Surprising though it may appear, the anti-Congress, anti-Rajiv to be precise, sentiment is fairly well matched by the anti-BJP sentiment among the same aggressively articulate English-speaking section of the intelligentsia. If it accuses Rajiv Gandhi of being personally corrupt, it holds the Bharatiya Janata Party guilty of Hindu chauvinism, communalism and, indeed, of inciting communal passions and thereby provoking riots. Together these two sentiments are blocking a cool, clear and dispassionate analysis of the national scene. Or at least so it seems to me.
As I see things, broadly, three choices are open to the Indian people as they get ready to exercise their franchise on November 22 and 24 – a measure of political stability, the possibility of the beginning of a new orientation in the political order and confusion. Not to keep you guessing, let me add at this early stage that I equate stability essentially with the Congress, the possibility of a new orientation with the BJP and confusion with the Janata Dal and the so-called National Front.
Surely the first point does not need much elaboration. There still exists a broad consensus that despite all its failings and weaknesses, the Congress party alone is in a position to provide a stable government at the Centre provided, of course, it secures a majority in the Lok Sabha. To say this is not to ignore either Rajiv Gandhi’s personal vulnerability on the Bofors payoff issue, or the possibility, though, on the face of it, rather remote, that a small majority in the Lower House of Parliament may be followed by loss of some Hindi-speaking states. The proposition I am advancing is essentially a negative one. Which is that, as things stand today, no other party or combination can at all promise a reasonable measure of political stability in New Delhi.
This last proposition stands self-proven in the light of the state of opposition “Unity”. V.P. Singh has behaved as if he is the successor to Chaudhuri Charan Singh, on the one hand, and leader of the long defunct Socialist Forum in the Congress, on the other. Thus he has sought to build on the Chaudhuri’s old constituency of the “other backward castes”, keep a distance between himself and the BJP and play to the CPI-CPM’s tune on the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri mosque issue. He has, of course, not been in a position to prevent the state units of the Janata Dal from making deals with the BJP; perhaps he has not even been so inclined. But that can only minimise the damage; it cannot undo the damage. In effect, the Janata Dal has thrown away the opportunity, or at least the possibility, of transforming the atmosphere in the country which an open alliance which the BJP, in my opinion, offered it.
V.P. Singh and his aides can argue that such a strategy on their part would have attracted the twin risks of alienating the Muslim vote (11-12 per cent) and of pushing the two Communist parties and their allies closer to the Congress. Indeed, it is a safe bet that they have been guided primarily by these considerations of realpolitik. But that would only show how divorced they are from the reality.
Anyone who knows anything about the psyche of the Indian Muslims would know that when it comes to the crunch, they would not give up the Congress umbrella they have lived under fairly comfortably for over four decades in favour of an unknown entity and leader, unless they conclude that the Congress would, in any case, lose the election. In such an eventuality, they would cross over to the winning party, without much compunction, provided one is in sight, for the simple reason that their first concern is their own security and political order because, for them, the two are interlinked. Like other sections of society, the Muslims certainly want to improve their bargaining position and status in the country’s political life. But they are on the whole a conservative lot and are not inclined to engage in adventures.
Only once in the election to the Lok Sabha in March 1977 did an overwhelming majority of the Muslims in north India vote against the Congress. Then they were furious over the forcible sterilisation programme, headed in all but name by Sanjay Gandhi, which incidentally they alone had openly resisted with determination. It also seems to me that they realised, even if only instinctively, that restoration of the democratic order under the Janata Party was best suited to them. But all that notwithstanding, as the wind began to blow against the Janata, the Muslims began to trail back to the Congress. The fact was visible in the elections to various state legislatures just three months later in June 1977 in 1980, though their tormentor, Sanjay Gandhi, had in the meantime greatly strengthened his position in the Congress leadership so much so that he was publicly acknowledged as Indira Gandhi’s only possible successor.
As for the Communist parties, they would have found it extremely difficult to jettison their anti-Rajiv campaign and make common cause with him. And even if they were willing to make the kind of somersault for which they have been known in the past, Rajiv Gandhi would have been hard put to it to accommodate them. He could not possibly have trusted them and at the same time risked alienating a lot of Congressmen, businessmen and his Western supporters. Above all, he could not have adopted, as the Communists would have expected him to adopt, a raucous anti-Hindu attitude on the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri mosque issue and thrown what prospect he commanded of retaining sufficient support among them to be able to win.
The Communists apparently continue to enjoy support in their old strongholds on account of a number of domestic factors, the near total disarray in the Congress party in West Bengal and the religious-caste divides in Kerala, for instance. But in ideological terms, they are wholly bankrupt and cannot offer a blueprint for future India. Rajiv Gandhi could not have regarded them as valuable partners even if his orientation was not totally opposed to theirs, which happens to be the case.
In the circumstances, V.P. Singh did not need much political courage to resist the Communist pressure. By yielding to it, he has demonstrated that he lacks the minimum daring necessary in a leader who looks upon himself as a future Prime Minister of India. By contrast, Rajiv Gandhi has shown himself to be man of great courage, his decision to seek election from Amethi alone being the latest evidence of it. As it happens, he has also challenged V.P. Singh to a one-to-one combat in that constituency.
Not to mince words, I do not entertain the slightest doubt that defeat for the Congress would lead to political instability because, in my view, the Janata Dal and the even more vague entity called the National Front are just not in a position to step into its place and they cannot produce a long-term and stable alliance with the others. They have undermined that possibility at the very start. This is clinically neutral analysis and not special pleading for the Congress and Rajiv.
I am aware that I run against the widespread sentiment among my readers when I suggest that the BJP holds the possibility, though only just the possibility, of initiating a process whereby the Indian political order, now in dire straits, may hopefully undergo a reorientation along healthier and more promising lines, in case it secures a meaningful representation in the Lok Sabha and if, unlike in 1977-79, its leadership plays its cards with skill. But this awareness on my part is coupled with the conviction that this is the central issue before the Indian electorate.
The issue is complex and calls for a lengthier statement than space permits in this piece. So I shall return to it soon. Today I can only lay the groundwork. In this regard I shall say that to centre the proposed discussion on the current Ramjanambhoomi-Babri mosque controversy is to submerge it into utter confusion and render it meaningless. Indeed, I hold this to be equally true in respect of the origins of the RSS, mother organisation of the Jana Singh of which the BJP is an incarnation. The RSS was born out of, and grew to maturity in, the psychology of defeat; and it remains a victim of that psychology. In the deepest sense, the campaign to restore the Rama temple, if indeed one existed at the present site of the Babri mosque, is an expression of the same psychology. Self-confident communities on the march do not as a rule entertain the idea of undoing old injustices and humiliations, especially at the hands of fellow citizens.
It is without doubt a great pity that a significant section of the Hindus should be looking for a symbolic vindication of their honour more than two centuries after the virtual end of the Moghul rule and four decades after the attainment of Independence. But it does no great credit to those who condemn this search as a great assault on Indian nationhood and demand that it be so treated by the government. Many of these spokesmen of “secular nationalism” would, of course, be only too glad if Rajiv Gandhi was to take on the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the BJP, the RSS and their supporters and in the bargain destroy himself politically.
That, however, is another matter, though it might be added that they are not consciously guilty of duplicity and hypocrisy. Many of them are trapped in borrowed and shop-worn clinches and are, therefore, unable to think in terms which are valid for India at this stage in its history. Once a while they speak of the great Indian civilisation. But more often than not, they behave as if, in Mao Zedong’s infamous words in respect of his country, India is an empty slate on which they can write anything they have dutifully learnt from their Western teachers. At the heart of it all is the very definition of Indian nationalism.
Sunday Mail, 29 October 1989