There must have been some good reason why on two consecutive occasions during his visit to Delhi, president Gorbachov made two references to “unfriendly” comments on the future of Indo-Soviet relations. But we do not know what that reason is. On the contrary, we are rather baffled, for, as we see it, the Indian response to him and his policies has, by and large, been positive and did not call for the kind of “defensive” observations he made.
Perhaps a clue is available in his refusal to agree to meet the press during his visit. Gorbachov is not the kind of leader who shuns the press. Indeed, he is adept at handling the media. Remember that it was the favourable publicity he received during his visit to Britain, in 1984, that helped to launch him as a new significant figure on the world stage. The media within the Soviet Union has served as his principal instrument in his battle against neo-Stalinists. Why then the shyness towards the media in New Delhi?
Again, we are in no position to answer this question. We can only speculate. One line of speculation can be that this was an inconvenient moment for president Gorbachov to meet the international press in Delhi in view of the declaration of “sovereignty”, though not secession, by the Estonian parliament last week. It is notable in this connection, that he found it necessary to speak to Soviet mediamen accompanying him – of all places at the Indira Gandhi samadhi – on the development in Estonia, apparently to reassure the people at home that there was no cause for anxiety and that the problem could and would be taken care of, without resort to the traditional repressive measures.
Afghan Situation
Another line of speculation can be that Gorbachov still remembered the “inconvenient” questions he had to face regarding the Soviet response to possible threats to India’s security from China and Pakistan, during his previous visit in 1986, and wanted to avoid a repetition of the same experience. The difficult situation in Afghanistan could well have reinforced him in his decision to keep away from the media in Delhi.
On the face of it, Gorbachov behaved in a manner uncharacteristic of him – defensively. This is rather surprising, especially because he could have faced the most “unfriendly” questioners and turned the tables on them on the future of Indo-Soviet relations; only he had to be willing to acknowledge that his determination to end the Cold War with both the West and China must inevitably involve reshaping of the entire Soviet foreign policy, including the policy of friendship with India.
Be that as it may however, it is indisputable that Indo-Soviet friendship, as it has developed since the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to this country in 1955, has been deeply influenced, if not shaped, by two Cold Wars in which the Soviet Union has been caught, one with the West led by the United States, and the other with Communist China. The point about the Cold War with China needs to be underscored, because it has not attracted the attention it deserves, especially in discussions of Indo-Soviet friendship.
The East-West Cold War was an established and universally acknowledged fact at the time of Indian independence. In our own case, it led to the formulation by Nehru of the policy of neutrality, subsequently rechristened as the policy of non-alignment.
Not just Nehru, but hardly any world statesman was aware of the Stalin-Mao differences then. But the subsequent disclosures leave no room for doubt that the Sino-Soviet Cold War too was a fact long before Mao Zedong unfurled the red flag in Peking on October 1, 1949. Stalin was opposed to the unification of China under the communists for the twin reasons that he was thoroughly distrustful of Mao and he did not want a formidable power to arise on his country’s eastern border, when it had barely managed to cope with one (Germany) on the western frontier. But this was not too widely known then.
Simultaneously, on our side, when the United States decided to look for allies in Asia in the early fifties, in a bid to establish a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union and China (which Washington regarded as a Soviet satellite), Nehru did not oblige, though by that time China had moved its troops into Tibet and thereby put India on notice that there could be trouble on its Himalayan frontier as well. In the context of India’s partition, preceded and followed by a communal holocaust, Nehru regarded the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan as far more fundamental to India’s long-term security interests, than a possible danger from the Chinese occupation of Tibet. He did not, therefore, allow himself to be lured by American inducements into abandoning the path of non-alignment he had chosen for India.
It is seriously open to question whether in the early fifties, Nehru felt even vaguely that if it came to the crunch, India could depend on Soviet support in a conflict with Pakistan, possibly armed by the United States, and China. For all we know, he did not then expect the US to arm Pakistan and he felt that his recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and his policy of continued friendship towards Peking, fully demonstrated in connection with the war in Korea, would buy him peace in the Himalayas.
Nehru’s Stance
But he did not have to wait too long for indications of possible Soviet support to emerge. The US decision to arm Pakistan in 1954, and the appearance of the first signs of a possible border dispute in the Himalayas, were followed by Soviet offers of economic assistance in 1955 and the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit later the same year. The interests of the two countries had come to intermesh and, more important, they had begun to be seen to intermesh by the leaders in Moscow and Delhi. There has been no looking back since.
It is to Nehru’s credit that he was among the first, if not the first, world figure to recognise that Communist China was not and could not be a Soviet satellite in view of the strength of Chinese nationalism, and that he was quick to realise that the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit was intended to reassure him, not only in respect of US-armed Pakistan, but also in respect of Communist China. He said so, within weeks of the visit at the meeting with Indian diplomats in London.
It is ironical, though understandable, that while the fact of Soviet support to us in our conflicts with Pakistan should have been over-emphasised, it has been greatly de-emphasised in relation to our difficulties with China. Ironical because the latter have been by far the more important in cementing Indo-Soviet bonds, than our conflicts with Pakistan. After all, India turned for military supplies to the Soviet Union in view of the conflict with China and not with Pakistan; we acquired one squadron of MiGs in 1961, when tensions on the Tibet border were mounting, and we turned to the Soviet Union for all kinds of hardware after the Chinese aggression of 1962; and Indira Gandhi concluded the Treaty of Friendship in 1971, not because she needed to deter Pakistan from attacking India, but because she regarded it necessary to deter China from intervening in an Indo-Pakistan war, which she regarded as having become unavoidable. Understandable, because it has suited most of the proponents of Indo-Soviet friendship to emphasise its anti-China aspect and de-emphasise its anti-Pakistan, and therefore its non-ideological aspect.
On the other side of the ideological fence, most of those who have expressed anxiety regarding India’s security vis-à-vis China, in the context of Gorbachov’s determination to mend fences with Peking almost at any cost – apparently he is not given to cautious half-measures, as is evident in the case of Afghanistan – have also not been too cognisant of this reality of Indo-Soviet relations. They too have been influenced by ideological considerations. Many of them are well disposed towards the West and therefore to Pakistan and have been interested in embarrassing the Indian leadership on the issue of its policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. Objectively speaking, however, in terms of the old realities of Chinese policy, their concern has not been misplaced. China has constituted a threat to India, both by itself, and as a firm supporter of Pakistan. Indeed, it is as a surrogate for the Chinese that Islamabad has been a bigger nuisance for India, than as an ally of the United States. For while it has been possible for us to persuade Washington to exercise its influence in Islamabad in favour of moderation, it has not been practical for us to try to so persuade Beijing.
This brief narration of the history of Indo-Soviet friendship raises questions which need to be discussed with great care and in great detail. Clearly this is not possible in this piece. But surely, neither Gorbachov’s advice that we improve ties with China, nor Rajiv Gandhi’s forthcoming visit to Beijing in that search, can clinch the issue. At the very least, we have to wait and watch China’s responses over a rather long period, if only because Chinese policies have been known to fluctuate rather wildly.
Search For Detente
Some points can, however, be made straightaway. First Gorbachov’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s statements notwithstanding, Indo-Soviet friendship will need to rest or a different foundation in the future. Secondly, India’s policy of non-alignment will lose much of its raison d’etre in the context of the Soviet search for detente with the US and China. Finally, both Gorbachov and Rajiv Gandhi need to be careful in dealing with China lest they feed its proverbial “Middle Kingdom” complex and persuade its leaders to behave as if the whole world is their servitor.
The Times of India, 22 November 1988