EDITORIAL: An Akali Ultimatum

While there is an element of surprise in the ruling Akali Dal’s “ultimatum” to the Centre, it is not particularly difficult to locate the reasons behind it. This faction is engaged in a competition with the breakaway Akalis; the dice have got loaded in favour of the latter, especially since Mr. G.S. Tohra’s election as SGPC chief; so the Akalis in office have to do something to prove that they are not indifferent to the “interests” of the Sikhs and indeed that they are prepared to take on New Delhi in pursuit of those “interests”. And within the ruling Akali Dal itself, a power struggle has been going on between the chief minister and those who are willing to stand by him on the one hand and the advocates of Akali unity on the other. This factor, too, could produce the “ultimatum” in two ways. Either Mr. Barnala has managed to get the ultimatum issued in order to prove that he is not Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s stooge or his opponents have resorted to this manoeuvre in order to strain the chief minister’s relations with the Prime Minister. It is not easy to settle for one of the two assessments. But from the statement issued by four Punjab ministers on Monday in criticism of Mr. Gandhi’s remarks on the question of the transfer of Chandigarh, it would appear that the ultimatum is part of anti-Barnala moves in the ruling Akali group.

But whatever the factors which have influenced the Akalis in office, the “ultimatum” must embarrass Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He cannot oblige the Akalis by taking steps to implement the accord with the late Sant Longowal. The agreement is a travesty of justice. For in the face of the opposition of an overwhelming majority of its inhabitants, there is just no case for transferring Chandigarh to Punjab. The transfer of some Hindi-speaking areas to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh, as provided for first in Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s award and then in the Rajiv-Longowal accord, may “compensate” Haryana, but it can provide little comfort to the people in Chandigarh who wish to continue to live under the Centre’s protection in order to stay by and large outside the range of terrorists’ stenguns. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi could have delivered them to the Akalis if the latter in turn had managed to restore some kind of law and order, which they have not done. Indeed, a section of the Akalis has walked out of the government and provided encourage­ment to the extremists and the terrorists. Therefore, despite all his desire to please the Akalis, the Prime Minister just cannot oblige them. This means that either the Akalis retreat and do not announce their “action programme” on January 14, as they have threatened to do, or Mr. Gandhi will find extremely it difficult to continue to support them. As it is, the state Congress leadership does not approve of his decision to keep Mr. Barnala in office; it would become very restless if it had also to confront an anti-Centre agitation; and the agitation will make it more difficult for Mr. Gandhi to impose his will on the state Congress legislature party. And such is the irony of the situation that a retreat by the ruling Akalis would also add to Mr. Gandhi’s headache because it would reduce whatever little credibility they still command with the Sikh community in Punjab.

Meanwhile, it is notable that Mr. Barnala has obliged the Prime Minister to revise his stand on the publication of the Mishra commission’s report on the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and other north Indian towns in the wake of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s assassination on October 31, 1984. We do not know whether the report supports or refutes the general Sikh view that the riots were engineered by some prominent Congress leaders. So we cannot say why Mr, Rajiv Gandhi wanted to keep it secret, or why Mr. Barnala pressed for its release, or why the Prime Minister has now agreed to place it on the floor of Parliament when it meets for its winter session. But it can safely be predicted that publication of the report will create problems both for Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Barnala, whatever its contents. If it refutes the Sikh charge, they would call it a whitewash job. If it confirms the accusation even partially, it would strengthen the position of the extremists because it will “establish” that the Congress and therefore the Union government are anti-Sikh. Mr. Gandhi and his aides were aware of this danger and that is precisely why they were, to begin with, opposed to a judicial inquiry into the riots.

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