The Muslim voter in North India, especially in the heartland of Indian Islam in Uttar Pradesh, confronts a dilemma the like of which he has perhaps not faced since Partition. The reasons, on the face of it, are obvious. In reality, these need to be probed carefully.
As Muslims hold the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) responsible for riots in the past one year or so, it is widely assumed that they are particularly apprehensive about their security in a political environment dominated by these organisations. There is an element of truth in this proposition. But it should not be blown out of proportion.
Muslims, as a group, can cope with violence, regardless of whether or not they are the first to start a trouble. Surely, if avoidance of violence was their first and foremost concern, they would have sought, or at least thought of seeking, accommodation with the BJP. For they must know that the BJP in power would be best placed to contain the allegedly anti-Muslim bias of the armed constabulary and that it would feel obliged to do so in its own interest.
Similarly, while there cannot be any doubt that Muslims are strongly opposed to the BJP on account of its demand for a common civil code and its support for the Ram temple the VHP is determined to build at the Janambhoomi site in Ayodhya, these too may not constitute the heart of the matter.
The BJP’s stand on these issues has not changed since the last poll in 1989. It favoured a uniform civil code, construction of the Ram temple and shifting of the Babri Masjid from the Janambhoomi site even then. But Muslims were not all that hostile to it. So it is relevant to ask: what has changed since?
The answer must be that instead of ending up as a subordinate ally of the Janata Dal in office, the BJP has emerged as potentially, if not yet in reality, the most powerful and durable factor in Indian politics. This is what, in my assessment, truly alarms Muslims.
Aggressive Hinduism, ready to take to violence in offence or self-defence, must inevitably worry Muslims. But it is the quiet self-confident face of Hinduism, as represented currently, above all, by Lal Krishan Advani, that alarms them. Advani is not all that different from Atal Bihari Vajpayee in respect of the goal. For Advani is as sensitive to the need to win the confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of Muslims in the interest of orderly progress as Vajpayee. Unlike Vajpayee, however, Advani is willing to wait till Muslims too are prepared to walk at least one-quarter of the distance to a meeting point.
The current rise in the appeal and status of the BJP is doubtless the result of recent developments – disarray in the Congress under Rajiv Gandhi, its loss of office in 1989, the ineptitude and undependability of V.P. Singh as Prime Minister and the sweep of the VHP movement on the Ramjanambhoomi question, for instance. But at a deeper level, a long-term movement accounts for it.
Despite repeated setbacks, the process of Hindu self-renewal and self-affirmation has been on since the latter part of the 18th century when western orientalists discovered close affinities between Sanskrit and leading Europe languages such as Latin, Greek, German and Irish and Sir William Jones proclaimed Sanskrit to be the most perfect of them all. This process has inevitably sought political expression in various forms so much so that the history of India since 1885, when the Indian National Congress was established, can make best sense if it is viewed in that light.
No similar process has been in evidence among Indian Muslims since the battle of Plassey in 1757. The ghetto psychology was in evidence among them at the height of Moghul power, as would be evident on a close scrutiny of the activities of Syed Ahmed Sirhindi in the reigns of Akbar (towards the end of it) and Jahangir. The same psychology was reflected in the writings of Shah Walliullah and his successors in the 18th century and its grip has not eased since. Viewed in this perspective, the demand for Pakistan, however aggressively and violently pursued, would be seen as a self-chosen form of roll-back and self-containment.
To appreciate the logic behind these wholly different Hindu and Muslim responses to the British Raj, it is necessary to distinguish between the Raj as a political-economic-military power and an expression and instrument of western civilisation. Thus, while the Raj as a power could and indeed did tilt in favour of Muslims, as a community, however, they could not come to terms with it as a civilisation.
Hindus, on the other hand, could in course of time subsume it. While nothing in it clashed with theirs except in a superficial sense, western civilisation, even at the height of its power and glory, lacked our oceanic capaciousness and catholicity. Western scholars have expressed alarm at what they call Hindu ‘inclusivism’ and confidence in the self-sufficiency and superiority of their ancient heritage.
Similarly, it is necessary to pay attention to the consequences of the disarming of the Indian peasantry from 1818 to 1858 for the Hindu-Muslim power equation. As Muslims had relied primarily on the sword as the source of their power, and Hindus had other skills to fall back upon, the new situation could not but favour Hindus. They, for example, had retained control on the economy and revenue administration even under the Moghuls.
To cut a long story short, the India that emerged independent in 1947 had to be Hindu India not so much because it was predominantly Hindu in terms of population (which would have been the case even without Partition) as because Hindu power was no longer open to challenge which it would have been in the absence of Partition. But this reality could not be so defined not only because the Congress leadership was not trained to think in terms of civilisational contests but also because the shock of vivisection of Mother India was too great for most Hindus to allow them to realise that they had reached an important milestone on the road to recovery and reassertion.
The obvious connection between the stance of the leadership and the popular mood at the time of independence is not generally appreciated. This is rather surprising. After all, Nehru could not have survived for 17 long years in the office of Prime Minister with ease if the dominant sentiment among Hindus had not been generally favourable towards him and his broad policies.
Independent India saw herself and defined herself in western secular terms as a nation-state and not explicitly in civilisational terms as a Hindu Rashtra for a variety of reasons. The Muslim factor was only one and not critically important of them at the deeper level of Hindu psyche.
At that level, Hindus have never seen any basic conflict between their heritage and western science and technology and therefore the western emphasis on rationality. Facts in terms of the ease and speed with which so many of them took to western education and mores speak for themselves. It needs to be added, though, this has been a negative approach and its cost has been pretty heavy.
Till the eve of independence, Hindu thinkers emphasised the contrast between their spiritual heritage and western materialism as part of the process of recovering their self-esteem. But in reality, they needed to overcome the lopsidedness which an undue emphasis on piety at the cost of two of the central Hindu goals of Artha and Kama (prosperity and enjoyment) had produced in their lives in the period of their decline when they did not have a state of their own. They had to bury the maya (illusion) concept in its vulgar form in fact, if not the theory.
But just as the relationship with the West has taken an unhealthy form because, for want of a clear perspective, we have allowed ourselves to be manipulated and to become parasites on its intellectual resources, our search for economic well-being has for the same reason degenerated into rapacious greed with little concern for the good of the community as a whole. Our talk of non-alignment and our close ties with the Soviet Union have not saved us from pathetic dependence on the West and our talk of socialism has positively contributed to the moral chaos we witness around us.
History, however, always moves in a zig-zag fashion, the upward or the downward direction, depending on the basic health or ill-health of a community. In our case, it is not unreasonable to suggest that we are moving in the upward direction.
Sunday Mail, 12 May 1991