Not to speak of other capitals, New Delhi itself has not yet realised that recent events may have begun to transform the nature of the struggle in Jammu and Kashmir and to give it importance far beyond Indo-Pakistan relations.
At stake in Jammu and Kashmir may no longer be just the territorial integrity of the Indian Union, though that by itself must be a matter of the deepest concern for us. At stake there may also be the future of the proposed new world order, involving as it must containment of Muslim fundamentalism.
The issue is far more intractable than has been the case in respect of Marxism-Leninism or Communism. For, unlike the international Communist movement, Muslim fundamentalism does not possess a directing or even an inspirational centre or centres. But no one can possibly deny either the fact or the power of Muslim fundamentalism, or that it constitutes a challenge to the very spirit of the new world order which is sought to be built on the principles of pluralism, democracy, human rights, free inquiry and free flow of ideas and goods.
Since in most discussions of Muslim fundamentalism, the spotlight has been turned first on movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in West Asia and then on Iran since 1979, the possible importance of Pakistan in this regard has generally been disregarded. Late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s talk of an ‘Islamic bomb’ in the mid-seventies caused some concern in the West, especially in the United States. But this was superseded by a number of developments.
Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup in 1977. This was followed by the fall of the Shah and the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and finally by Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the same year. As a result of these and other developments, Pakistan, instead of being a source of anxiety in Washington, came to be regarded as a frontline state in the struggle against Soviet expansionism.
Even before the Soviet leadership decided to cut its losses in Afghanistan, there were clear indications that General Zia was thinking beyond Soviet withdrawal in terms of establishing a Muslim power centred on Pakistan and incorporating, to begin with, Afghanistan and Iran.
A few points may be noted in this connection. Zia stepped up the nuclear weapons programme despite strong and explicit US opposition. He channelised a large part of the money and weaponry he received from the US for Afghan Mujahideen forces to the Jamaat-e-Islami group as it had the closest links with the Pakistani establishment and could be depended upon to promote Islamabad’s long-term designs in Kabul if it were to come to power there. He and his men kept some of this money and weaponry for themselves as well. But that is another matter.
As it happened, the struggle against the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan coincided not only with a virulently anti-US campaign by Iran but also with the Iraq-Iran war in which American sympathies were openly on the side of Baghdad. Despite all this and his dependence on US aid, Zia refused to side with Saddam Hussein and criticise Ayatollah Khomeini. He remained steadfastly neutral.
Finally, while it may be less than fair to deny Zia’s religiosity, it is not inconceivable that his efforts to establish the so-called nizam-e-mustafa in Pakistan was connected with his grand design. Certainly this part of his programme cannot be explained solely in terms of domestic compulsions or calculations. The search for a Shariat-based Islamic order has not been, all that powerful in Pakistan.
It is not possible to say whether Zia was farsighted enough to foresee the possibility of the disintegration of the Soviet State and the emergence of autonomous Muslim-dominated republics in Soviet Central Asia. But it would not be surprising if it turns out that he was involved in CIA-led efforts to destabilise the regimes there. In any event, the disintegration of the Soviet State and Union cannot but strengthen the position of those in the Pak ruling establishment who favour pursuit of Zia’s plans for the region.
Simultaneously with the collapse of central authority in Moscow has come the Soviet agreement to stop military aid to President Najibullah’s Government in Kabul from January 1, next year. The US too will stop aid to the Mujahideen at the same time. But there is no symmetry in this agreement for the obvious reason that while there is no shortage of suppliers for the Mujahideen, Najibullah has no one to turn to if only because no government would like to risk US displeasure in the new international situation.
For all we know, the Mujahideen may not be able to come together; the differences between Teheran and Islamabad on the proposed set-up in Kabul may prove irreconcilable; and Najibullah may still survive to the surprise of his detractors and tormentors. It is also feasible that the predominantly Muslim republics in Central Asia may prefer to stay within the proposed Union of Sovereign States in view of the close integration of their economies with the rest of the former Soviet Union. But if the Zia plans are not assured of success, there can also be little doubt that it has become more realistic for Pakistan to cast itself in a bigger role than it has been possible for it to do so far.
It is not generally recognised that Pakistan is far better placed than Iran or any Arab country to promote Muslim revivalism. Unlike Iran, it is predominantly Sunni. Unlike the Arabs, it does not have fellow-Muslim governments to contend with. Unlike both, it has the bomb which can be of critical importance in the future. Imagine Saddam armed with nuclear weapons at the time of his occupation of Kuwait.
Above all, it has discovered a cheap method of establishing its Islamic credentials without alarming either the powerful West or the friendly Chinese who are apparently ready to replace the US as Pakistan’s principal source for supply of sophisticated weapons. All that it has to do is to keep training and arming Kashmiri terrorists and blowing out of all proportion the measures India has to take to fight them. In the latter task it has influential allies in India who are doing their best to discredit the country’s security forces.
In view of Islamabad’s failure to keep a majority of the people of original Pakistan within the state of Pakistan and the establishment by them of sovereign Bangladesh in 1971, it is absurd for it to speak in terms of ‘completing’ the ‘incomplete’ partition of 1947 by securing Kashmir. Indeed, Zia embarked on the mission to promote terrorism and secessionism first in undisputed Punjab. He extended it to Kashmir only when he was convinced that he could get away with his subversion in Punjab.
Zia was, of course, dead by the time terrorism and secessionism exploded in our face in Kashmir in January last year. But the groundwork had more or less been completed when he was still around and he was succeeded in the critical office of the Chief of the Army Staff by someone who shared his strategic outlook. General Mirza Aslam Beg was Zia’s true successor in that sense.
Gen. Beg was committed to the operation in Kashmir not just in the old context of the history of partition and of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over the state but also in the context of Zia’s ambition to establish and head a powerful Muslim power configuration. This point may not have been evident before the US-Iraq confrontation last year when the General spoke of the need for ‘strategic defiance’ of the US and left no one in doubt that his sympathies were engaged on the side of Saddam. Since then there has been no scope of confusion.
The essential aspect of the approach has survived Beg’s retirement. It is not an accident that President Ishaq Khan has recently paid a four-day visit to Teheran, the first by a Pakistani Head of State since the Islamic revolution in 1979, and discussed with Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s spiritual guide after Khomeini’s death, the need for cooperation among Muslim countries in the context of the proposed new world order.
Beg also spoke rather rashly and prematurely. Zia would have been far more discreet and circumspect. But the General did not articulate the concept of ‘strategic defiance’ on the spur of the moment in a fit of excitement. He had inherited it from the deceased master.
It is almost certain that like most other experts, Beg too expected the Iraqi armed forces to put up stiff resistance and impose heavy casualties on the US-led alliance forces. It is also possible that he was giving expression to an anti-American sentiment in Pakistan currently provoked by the suspension of US aid on the question of nuclear weapons. But these and other factors which may have influenced the General, cannot detract from importance of the formulation in the context of Pakistan’s ambitions as Zia formulated and sought to implement them.
Beg also spoke of Pakistan’s need for strategic depth in the event of a war with India. This was so much nonsense in view of the brief and limited nature of Indo-Pakistan conflicts in the past. But it could well be a cover for the proposed Muslim power arrangement centred on Pakistan.
It would be ridiculous to suggest that India serves a mere whipping boy for Pakistan. The hatred for India is deep rooted and widespread. But distrust and hatred of the US simmers just below the surface. America’s friendly attitude towards India has brought it into the open in the past and may do so again. The two hatreds then reinforce each other. Perhaps behind both lies the old commitment to fight the ‘Kaffir’.
Other than Israel, Pakistan is the only state which has been built on religious ideology. And its is not a case of a people suffering persecution, culminating in the infamous holocaust, wanting legitimately to buy a measure of security by carving a state of their own. The ideology was conceived in a spirit of aggression and is now being implemented with greater aggressiveness than ever before. India is the immediate victim but the commitment is inherently much wider. Ideologies do not recognise boundaries. Only traditions do. That is one reason why India at best reacts, and that too defensively.
Sunday Mail, 22 September 1991