President Jayewardene’s government in Sri Lanka has come dangerously close to collapsing. That much has been evident for some weeks as the extremist JVP has successfully stepped up its murderous campaign virtually without meeting much resistance. On November 1, it raided a military camp and escaped with the entire armoury consisting of around 450 weapons. Five days later on November 6, 153 prisoners belonging to it escaped, not from an ordinary goal but from a military detention camp. While the two events do not necessarily establish complicity between a section of the Sri Lankan army and the extremist JVP, they do draw attention to this possibility. Indeed, given the Sinhala-Tamil polarization in the island republic and the widespread opposition to the accord with India and the Jayewardene government responsible for it, it would indeed have been highly surprising if some sections of the armed forces were not sympathetic towards the JVP which has come to be regarded as the most trenchant and best organised exponent of Sinhala nationalism. Apparently, this sympathy has grown as the Jayewardene government has proved incapable of putting down JVP-inspired violence in the southern parts of Sri Lanka.
It is not fair to review recent developments in Sri Lanka with the advantage of hindsight. It is wrong to charge president Jayewardene with lack of foresight when most others too failed to anticipate that the JVP would acquire the kind of influence and power that it has. The source of Sri Lanka’s tragedy, it must be accepted in all conscience, is India’s miscalculations regarding the LITE. First our policy makers thought that they could force the LTTE leadership to accept the accord which fell short of an independent Tamil state even if it took care of most of their legitimate demands. Then New Delhi took the view that its Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) would crush the LTTE speedily enough. Having failed to do so, it has tried to negotiate with the LTTE without letting up pressure. That has also not worked. Inevitably, the Indian failure to deliver its side of the bargain, though understandable in that New Delhi has done all it could have to deal with the LTTE, has weakened president Jayewardene’s position and strengthened that of his detractors. Even so, in retrospect it is evident that he should have attempted the kind of understanding he is now trying to reach with Mrs Bandaranaike much earlier.
President Jayewardene has finally recognised that he and his party cannot hope to overcome the mounting crisis on their own. So he has offered to set up a caretaker government which would supervise the forthcoming presidential election. He is willing to bring into such a government not only the legally constituted opposition parties such as Mrs Bandaranaike’s SLFP but also the banned JVP provided, of course, its leaders agree to abjure violence. So the key questions are whether Mrs Bandaranaike and her allies in the seven-party opposition alliance too see the writing on the wall, whether the opposition leaders can persuade the JVP to modify its position, and whether, in the event of their failure to so persuade the JVP, they can summon the necessary courage to cooperate with president Jayewardene in what is without much doubt the last attempt to salvage the unity of the island republic.
The answers to the first two questions are reasonably obvious. By all accounts, it appears that not only Mrs Bandaranaike but also the leaders of the Buddhist clergy have come to realize that the collapse of the Jayewardene’s set-up, in the absence of an alternative arrangement acceptable to India, will almost certainly lead to a civil war and the breakup of Sri Lanka. And, by the same accounts, there is not much chance that the JVP will accept such an interim arrangement and a peaceful presidential poll; it seems determined to seize power by the force of arms. For an answer to the third question, we have to wait. But it can be said without any doubt that if Mrs Bandaranaike and other opposition leaders do not summon the necessary will to cooperate with president Jayewardene in his last-minute salvage operation, they will sink with him. All is not lost yet. But it shall soon be, if the saner elements in Sri Lanka do not band together without further loss of time. We are trapped in a situation we had not bargained for. But we cannot scuttle and run – not till authority has collapsed in Colombo and there is no prospect if resuscitating it. Contingency plans must, however, be kept ready. Our continued presence can make sense only in the followed by the withdrawal of our troops, however disastrous the consequences for Sri Lanka. We cannot allow Sri Lanka to become our Vietnam or Afghanistan.