were utterly phoney. The President does not order the country’s armed forces to undertake any task; this is done by the council of ministers headed by the Prime Minister; and the Giani is too devout a Sikh to even dream of entering the temple “parkarma” with his shoes on or of taking an umbrella inside the holy precincts. The head priests could not possibly have believed these charges to be true; they must have held him guilty for political reasons; and so this issue should have been taken care of during the secret negotiations between the Prime Minister’s principal secretary, Dr PC Alexander, and the representatives of the other side – the Akalis, the SGPC and the head priests. Did Dr Alexander try and fail, making it necessary for the President to plead innocence, through emissaries if not in person, before the head priests? Even if Dr Alexander had failed to win a reprieve for the head of the republic, why was the matter regarded so urgent as to require the President to make a direct appeal to the head priests? And what about Mr Buta Singh who too was declared a “tankhaiya” along with Giani Zail Singh? Is it the Union government’s tacit assumption that while the Giani could not live with the “hukumnama”, Mr Buta Singh can, because, after all, he is a mere Union minister and not the head of state?
These questions must unnerve the ordinary Indian not initiated into the mysterious ways the government in New Delhi functions. He would not be opposed to the withdrawal of the army from the Golden Temple or to its handing over to the head priests, though he might take note of the fact that they are appointed and paid by the SGPC, and recall that the recent white paper on Punjab had a lot to say about the functioning of this body. But he would be wondering why the Union government should have done all the running and whether there can be genuine peace in the state so long as the head priests and those who are ranged behind them continue to behave as if they are an independent power centre superior to New Delhi. Tensions in Punjab needed to be defused and a possible confrontation between the government and the Akalis avoided. But the other side should also have shown some anxiety to ease the situation and it did not, with the result that intransigence has had the better of reason. We can only hope that this does not go to the head of Akali leaders and their minions and set in motion another dangerous chain of events.
Even before the repair work was completed at the Golden Temple and before the Prime Minister had decided to withdraw the army from there, Punjab Congress leaders had begun to press for restoration of what they call popular rule in the state. They are now certain to step up this campaign. Mrs Gandhi must not yield to them. The law and order position in the state is fragile; the extremists are said to be regrouping and retraining; and they have demonstrated more than once in recent weeks that they can still strike at will. This is not a situation a Congress government can cope with, the party being a shambles and virtually leaderless at the state level. The new governor and his advisers have not covered themselves with glory in the short period they have been in office. But they are said to be trying to revamp the administration to restore it to some effectiveness and impartiality. While it is difficult to say whether this effort will produce any worthwhile result, it should at least not be reversed and the state plunged once again into confusion. Which is precisely what a restoration of “popular rule” will do. This must await a fresh poll to the state assembly. It is clearly premature to try and forecast the possible result of an election when it is not even possible to say when it is likely to become feasible to hold one. But it is obvious that a long-term plan to restore a reasonable degree of genuine peace in the state must envisage a role for the Akalis. They will never reconcile themselves to continued exclusion from power and they have demonstrated their capacity to create enormous trouble. We are aware that we are jumping several steps and that right now the problem is gradually to release those who have not been guilty of violence and at the same time ensure that in their euphoria over their “victory” they do not create trouble. But it is necessary to think and plan ahead if we are not to return to ad hocism and politics of expediency and once again run the attendant risks.