The government and the people of India heaved a sigh of relief when the so-called ghallughara (genocide) week in Punjab passed off peacefully. But that is about all that can be said on the positive side about the situation in Punjab right now. No one can even be sure why extremists and terrorists did not strike during that week.
It is, of course, true that the government had taken extraordinary precautionary measures. But that cannot explain the absence of terrorist activities.
Perhaps even terrorists were rational enough to recognise that it would be odd for them to kill Hindus during an observance which was intended to draw attention to the killing of Sikhs earlier. Perhaps they needed time to recover from the shock of arrests and confessions that had followed the bomb blasts in Delhi last month. Perhaps their foreign masters and controllers kept them on a leash for their own reasons. But all this is speculation. We just do not know why terrorists remained inactive during the “ghallughara week”. That they are very much there cannot be in doubt.
Terrorism is, however, only one facet of the problem we have faced and continue to face in Punjab. It assumed extraordinary importance before Operation Bluestar in June 1984 because it got linked with the Akali agitation. The Akali leadership did not advocate violence, but it did not have the courage to repudiate Bhindranwale, who did. Indeed, by continuing the agitation, it created an atmosphere in which extremists and terrorists were assured of widespread sympathy and support in the Sikh community.
Terrorism lost its focus after Operation Bluestar, involving as it did the death of Bhindranwale and his aides, the arrest of important Akali leaders and the end of their agitation. But terrorists came to embody the Sikh community’s anger and sense of alienation. These feelings were greatly reinforced by the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and several other north Indian towns in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination. As students of psychology would know, alienation feeds on self-righteousness. In November last, a large number of Sikhs suffered from this feeling of self-righteousness.
A Turning Point
It would be wrong to say that too many of them celebrated Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination on October 31. Before that fateful date, however, it was not easy to find non-Congress Sikhs who were willing to concede that she had been left with no choice but to order the army to enter the Golden Temple last June. While most articulate Sikhs had convinced themselves that she had deliberately avoided an agreement with the Akalis and thereby created a situation in which extremism and terrorism could prosper, nationalist Sikhs were on the defensive. In plain terms, Sikhs in general did not feel in any way responsible for the killings in Punjab in the previous two years.
The response of a number of non-Sikh writers to events in Punjab before Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination also strengthened this feeling of self-righteousness in the community. They too blamed Mrs. Gandhi for the failure of the talks with the Akalis, as if that justified either the Akali agitation, or the terrorism that accompanied it. Some of them went to the extent of endorsing Akali statements that some government agencies and leaders and not Sikh terrorists were responsible for the murders in Punjab.
This feeling of hurt, injustice and self-righteousness continued to dominate the hearts and minds of at least a significant section of the Sikh community up to the time of the bomb blasts in Delhi last month. Involving as they did the death and mutilation of scores of innocent people, these appear to have made a dent in this feeling of self-righteousness.
Again it would be speculation to say that this might explain the absence of terrorist activities during “ghallughara week” since we just cannot be sure. But that is a possibility which should not be dismissed out of hand, especially since Bhindranwale was a phenomenon in Sikh history whose disappearance could mark a turning-point — for the better.
A great deal has been written about Bhindranwale having been a creature of Giani Zail Singh, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Sanjay Gandhi. Even if this was true, this proposition had become irrelevant by the time he moved into the Golden Temple complex and virtually seized the leadership of Sikhs. He did not so much take up the leadership of extremists as create them. Some so-called advocates of Khalistan had existed before he shot into prominence. But it was he who made them a force to reckon with. Similarly, while he had had nothing to do with the Anandpur Sahib resolution in any of its incarnations, it was he who gave substance to its separatist overtones or undertones.
Since Operation Bluestar, especially since Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, it has been asserted repeatedly by various commentators and reporters that Bhindranwale had become even more powerful in death than he was when he was alive. The basic proposition is undoubtedly true. Bhindranwale continues to appeal to a section of Sikhs who regard him as a martyr in the cause of the panth. That is indisputable in view of the fact that cassette recordings of his ravings continue to circulate widely in Punjab and elsewhere. Even so, his disappearance has eliminated the most influential source of inspiration for extremists and terrorists.
Not An Organisation
This does not, of course, clinch the issue. Bhindranwale was a sort of mad monk, a symbol of a bygone age. He was not an organiser. His bands killed but did not, on the available evidence, forge an organisation with a reasonably well-defined structure of command and communications. Such an organisation could now come into existence if frequent reports regarding Pakistani involvement in the training and arming of terrorists are in fact accurate.
It is evident that press reports regarding Pakistan’s involvement come from our intelligence agencies. We should also assume that the intelligence agencies are in possession of hard evidence. This is especially so when the Prime Minister himself has said more than once that such evidence exists. If that is so, we should brace ourselves for dealing with a far better organised and therefore far more dangerous type of terrorism than anything we have witnessed so far.
The bomb blasts in Delhi last month do not fit into this picture unless the intention of those masterminding it was to create an atmosphere in which Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s aides would regard it prudent to advise him to postpone his then forthcoming visits to the Soviet Union and the United States. Since that could well have been a Pakistani design, we cannot be sure that the exercise in Delhi was not part of the bigger effort Islamabad is said to be engaged in. If that was the plan, it failed. Mr. Gandhi went ahead with his trip to the Soviet Union. Which incidentally might explain the absence of terrorist acts during “ghallughara week”.
A clear determination of the fact, nature and magnitude of Pakistan’s involvement with terrorists is a matter of the greatest importance. Our policy towards Islamabad must hinge on this assessment more than on anything else, including its more or less successful effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and its possession of weapons such as F-16s which it can use to attack our country.
The argument that Pakistan has gone in for sophisticated weapons and a nuclear weapons capability in search of security against a much stronger India may not appear reasonable to us in this country. But it is a plausible proposition. Indeed, it is widely accepted in the West, not always and not necessarily by individuals and groups who are hostile to us and friendly towards Pakistan. But no similar alibi can be advanced in support of a Pakistani programme to train, arm and finance terrorists for operations in India. That would constitute clear evidence of its hostile intent.
The Union government’s approach to the Punjab problem, too, must depend a great deal on a firm assessment of Pakistan’s connections with terrorists. If these connections are a fact and if they are extensive, New Delhi has little choice but to accord the highest priority to an anti-terrorist programme in Punjab.
Facing The Truth
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi will be face to face with a cruel dilemma here. He will be told, on the one hand, that he must settle with the “moderate” Akalis in order to avoid aggravation of the feeling of injury and humiliation among Sikhs. And he will be told, on the other, that the Centre cannot afford to relax its control in the state if it is to cope effectively with the problem of Pakistan-assisted terrorism.
Mercifully for him, there is just now no Akali leadership with whom he can engage in a meaningful dialogue and no such leadership may emerge for quite some time. On the face of it, New Delhi cannot be neutral in the intra-Akali power struggle. It would be sympathetic to Sant Longowal and his colleagues, though they are substantially responsible for the disaster that has hit the country and the Sikh community. For ranged against them are not so much the faceless men, such as the 83-year-old Baba Joginder Singh, as extremist youth belonging to the All-India Sikh Students Federation. But there is no means by which the Centre can indicate its preference without running the risk of hurting those it wishes to promote.
In any case, Mr. Gandhi must hold his hand till Sant Longowal demonstrates that he is worthy of his and the nation’s support. The Sant made a grievous blunder before Operation Bluestar by trying to compete with extremists. He has made the same mistake since his release. We can give him the benefit of the doubt and argue that he has been trying to cover his flanks. But that has its own logic, as our past experience shows. Sikhs are not adolescents who have to be pandered to. They are a hard-headed people who can face the truth if it is presented to them. We do not know whether Sant Longowal or other Akali leaders have the courage to do so. Meanwhile, it is clear beyond doubt that the situation in Punjab remains too tricky and dicey to admit of easy optimism.
The Times of India, 15 June 1985