On the eve of president Gorbachov’s visit, it might appear impolite to say that for us in India, his leadership is on trial in Afghanistan and that, if he fails to pass the test, the interests of both the Soviet Union and India will be compromised, his country’s even more seriously than ours. But the point has to be made, if only because evasive politeness cannot serve as a solid foundation for understanding and friendship. To be fair to Moscow, there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is seriously disturbed by the continuing US-Pakistan support for the Mujahideen and their consequent refusal to accept anything less than the Kabul government’s surrender. Thus it has stepped up its own supplies of sophisticated weapons to the Kabul regime, suspended the withdrawal of its remaining troops, issued stern warnings to Islamabad, and possibly dropped, at least for the time being, plans to replace president Najibullah with someone who, in its view, may be more acceptable to the Mujahideen as an interlocutor for a possible rapprochement. But the general impression is that all these moves are intended mainly to influence the outcome of the elections in Pakistan and to ensure that a civilian government emerging from the poll would adopt a less intransigent stand on Afghanistan. All in all, the impression prevails that the Kremlin does not have a long-term Afghan policy.
Mr Gorbachov knows as well as anyone else that the Geneva accord has collapsed, except in respect of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It did not have much of a chance to begin with. For, the Americans had made it known in advance that they would continue to arm the Mujahideen and the Pakistanis that they would not rest content till they had installed their favorites in Kabul. It was not known then that at least some of the US and Pakistani policy-makers are determined to put in power in Kabul men who would cooperate in a strategic design which is a revised version of the CENTO. Afghanistan did not figure in CENTO. It does in the new proposal, covering as it does Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. The anxiety of American and Pakistani hawks to bring Afghanistan into the new arrangement can leave little scope for doubt that despite the growing Soviet-US detente in other fields, mostly on American terms, Washington has designs on the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union – the predominantly Muslim republics in Central Asia. This by itself is a matter of concern for us in India. But as it happens, the proposed grouping is aimed at us as well. The Pakistan army chief, General Aslam Beg, has left no room for doubt on this score.
President Zia was fully committed to the strategic plan and the Reagan administration was backing him to the hilt. Some of president Zia’s actions such as the dismissal of the Junejo government and the show of utter disregard for Soviet susceptibilities make better sense in this context, than they did earlier. And so does the Reagan administration’s cool attitude towards the dismissal of the Junejo government and its readiness to go along with president Zia in his flagrant violation of the constitution. In view of the victory of Mr Bush in the presidential poll, the US policy in this regard is not likely to change. In Pakistan, the situation is fluid. We do not yet know what kind of government will emerge as a result of the poll and, even more important, we do not know what kind of power the army top brass will continue to wield. But it cannot be a mere coincidence that General Beg has chosen to disclose the strategic plan on the eve of the poll. Apparently he means business.
The inclusion of Iran in the proposed US-Pakistani design must come as a surprise, in view of the hostile relations between Washington and Teheran. It raises questions we cannot yet answer. But two points are obvious enough. First, America has at no point given up the hope and the effort to win back Iran; the Iran-Contra affair was not an aberration; it was part of a larger US strategic design, which assigns an important place to Iran. Second, during this period of Washington-Teheran hostility, Pakistan has managed to maintain reasonably good relations with Iran; surely it could not have done so without Washington’s acquiescence and in fact endorsement. And it would not be out of place to add that as the Khomeini phase draws towards a close, new possibilities could open up for the Americans in Iran. The “moderates” in Teheran could seek accommodation with the United States in their search for economic assistance from the West which they desperately need. This is, however, speculation. We have to wait and watch as events unfold. But meanwhile, it is obvious that new schemes dangerous for the Soviet Union and India are in preparation which Moscow and New Delhi will be ill-advised to ignore. By any reckoning, developments in Afghanistan would have a critical bearing on the security of both the Soviet Union and India. The issue is urgent enough to merit discussion between president Gorbachov and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.