The expected has at last happened. The Soviet government has finally announced suspension of the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. The decision is wholly understandable in terms of provocations by the other side, indeed, the surprise, if any, is that the Kremlin should have taken so long to respond to these provocations. Contrary to the provisions of the Geneva accord, Pakistan has continued to serve as a conduit for the supply of arms and ammunition to the mujahideen. But this was only to be expected. Even when the Geneva agreement was being worked out, the United States had made it abundantly clear that it would not stop supply of weapons to the mujahideen so long as the Soviet Union did not do the same in respect of the Kabul government. And surely the US could not maintain the supply except with Pakistan’s help. In plain terms, the Geneva accord was flawed from the start and the Kremlin was fully aware of it. The Soviets can argue that their troops have continued to be attacked by the mujahideen. But surely the Soviets cannot in all honesty claim that they did not anticipate such attacks. For one thing, the mujahideen groups are not a party to the Geneva accord and, for another, they have shown no inclination to accept accommodation with the set-up in Kabul.
The plain truth is that the Soviet Union acceded to the Geneva agreement out of weakness – inability to win the war in Afghanistan accompanied by the desire for an overall detente with the United States – and that it is not within its power to reverse this reality. It follows that suspension of the troop withdrawal does not resolve the dilemma it faces in Afghanistan. There have been reports that the Kremlin recognizes that Dr Najibullah cannot make himself acceptable to the mujahideen and is, therefore, willing to dump him. But in favour of who? The Prime Minister who does not belong to the ruling PDPA? But, in Stalin’s memorable phrase, how many divisions does he command? Not even a battalion. The mujahideen may at best accept him as a stop-gap arrangement, and that top only if the Soviets disband the entire PDPA-dominated set-up, which must include the intelligence and the special forces. For the Russians to agree to do so must mean total loss of face which is what they have been wanting to avoid. Apparently that leaves them one choice – the old King Zahir Shah. But Zahir Shah can come back only if at least asubstantial majority among the mujahideen leadership decide in his favour and if the Soviets make sure that radical sections of the PDPA are in no position to resist his return. That too involves the withdrawal of Soviet assistance to the Kabul regime and that without a guarantee that either Zahir Shah will head the next set-up in Kabul, or that the remaining Soviet troops will be allowed to go back home in safety. All in all, the withdrawal suspension decision at best buys them some time in which to negotiate with the United States. That can be possible only on American terms which have not changed since the Geneva talks began. The terms in sum amount to end of the PDPA and Soviet influence in Kabul.