The Indian Muslim perception of having ruled over India for a thousand years (a figure Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto popularised) played a major role in the rise of Muslim “nationalism” in the sub-continent. But as any student of history would know, this self-perception of the Indian Muslims has little relation to reality.
The Muslim kings were never able to consolidate their hold over India. Even the Moghul empire at the height of its power was plagued by what Heesterman has called the “inner frontier”, that in the frontier beyond which their hold was tenuous. Indeed, the Moghul rulers too, functioned essentially as super-zamindars and remained critically dependent on the support of local notables. Among the Muslims elite itself, Fitna (unruliness to rebellion) was a permanent feature. In any event, the entire nobility came from Persia or Central Asia. The local Muslims, that is those Indians who got converted to the faith, had little share in power.
The Muslim rule, however we may define it, did not bring about a significant change in the economic order. The same old castes, for instance, continued to serve as rent collectors and dominate the country’s commerce, including external trade. Thus, by and large, economic power remained with the same old groups. This is best illustrated by the fact that during his struggle for power, Aurangzeb borrowed four lakh rupees from a Hindu banker in Ahmedabad and, at the time of the British takeover of Bengal in the 18th century, a vast majority of the rent collectors with rights in the land were non-Muslim. That is how they became the principal beneficiaries of the permanent settlement.
In plain terms, while the conversion to the faith of the rulers changed the self-perception of the converted (who mostly came from lowly artisan classes in most parts of the country) giving them an elevated view of themselves, it did not in most cases change their economic status. It did not even win for the converted the respect of members of the Muslim upper crust who treated them with condescension, if not contempt; the Muslim society continued to be sharply divided along racial and economic lines up to the time of partition when a majority of its elite class migrated to Pakistan. The gap between self-definition and reality has dogged the Indian Muslims and through them the rest of us since at least the middle of the 19th century.
Brutal Affair
Partition was an act of desperation. When the crunch came, none of the parties concerned was keen on it and yet they could not avoid it. In every sense, it was a brutal affair. It could not have settled any issue; it did not settle any issue. It is difficult to say whether Mr Jinnah realised the horror of what he had done. His actions point in contradictory directions. While he delivered in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly an address that virtually repudiated the two-nation theory on which he had based his demand for a Muslim “homeland”, he ordered the tribal invasion of’ Jammu and Kashmir as if the horrors of mass massacre and mass migration accompanying partitions were not awesome enough. But we cannot settle that issue; nor need it concern us presently.
Seen in rational terms from the perspective of the Indian Muslims, partition was one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Islam in India. In some ways it was worse than even the disintegration of the Moghul empire. For in the 18th century they could have developed the kind of communal solidarity that they had undoubtedly acquired in the forties. More pertinently, as in the 18th and 19th centuries, they had to adjust to the new power realities. But how?
It is often forgotten that the rise of Shah Wali-Allah, the architect of Muslim revivalism or fundamentalism, followed the last great Moghul emperor, Aurangzeb, in the early 18th century. This was no mere coincidence. In defeat, the Indian Muslims had to fall back on religion and tradition, however outdated, in order to preserve their self-respect. The Jews in diaspora had done just that and so had the Hindus under the Muslim onslaught. Indeed, it is a universal experience that communities and societies in distress emphasise unduly the role of religion and tradition in their lives.
By virtue of its commitment to territorial nationalism which, unlike ethnic nationalism, does not exclude any group from full citizenships, and secularism and democracy based on adult franchise which emphasise the same principles of non-discrimination and equality, independent India at its birth was very different from British India in the 19th century. It offered the Indian Muslims a unique opportunity to share power with non-Muslims, which is something Muslims in no country have ever done. They have either ruled over non-Muslims or been ruled by the latter.
Democratic Process
To be able to take advantage of this opportunity which has been truly available to them additionally by virtue of the nature of the Hindu society, the Muslims had to overcome, to begin with, the trauma and shame of partition. In this regard they have shown remarkable resilience. They overcame the trauma a long time ago and it is now impossible to find a Muslim who feels guilty on account of his community’s role in the division of the country. This, however, could not have sufficed, and has not sufficed, to enable them to share power with the others in the democratic political order. By and large the Muslims have accepted the passive patron-client relationship with those in office. By and large, they have not sought to participate actively in the democratic process by trying to share leadership.
To begin with, they sought cover under the Congress umbrella because Mr Nehru offered them the protection and legitimacy as Indian citizens which they thought they needed. But that was a long time ago. For years there has been no evidence that they have genuinely felt threatened. On the contrary, they have been pretty aggressive on a number of occasions. That has, however, not changed the by and large passive nature of their involvement with the democratic process.
Those in charge of the country’s affairs have basically left the Muslims alone. They have had not much choice in the matter. Witness the ferocity of the reaction over the Supreme Court judgment awarding a miserable maintenance allowance to a poor divorcee woman from a reasonably well placed former husband. Though I had earlier opposed such interventions in the affairs of the community, on this occasion I felt that Mr Rajiv Gandhi should not have pushed through, at the instance of the ulema, a piece of legislation which annulled the Supreme Court’s verdict. But I am no longer sure. I feel that perhaps it is as well that the Prime Minister did not allow a sore to fester.
Clearly there is an obverse side to this non-interventionist approach. Which is indifference. This indifference on the part of the non-Muslims towards the Muslims is a fact. The Imam of the Jama Masjid in Delhi and Syed Shahabuddin attract attention by virtue of the offensive remarks that they make from time to time. Mercifully the Indian state has not become similarly indifferent to the well-being of the Muslim citizens even though they have successfully denied it the right to enact a uniform civil code, which every modern country must possess, and in the process questioned its sovereignty.
Hindu Backlash
This enables Mr Shahabuddin and his ilk to play both ends of the stick, that is, at the same time oppose a uniform civil code and go on listing grievances of behalf of the community. In doing so, they are playing with fire not because it can provoke a so-called Hindu backlash (that is wholly unlikely) but because they are playing on the sentiments of a community that tends to be volatile. Indeed, even from the strictly Muslim point of view, they are mistaken. They are discouraging the Muslims from engaging in competition by telling them that it is pointless for them to do so because they will be discriminated against and denied their due any way.
Perhaps Mr Shahabuddin recognises the dangers inherent in his approach. Perhaps he too is helpless since the leadership of the Muslims which he seeks is available largely, if not wholly, on such a self-defeating and negative platform. For there can be no question that the Indian Muslims are caught in a circle they do not wish to break. They are determined to preserve and strengthen their solidarity; this solidarity is possible only on the basis of adherence to mores which belong to the past, especially the Shariat; this makes it relatively difficult for them to overcome their backwardness and build bridges with the Hindus, millions of whom, incidentally, are going to the other extreme and virtually becoming pagans in the pejorative sense of the term.
On the face of it, all this should be cause enough for alarm. Indeed, it is. But there is some room for hope. The process of modernisation and therefore of secularisation is remorseless; by secularisation I mean increasing knowledge of the mysteries of nature and life and their harnessing for the human good. No large group can escape it, especially if that group happens to be living, as the Indian Muslims happen to be, among a people who are determined to match the advanced nations of the world. This is not a painless process. On the contrary, it can be extremely painful, specially for those who resist it, as the Muslims all over the world are trying to do in their despair and hopelessness. At its lowest, the modernisation-secularisation process is pretty disruptive, as we in India know to our cost. That is cause for concern. But that is another matter.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 7 January 1988
