The formation of the Punjab Suba in 1966 should by rational considerations have finally satisfied the legitimate aspirations of the Sikh community.
For this development should have assured it that there would no longer be any kind of threat to its distinct identity in terms of the country’s political arrangement.
The religious-cultural identity of the Sikhs has never been in danger. Its continued survival has been guaranteed by, if nothing else, the external symbols (the famous five Ks) which Guru Gobind Singh gave the Khalsa. If they had any reason to be anxious, it was on account of the future of the Punjabi language in the Gurmukhi script. The establishment of a Punjabi-speaking state should have left no room for anxiety on this score. After all, the Sikhs had won their demand; the Punjabi Hindus had lost the battle, leaving them no alternative but to acquiesce in the new dispensation, which they did.
Another Goal
So if the problem had in fact only been the Sikh community’s natural and legitimate desire to protect its religious-cultural identity, Mrs Gandhi’s gesture in 1966 should have resolved it to its satisfaction once and for all. But, as we know only too well, it did not, as far as the Akalis were concerned. They had another goal as well in mind – power for themselves – and it is the non-fulfilment of that objective that has led them to behave in the dangerous way they have in recent years. As they viewed things, the interest of the Sikh community in preserving its identity converged with theirs in gaining power for themselves.
Master Tara Singh made no bones about it. He spoke in the name of the Sikh community. His demand for a Punjabi Suba was inspired by communal-power considerations and he said so. Sant Fateh Singh adopted a different strategy. He spoke in the name of the Punjabi language and culture. This perhaps made it easier for Mrs Gandhi to concede the demand. But the new Akali strategy did not change the old reality. As under the leadership of Master Tara Singh, the Akalis under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh were working for a state where the Sikhs would be in a majority and they themselves would be in power.
It has often been argued, especially in the context of developments in Punjab in recent years, that the Akalis were left with no choice but to think and act in communal terms once the Punjabi Hindus had disowned Punjabi as their mother tongue in favour of Hindi in the Devnagari script. But even if we ignore developments which either persuaded (the Hindu-Muslim conflict and the Hindi-Urdu controversy since the beginning of the century) or forced (the Akali stance before, during and after partition) the Hindus to make the choice they did in 1951, the validity or invalidity of the above proposition would in reality depend on the correctness or otherwise of a corollary. Which is that in the event of the Hindus having acted differently, the Akali leaders would have given up their religion-based politics and invited the Hindus to join the Dal. Surely, no one would seriously advance such a view. If the Akalis were in fact inclined to take up the larger cause of Punjabi culture and language, they could have at least made the kind of gesture to the Hindus which the Jana Sangh in its old and new incarnation as the Bharatiya Janata party has been making to the Muslims despite its pronouncedly Hindu character and orientation.
Having won their demand, the Akalis were in for a disappointment. The new Punjabi-speaking state was not another Kashmir (leaving aside the issue of accession). For one thing, unlike the Muslims in the valley, the Sikhs were not in an overwhelming majority in Punjab; over the years, their majority got whittled down to around 52 per cent. For another, unlike the National Conference, the Akali Dal could not have been assured of the support of an overwhelming majority of the Sikhs in view of the presence of diverse and competing interests within the community; as reflected in the election results, they did not enjoy majority support up to 1966, and since then they have commanded only a narrow majority in the community for political purposes as distinct from religious ones. The Akalis have easily dominated the SGPC.
This problem would, of course, not have been as acute as it has been from the Akali point of view if at the time of framing the Constitution the nationalist leadership had accepted either their demand for separate electorates, which the British had introduced with the deliberate intention of aggravating communal divisions, or the equally disruptive proposal, favoured strangely enough by the RSS-backed Jana Sangh among others, in favour of proportional representation. But an Indian leadership which had gone through the trauma of partition and was sensitive to the continuing danger of disruption of the state from within could not have done so.
Demand Rejected
Thus, a clash between Indian nationalism as embodied in the Constitution and its principal architect and exponent, the Indian National Congress, on the one hand, and on the other the Akalis search for power on the basis of religion was built into the situation. Mr Nehru knew this to be the case. That was why he refused to concede the demand for a Punjabi Suba.
Those who talk about the Sikhs being entitled to preserve their religious-cultural identity without their nationalism and patriotism being called into question either do not recognise, or do not wish to recognise, the true nature of the problem. The religious-cultural identity of the Sikhs, it will bear repetition, has never been in question. Their sentimental talk of the Sikhs being a branch of their family notwithstanding, the Hindus have had neither the desire nor the capacity to erode it. No Hindu has, for example, ever proposed that the Sikhs give up the symbols which distinguish them as a community. On the contrary, by going to Sikh gurdwaras in the millions and making generous offerings there, they have been acknowledging the power of the precepts and practices of the Gurus and in the process strengthening the claim of the Panth to continue as a distinct entity.
In view of widespread misunderstanding about the Hindus and the nature of Hinduism, it might be useful to make a couple of essential, even if obvious, points. The Hindus are not a self-aware people; they have not even given themselves the name by which they are known; it has been given to them by foreigners. Hinduism is not a proselytising faith; it does not seek converts. Instead, its adherents seek to absorb new spiritual lights and experiences the others may have to offer them; basically, they wish to enrich themselves spiritually, though in the process they might reduce the distance between themselves and the adherents of other filths and great masters. They have not always succeeded in reducing the distance because the others have raised insuperable barriers. It is interesting to note that while Hindus of all classes go to Muslim Sufis and their graves, they do not invite Muslim to visit Hindu temples or Hindu saints; indeed, they cannot, in view of their ideas of purity and pollution. In the case of the Sikhs too, they have been visiting gurdwaras but have not expected the Sikhs to return the compliment.
Clearly, the issue has not been the Sikh identity. The issue has been the Akali pursuit of power, their inability to gain it on their own strength within the parameters of the Constitution, and their refusal to draw the necessary lesson and either try and widen the Dal’s social base to include the Hindus, or enter into an alliance with another party which commands the necessary number of Hindu votes. This could not but produce the kind of frustration and extremism which we have been witnessing in recent years. Bhindranwale was above all a product of this frustration. As such, he was a child of Akali politics even if on the way some others looked after him.
Up to last October, when the growth of terrorism obliged Mrs Gandhi to impose President’s rule in Punjab, the national leadership tried to overcome this difficulty in a manner characteristic of the Hindus. It tilted in favour of those Sikh leaders in the party’s state unit who acted as if the only way to keep the Akalis in their place was to appropriate the substance of their platform and implement it. The strategy could not have worked in the long run, and it has not. The Akalis, wanting power for themselves, could not possibly be satisfied if the Punjab state Congress acted as a surrogate Akali Dal. The crunch came in 1983 and 1984. And when it did, New Delhi discovered to its horror that it just could not rely on the state apparatus and had to call in the army. But this was a desperate measure which could not possibly have taken care of the root cause of the crisis. It has not. So we are back to square one. In fact, we are in a far worse situation than we were at the time of the imposition of President’s rule. Not only are the Akalis more desperate than before but a very large part of the Sikh community is alienated as never before.
Problem Serious
The problem is at once extremely serious and complicated. One must be naive to believe that a quick fool-proof remedy is available only if Mrs Gandhi is willing to “listen to reason.” No such solution exists. But Centre will have to take certain risks. It is not possible for it to go on marking time. The status quo cannot be frozen in Punjab. Any attempt to do so is full of grave risks. As the army is gradually withdrawn, Akali leaders should also be released, though it does not necessarily follow that an attempt should be made soon to resume negotiations with them. The Centre has to weigh the pros and cons carefully. It should at least now set up a machinery which can spell out the consequences of the various courses of action open to it.
The Times of India, 17 October 1984