So finally the Soviet leadership has decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan unilaterally. Clearly, it is the unilateral nature of the decision, rather than the decision itself, that deserves to be noted. Mr Gorbachov has tried to cover up this fact. But he has not been able to do so successfully. All that he has been able to do is to claim that “by now, documents covering all aspects of a settlement have been almost fully worked out at the Geneva negotiations” and that “there are considerable chances” that the next round of talks “will become the final one”. Thus, in Mr Gorbachev’s own testimony, a final agreement has not yet been reached, and there is no guarantee that the next round of talks will be the final. Indeed, it can well be argued that if the Soviet leader was confident that an agreement was round the comer, he would have preferred to wait, rather than set a final date for the beginning of the withdrawal – May 15. Add to this agreement the fact that while, on Mr Gorbachev’s own statement, this date can be advanced in case an agreement is concluded by March 15, it cannot be delayed, if the expected deal between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the UN auspices does not materialize by then. Mr Gorbachov has not left any exit open for himself, even by indirect implication, apparently because he is not interested in holding out a veiled threat.
It is not that Mr Gorbachov is not aware of possible difficulties still ahead. He has himself admitted that his decision to announce the time-frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops does not mean “that no one could now obstruct the settlement, or push the talks backwards”. But this admission is not followed by the statement that in that event, the Soviet Union would review its decision. On the contrary, all that he has to say is that “we would not like to think that some states or political figures might want to be held accountable to the Afghan nation and other nations for scuttling a settlement” and to hope that “commonsense will prevail”. Surely, Mr Gorbachov could not possibly have made it more clear that the decision to withdraw is unilateral and that it is not linked inextricably with an agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
As if this was not an obvious enough indication that the Soviet leadership has decided to wash its hands off Afghanistan, Mr Gorbachov has delinked the Soviet withdrawal from the question of forming a coalition government capable of avoiding another bloodbath in the country and indeed from the character of whatever set-up finally emerged in Kabul. To quote him: “There is need to make clear our position on yet another aspect – whether the withdrawal is linked with the completion of efforts to set up a new coalition government in Afghanistan, i.e., with the bringing the policy of national reconciliation to fruition. We are convinced that it is not.” And “most often, it is being said that the future peaceful Afghanistan will be an independent, non-aligned and neutral state. Well, we would only be happy to have such a neighbor on our Southern border”. The implication is clear. The Soviets no longer feel that they are in a position to ensure that Afghanistan will be non-aligned and friendly towards them and are willing to live with whatever kind of regime, if any, comes up in Kabul.
That too is not all. Mr Gorbachov poses the question: “Could hostilities flare up even more after Soviet troops leave”? and returns the answer: “It would hardly be appropriate to prophesy, but such a course of events could be prevented, if those now fighting against their brothers take a responsible attitude”. But what if “they are guided not by arguments of reason, but by emotions multiplied by fanaticism?” Once again Mr Gorbachov has nothing stronger to lean on than the mythical “will of the Afghan people to see their country pacified”. And once again, he takes care to let it be known beyond a shadow of doubt that the Soviet Union would not intervene in such an eventuality. For he adds: “If necessary, consideration could be given at that stage, to using the possibilities available to the United Nations and its Security Council”. All in all, we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the first direct Soviet military intervention outside the Warsaw Pact countries.